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ABSTRACT
Reflection as Praxis: An Exegesis of the Work of Jurgen Habermas and
a Consideration of the Implications of His Thought for a Radically-
Motivated Education.
May 1983
Deborah Anne McIntyre
B.A., University of New England
B.Soc.Stud. (Hons), University of Sydney
M.Ed., University of Massachusetts
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Susan Campbell
The work of Jurgen Habermas, a contemporary German
Marxist philosopher and social theorist, is only recently becoming
more available in the English speaking world. This dissertation has
two main aims, the first being to contribute to the dissemination of
his thought. The first three chapters present a basically
chronological account of his work, focussing particularly on his
efforts tc develop an epistemological basis for critical theory, to
analyze the crisis potential of late capitalism, and, in line with his
theorv of social evolution, to examine the possibilities for movement
to a more highly developed social formation.
Throughout his work, Habermas has struggled to resolve the
theory/praxis dilemma which has haunted Marxist thought. This prompts
the second major aim of the dissertation, to develop a theory of
education based on Habermas' work. This is undertaken in an effort
first to consider the possibilities contained in Habermas' work for
the generation of a political praxis, and second to provide a
perspective from which to reflect back on the theory itself.
Within the framework of the dissertation, only the contours
of a radically-motivated education could be articulated. It is
argued that an education based on Habermas' work would take
'reflexive i ntersubject i ve activity' as its central image, and would
be concerned to develop a 'rational identity' in its students,
preliminary to their collective participation in a 'fully rational
society '
.
It is concluded that while, in general, Habermas offers
substantial direction for the development of praxis, there are some
persistently troubling features of his work, particularly with regard
to his communication theory. Given the centrality of this aspect of
his theory to Habermas' attempt to generate normative principles for
a transition to a higher form of social organization, his efforts
seem to falter at precisely this point.
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INTRODUCTION
According to George Lichtheim, the work of Jurgen Habermas
constitutes "the most impressive body of philosophy and sociology to
have come out of Central Europe during the 1960's" 1
. Habermas'
encyclopaedic knowledge (drawing on philosophy, sociology, economics,
and linguistics), together with the originality and ambitiousness of
his work, have established him as one of the most influential thinkers
in contemporary Germany. Yet his work is barely known in, much less
impress itself on, the Anglo-American world.
There is however, an embryonic interest in his thought in
this country, stimulated, at least in part, by the recent translation
and publication of some of his major works. There are problems with
its dissemination and reception, however, for Habermas writes in an
enormously complex fashion (a complexity which is only compounded in
translation), and because his work embraces themes from a wide range
of disciplines. This dissertation will seek to render his thought
more accessible.
A full appreciation of the theoretical contributions of
Jurgen Habermas necessitates an historical perspective. He is
associated with, and is currently the major representative of, a group
1 Quoted in Martin Jay, "Some Recent Developments in Critical Theory."
Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Number k, 197^> P* 29.
2of Marxist scholars known as the Frankfurt School (the name reflects
the site of the group's formation - Frankfurt-am-Main, in what is now
West Germany); its organizational form was the Institut for
Soz i al forschung (Institute for Social Research), set up in 1923,
independently endowed, and committed to the re-examination and re-
formulation - in the light of historical circumstances - of Marxist
theory. Under the directorship of Max Horkheimer, the Institute
attracted a group of gifted young intellectuals into its membership -
Erich Fromm, Leo Lowenthal
,
Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, and
others. 2
The Nazi ascendancy in Germany forced the group's relocation,
in 1933, to Columbia University in New York City. Despite the
difficulties attendant on such an emigration, the group continued to
function, producing the Journal which had already established its
reputation in German intellectual circles. (That it continued to
publish in German rather than in translation no doubt contributed to
the School's subsequent lack of impact on American social theory.)
In 1950, the German government invited the School to return to Frankfurt
- Herbert Marcuse was one of the few who declined - where it has
exerted a steadily growing influence on the post-war generation of
students, and on the broader intellectual scene. That influence
remains unabated, if controversial, today.
See Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination. Boston, Massachusetts.
Little, Brown and Company, 1973-
2
3While thoroughly grounded in Marxist theory, members of the
Frankfurt School sought to develop and extend that theory in the light
of changing historical circumstances. The demise of working-class
movements throughout Europe, together with the emergence of Facism,
had seriously jeopardized the revolutionary possibilities which Marx
had foreshadowed; thus confronted, the School saw the necessity for a
re-evaluation of the original theory in order that these developments
might be further illuminated and, if possible, overcome.
Their investigations transcended the familiary categories of
Marxist thought. Convinced that economic structures no longer held
the exclusive key to a thorough-going social and political
critique,
members of the School moved to an analysis of supposedly ep i
phenomena 1
factors - personality development, the family and, in
particular, mass
culture - in an effort to locate the sources of ideology
and
mystification. As the investigation proceeded, however,
it became
increasingly clear that the 'culture industry' under
late capitalism
represented one of the most powerful of these
sources. Their
cons 1 us i on was the the individual was fast
becoming a completely
assimilated and social determined character,
this most graphical ly:
Marcuse has captured
4... this private space has been invaded and whittled down by
technological reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim
the entire individual ... The result is not adjustment but mimesis: an
immediate identification of the individual with his society and,
through it, with the social as a whole. 3
This process was complemented by the increasing dominance of
scientific, or instrumental, rationality, an idea of reason which
completely divorced fact from value, the empirical from the normative,
theory from practice. Under such a schema, only 'means' can be
rationally decided upon - 'ends', particularly at the level of the
goals and purposes of human activity, are inaccessible to reason.
The School came to understand the possibility of technological supremacy
as involving the institutionalization of domination, one that could be
justified in the name of rationality itself. Such a development
deprived the human race of the only basis on which it might work to
achieve a less oppressive, more rational society.
As a counterpoise, they sought to develop a dritical
rationality, one which asserted a fundamental connection between
knowledge and the possibility of human freedom. The hope was that
critical reason, through the potential it contained for the
identification and dissolution of oppressive social structures, was
capable of undermining the sc i ent i f i ca 1 1 y- 1 eg i t i mated rationality which
held increasing sway, not only over the operation of capitalist society,
3 Herbert Marcuse, One~D i mens i ona 1 Man .
Press, 1964, p. 10
Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon
5but equally over the consciousness of its members.
Both targets of the Frankfurt School critique redounded on
the possibilities for the development of revolutionary praxis.
Insofar as the individual was increasingly manipulated and controlled
by the wider culture, and to the extent that technological reason
inserted itself into the consciousness of human beings, the Frankfurt
School was progressively forced to conclude that the possibilities for
transcending these cultural and social constraints were extremely
limited. Their precise articulation of the way in which the
individual psyche interiorized the culture seemed to contain an immanent
conclusion: the inevitable disappearance of an historical subject
capable of engaging in revolutionary struggle.
The Frankfurt School had stressed the importance of praxis
throughout its work, and particularly, its vital relation to theory.
During the later years of its existence, however (and especially in the
1 960 1 s ) , the realization that critical theory could offer few guidelines
for praxis grew. The paradox was painfully apparent during the student
demonstrations in Germany - the School was angrily condemned for its
failure to provide more coherent theoretical structures for the
development of revolutionary action. Members of the School (many of
whom perceived the student uprisings as irrational, given the lack of
social preconditions for revolution) took the position that theory was
the only possible form of praxis.
6Many commentators have understood this conclusion as revealing
the internal bankruptcy of critical theory. More recently, however,
note has been taken of what appears to be a re-assessment of the
position on the part of various members of the School. Andreas
Huyssen, for example, referring to a late article of Adorno's -
"Culture Industry Re-considered" - discerns a position which, while it
continues to understand the culture industry as a 'deception' of the
mass of people, also holds out the possibility of a transcendence of
that deception. 4 Consider the following paragraph:
The culture industry ... impedes the development of autonomous
independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves.
These, however, would be the pre-condition for a democratic society
which needs adults who have come of age in order to sustain itself and
develop
.
5
From this vantage-point, the issue becomes one of
investigating the limits of the culture industry's potential "as a
means of fettering consciousness" 6 . What is crucial is a shift of
emphasis - from the explication of the mechanisms of mimesis to an
articulation of the extent to which cultural integration of psychic
needs has not been successful. It is in this gap that the potential
for praxis is to be found.
4 Andreas Huyssen, "Introduction to Adorno", New German Critique ,
Number 6, Fall 1 97 5 » P* 10.
5 Theodor Adorno, "Culture Industry Reconsidered", New German Cr i t i que ,
Number 6, Fall 1975, PP* 18-19*
6 ibid.
7Habermas' contribution derives from his attempt to develop and
extend the earlier work of the Frankfurt School. He has sharpened the
discussion of instrumental reason by seeking to explicate with greater
precision the alternative rationality - one directly applicable to the
formulation of 'ends' - which figured in their work. In so doing, he
has gone beyond other members of the School in an effort to develop an
epistemological base not only for normative ('practical') reason, but
also for critical theory itself.
Out of this work has evolved a fresh attempt to confront the
theory/praxis issue, and this aspect of his thought is a major concern
of the dissertation. In brief, Habermas' explication of a practical
rationality leads him to a focus on the centrality of communication
for human society and the possibility of an effective political practice
which derives from it. The development of this perspective
constitutes Habermas' major innovation vis-a-vis the remainder of the
Frankfurt School. Shapiro expresses it this way:
By locating the conditions of rationality in the social
structures of language use, Habermas moves the locus of rationality from
the autonomous subject to subjects in interaction. Rationality is a
property not of individuals per se, but rather of structure of
undistorted communication. In this notion, Habermas has overcome the
ambiguous plight of the subject in critical theory. If capitalistic
technological society weakens the autonomy and rationality of the
subject, it is not through the domination of the individual by the
apparatus but through technological rationality supplanting a
describable rationality of communication.
7
Jeremy Shapiro, "The Critical Theory of Frankfurt", Times Literary
Supplement
,
*4th October 197^, P* 1095-
7
8Praxis is no longer an issue of a disappearing subject, but
rather of repressed communicative activity. It is here that Habermas
perceives the target of a practically-oriented critical theory: to
raise, through reflection undertaken in interaction, that submerged
intersubjectivity. It is only through the recapture of lost sociality
that men and women will recognize themselves as both the products and
potential shapers of history. This, together with the flowering of a
practical rationality, form the touchstones for the possibility of a
'fully rational society.'
There is great controversy about whether or not Habermas
succeeds in his ambitious endeavour - but few question the fact that
Habermas' work is both brilliant and provocative. This, and the fact
that Habermas' work constitutes some 'rapprochement' of German
Idealism with the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, make timely
the growing awareness of his thought in this country. This
dissertation has several aims:
1. To contribute to the general dissemination of his thought.
As was indicated above, there is a growing literature (mostly
in the form of articles) commenting on his work; but the
intrinsic complexity of that work, together with the fact that
it assumes an acquai ntance wi th a broad philosophical and
sociological background, continue to limit general
accessibility. The dissertation aims to broaden that access.
92. To consider the major critiques that have been offered of the
central themes of his work - the theories of knowledge-
constitutive interests, communication, and social evolution -
and, on this basis, to contribute to the discussion about the
potential contained in the theory for confronting the issue of
praxis. While this has been one of the major points of focus
in the literature, few attempts have been made to draw out the
practical implications of his thought as a way to reflect back
on its potential for praxis. This leads to the third aim of
the dissertation.
3. To develop a theory of education based on Habermas' work.
There are three considerations here:
a) A Habermasian theory of education, radical in aim and
content, will contribute to the body of thought known as
philosophy of education. The significance of that
contribution will be considered according to the theory's
ability to (1) extend the critique of education which emerged
so dramatically in the late sixties and early seventies; (2)
shed light on the apparent faltering of that critique in the
past few years; and (3) further the search for a genuinely
radical education.
b) It will provide a mechanism by which to consider the
possibilities contained within Habermas' work for the
generation of a political praxis.
10
c) Because there are numerous implications for education
throughout his work (both explicit and implicit), a
systematic attempt to draw them out and constitute them as a
theory will provide a perspective from which to reflect back
on the theory itself.
The plan of the dissertation follows from its aims. The first
three chapters present the theory, following a broadly chronological
outline. The fourth chapter attempts to develop a framework for
considering a Habermas i an theory of education; it both comments and
builds on the critiques of education proferred in the sixties. The
final chapter outlines the rudiments of a theory of education based on
Habermas' work, and attempts an assessment of the work from that
perspective. The conclusion summarizes the thesis, and indicates
fruitful areas for further examination and research.
CHAPTER 1
THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE-CONSTITUTIVE INTERESTS
The Theory-Praxis Relationship
Habermas theoretical endeavor is of such ka 1 aedoscop i c dimensions
that any single way of characterizing it must ultimately be
restricting. The demands of a summary presentation, however,
necessitate some kind of perspective, and given the stated objectives
of the dissertation, the most fruitful theme would seem to be his
historically couched investigation of the relation has always been
crucial for the Frankfurt School, in that it determines the project
of any social or political theory. Habermas analyzes this
relationship on the level of epistemology: from this vantage point,
his work can be understood as a full-scale critique of the
supposedly logical distinctions between theory and action, description
and prescription, and the corresponding notion of a 'value-free'
sc i ence
.
This perspective can be amplified, and its parameters set by
considering Habermas' contrast between the classical and modern
conceptions of political philosophy. Classical politics, he asserts,
1 1
12
"seems hopelessly old-fashioned to us" 1
,
in which this is so:
and enumerates three ways
1. Politics was understood to be the doctrine of the qood
and just life ...
2. The old doctrine of politics referred exclusively to
"praxis" in the narrow sense of the Greeks. This had
nothing to do with "techne", the skillful production of
artifacts and the expert mastery of objectified tasks.
In the final instance, politics was always directed
towards the formation and cultivation of character; it
proceeded pedagog i ca 1
1 y and not technically
3. Aristotle emphasizes that politics, and practical
philosophy in general, cannot be compared in its claim
to knowledge with a rigorous science ... 2
This was a philosophy thoroughly oriented to the construction
of a state (the polis) which embraced an ethical inperative. Such
a community, dependent on the active participation of its citizens in
all aspects of civil and legal governancy, "must be concerned for the
virtue of its citizens". 3 In this, it was to be distinguished from
a mere legal association facilitating commerce and exchange.
The transformation from classical to modern political
philosophy involves the exact loss of this distinction. Modern
political theory takes its form increasingly from the dictates of
1 Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice
,
Boston: Beacon Press, 1971 P- M
2 ibid, p. k2.
3 ibid, p. ^7
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exper i menta
1
with the old
out 1 i nes the
science, and has "little more than the name in common
politics". 4 In the following quotation, Habermas
shift he perceives to have occurred.
First, the claim of scientifically grounded social
philosophy aims at establishing once and for all the conditions for
the correct order of the state and society as such. Its assertions
are to be valid independently of place, time, and circumstances, are
to permit an enduring foundation for communal life, regardless of the
historical situation. Second, the translation of knowledge into
practice, the appl ication, is a technical problem. With a knowledge
of the general conditions for a correct order of the state and of
society, practical prudent action of human beings toward each other
is no longer required, but what is required instead is the correctly
calculated generation of rules, relationships, and institutions.
Third, human behavior is therefore to be considered only as the
material for science. The engineers of the correct order can
disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse and confine
themselves to the construction of conditions under which human beings,
just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a
calculable manner. This separation of morality from politics
replaces instruction in leading a good and just life with making
possible a life of well-being within a correctly instituted order. 5
In other words, theory no longer contains a normative
imperative. It can secure the conditions of survival, but makes no
pronouncements as to the quality of life that ought to be lived by
the members of the society. This is certainly the tradition out of
which modern social and political thought has evolved. However, as
Habermas goes on to point out, the demands of a highly industrialized
society have further affected the relationship between morality and
4 ibid
, p. *4l .
5 ibid, p . ^3
•
Hi
politics. The recent burgeoning of scientific and technical
knowledge allow for greatly expanded control over both the natural
environment and the organization of social relations; and within
this matrix, normative issues, once circumscribed, are increasingly
subsumed under the category of technical problems amenable to
technical solutions. Decisions "relevant to the praxis of life" 6
are increasingly removed from the sphere of public discussion and
consideration, and rendered instead subject to the demands of
efficiency and ease of administration. To underscore this, Habermas
alludes to the fact that, at this point in history the distinction
between 'technical' and 'practical', so fundamental to the Greeks, is
barely discernible. Theory, as a productive force of industrial
development, "changes the basis of human life, but it no longer
reaches out critically beyond this basis to raise life itself, for
the sake of life, to another level". 7
Twentieth century citizens no longer possess collective
practical control over the conduct of their lives. While Habermas
does not seek a return to the days of the Greek polis, he does find
the contrast instructive. The principle of the 'public sphere' (a
situation in which citizens come together, under conditions of free
b ibid
, p. 266.
ibid. p. 255.7
15
speech and lack of privilege, to
decide upon the conduct of their
remains a continuing and informi
reflect
1 i ves)
,
ng theme
on, discuss, and rationally
prefigured in the polis,
throughout his work.
It is aga i ns
t
relation of theory and
The parameters of that
quotat i on
:
this background of the historically changing
action that Habermas undertakes his analysis,
investigation are made explicit in this
... How can the promise of practical politics - namel
providing practical orientation about which is right and just
situation - be redeemed without relinquishing, on the one hand
rigor of scientific knowledge, which modern social philosophy
contrast to the practical philosophy of classicism? And, on
how can the promise of social philosophy, to furnish an analys
interrelationships of social life, be redeemed without relinqu
the practical orientation of classical politics? 8
y, of
in a given
,
the
demands in
the other,
is of the
i shi ng
8 ibid, p . kk
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The Knowledge-Constitutive Interests
The Critique of Scientism
. It is the gradual collapse of the
distinction between the technical and the practical which Habermas
investigates in his first major publication Knowledge and Human
I nterests . The focus of inquiry is the conditions which make
possible the attainment of valid knowledge: this is in an effort
to critique what Habermas refers to as the current 'scientific self-
understanding 1 of modern science. "Scientism means science's
belief in itself: i.e. the conviction that we can no longer
understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must
identify knowledge with science ." 9
Initially, modern science was not accorded this status.
While considered the clearest model for the attainment of knowledge,
it was certainly not thought of as the only form of genuine knowledge.
With the rise of positivism, however, modern science began to claim
exclusive validity: knowledge became "implicitly defined by the
achievement of the sciences ". 10 Inquiry into the conditions of
possible knowledge was rendered meaningless except insofar as it
concerned itself with the principles of scientific method. The
theory of knowledge metamorphosed into the philosophy of science.
9 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests . Boston,
Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1971 , P-
10 ibid, p. 67.
17
Given such hegemony, any other claim to the status of genuine
knowledge - whether it be from theology, philosophy, sociology,
psychology, or even tradition - could be declared void, variously
labelled conjecture, fantasy, dogma and so forth; hence, the scramble
on the part of the so-called 'social' sciences to emulate their more
respectable counterparts. Without the scientific imprimatur, all
other contenders are relegated to the position of suppliant, a
"knocker at the iron gate" 11 before the castle of the Empirical Wizard.
The scientific monopoly of knowledge has specific
implications for the relation between the technical and the practical
(and, consequently, for the relationship of theory and action).
Empirical investigation produces technical knowledge which is then
applied in the interests of expanded control over nature and the more
effective functioning of society. Practical (that is, normative and
moral) issues, if they cannot be formulated as technical questions, do
not fall within the province of science, and therefore cannot be
considered 'rationally'. They are "reduced" to a question of values,
not to be judged on the basis of reason, but "simply decided upon, one
way or another". 12 As Max Horkheimer described it,
11 Judith Wright, "The Cedars", Penguin Book of Modern Australian
Poets . Sydney, Australia, 1 968
,
p. 223
12 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 265
18
... The acceptability of ideals, the criteria for our actions
and bel lefs, the leading principles of ethics and politics, all our
ultimate decisions are made to depend upon factors other than reason.
They are supposed to be matters of choice and predilection, and it hasbecome meaningless to speak of choice in making practical, moral or
esthetic decisions. 13
It would appear that, at least in science's self-understanding,
questions of theory and action, the technical and practical, are
rigidly separated. Habermas argues, however, that not only is this
different to the Aristotelean idea that these are distinct domains of
knowledge (insofar as the doman of 'praxis' is no longer considered
amenable to reason), but that science's claim to proscribe normative
issues is in fact suspect. " ... its underlying premise is the value
of empirical scientific theories, and this not simply hypothetically,
but normatively, that behaving in accordance with technical
recommendations is not only desirable but also 'rational' ". 14
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Habermas argues that science
does in fact make normative decisions, but under the guise of resolving
technical problems. The continued expansion of a highly
industrialized society requires increasing technical and administrative
control over the practical and normative aspects of social life.
Because such aspects have been declared inaccessible to reason,
13 Max Horkhaimer, Eel ipse of Reason . New York: Seabury Press, 1 97^
pp. 7"8
14 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 269
19
decisions about them are no longer made on the basis of a rational
consensus attained by the individuals affected; rather they are
appropriated in the name of technical control.
... When theory was still related to praxis in a genuine sense,
it conceived of society as a system of action by human beings, who
communicate through speech and thus must realize social intercourse
within the context of conscious communication
... (A) theory which
confused action with control is no longer capable of such a perspective.
It understands society as a nexus of behavioral models, for which
rationality is mediated solely by the understanding of soci o-techn i ca
1
controls, but not by a coherent total consciousness - not by precisely
that interested reason which can only attain practical power through
the minds of politically enlightened citizens. 15
It is this jettison of the practical for the sake of the
technical which inspires Habermas' investigation of the conditions
which make possible the attainment of valid knowledge. For if he can
establish that modern science's claim to represent the castellan of
such knowledge is ideological, that there are other equally legitimate
sources of knowledge, then there is a possibility of resurrecting a
rational knowledge which is also practical. Simultaneously, Habermas
wants to demonstrate an epistemological possibility for a cri tical
knowledge, for it i s on such a possibility that the success of his
critique of scientism depends. Without that epistemological
foundation, Habermas himself is threatened with being yet another
'knocker at the iron gate'.
1 5 ibid., p. 255
20
Jhe Conditions of 'Valid' Knowledge
. Scientism starts with 'the
facts'; it pays no attention to how those facts are constituted. It
is at this level, that of the conditions under which knowledge is
constituted, that Habermas focuses his attention. Such an inquiry
proceeds via a process of reflection
,
a process which, according to
Habermas, positivism disavows, presumably because its results would
challenge the assumption that empirically garnered knowledge is the
only form of valid knowledge.
The notion of reflection is of fundamental importance to
Habermas' investigation, and as the meaning of the German
' ref lektieren' differs slightly, but very significantly, from the
English understanding of 'reflection', it seems important to clarify
the term at this point. A translator's note from Knowledge and Human
I nterests is helpful in this regard:
... The difference between the German and the English usage of
'to reflect', 'reflection' are a source of difficulty in accurately
translating into English the present work ... In English, the word
'reflect' tends to mean aside from 'mirror', either 'bend back' or
'recurve' or_ the mental operation of reflecting oil something (albeit
the self) that is external to the act of reflection. In German usage,
particularly as developed by German Idealism ... the word 'reflect'
expresses the idea that the act in which the subject reflects ori
something is one in which the object of reflection itself recurves or
bends back in a way that reveals its true nature. The process through
which consciousness reflects back upon itself, insofar as it reveals
the constitution of consciousness and its objects, also dissolves the
naive or dogmatic view of subjects; thus they themselves are reflected
through consciousness. Accordingly, 'reflect' can be used transitively
in a cognitive context. 16
16 ibid, pp. 319*320
This nuance of meaning is quite difficult to grasp. The
difference lies, it seems in the relationship between the act of
21
reflection and the object of that reflection. In the English usage,
the object remains unaffected; it is accepted as already constituted.
In the German understanding of the term, on the other hand, it is
almost as if the object is 'activated' bu the process of reflection,
such that it reveals its history, the process of its constitution.
Whereas the former usage makes no separation between appearance and
essence, the latter considers the appearance of the object in direct
relation to its genesis. Only under these conditions could its
essence, its true nature, be uncovered. From this point of view,
an 'unreflected consciousness', for example, would be one which did
not question its 'givenness'. This is in clear opposition to a
consciousness which understands the possibility of a distorted
presentation (as occurs, for example, in the defense mechanism of
rational ization)
.
It is this latter form of 'reflection' in which Habermas
engages when he explores the conditions of possible knowledge.
Clearly, knowledge does not materialize out of nothing; it is
fashioned by human beings on the basis of their experience. It is
the particular manner in which we organize our experience that is the
focus of investigation for Habermas, for it is in that process that we
objectify reality, and thereby establish the framework within which
knowledge is constituted.
22
The essence of human experience is captured in the statement,
"Man is both a tool-making and symbolizing (or speaking) animal". 17
It is these two capacities which ensure the possibility of the
continued existence of the species: simply in order to survive, man
must appropriate and transform nature; similarly, he must, on the
basis of meaningful interaction with his fellow man, continually modify
and transmit the social structures in which he lives. These
transactions, with nature and with other human beings, (Habermas refers
to them as work and interaction
, respectively) must occur if the species
is to continue.
Habermas wants to argue that this anthropological framework
is simultaneously an epistemological one. In other words, the two
basic orientations of work and interaction also form the presuppositions
of our knowledge. Their fundamental character imposes a particular
organization on our experience, and consequently we objectify reality
subject to their demands. Knowledge is similarly constituted: it is
generated according to the necessity of establishing greater control
over nature, and to that of engaging in communication and interaction.
Habermas refers to these orientations as 'knowledge-constitutive
interests', a 'technical' and a 'practical' interest, respectively.
(He has, in fact, identified a third interest, that of the
Albrecht Wellmer, "Communication and Emanc i pat i on : Reflections on
the Linguistic Turn in Critical Theory", Stony Brook Studies in Phil -
osophy
,
Volume 1, 197**, p. 7*1
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'emancipatory' - its discussion will
subsection. See page 29 ).
be deferred to the following
Habermas describes
process of uncovering these
in a rather more formal fashion, the
knowledge-constitutive interests:
'
... I have let myself be guided by the problem posed by the
system of primitive terms (or the 'transcendental framework') within
which we organize our experience a priori and prior to all science, and
do so in such a manner that, of course, the formation of the scientific
object domains is also prejudiced by this. In the functional sphere
of instrumental action we encounter objects of the type of moving
bodies; here we experience things, events and conditions which are in
principle capable of being manipulated. In interaction (or at the
level of possible i ntersubj ect i ve communication), we encounter objects
of the type of speaking and acting subjects; here we experience
persons, utterances and conditions which, in principle, are structured
and to be understood symbolically. 18
The Technical and the Practical Interests . Elucidation of the
knowledge-constitutive interests can be furthered by examining them in
terms of several criteria: the interest itself; the particular type of
action associated with the interest; the kind of knowledge generated by
it; and the cluster of disciplines which yield that knowledge. The
table below summarizes the information. 19
18 Habermas, Theory and Practice
, pp. 7“8
Adapted from Gerard Radnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience
Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1973
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Interest Action Knowl edge D i sc
i
pi i nes
technical- work
cogn i t i ve
information natural and
technical sciences
practical- interaction
cogn i t i ve
i nterpretat i on hermeneutic and
cultural sciences
Techn i cal -Cogn i t i ve Interest. This is Habermas' designation for
the 'interest' which expresses the necessary quality of man's relation-
ship with nature. Man's survival depends on his ability either to
manipulate and control the environment, or to find ways of adapting
himself to its capricious bidding. The 'interest' generated in this
confrontation is that of improving the productive forces of society,
and thus of extending the power of technical control over nature: it
prefigures a situation of "human emancipation from material wants."
20
To achieve this, man must engage in labor, or work (more formally
referred to as instrumental or purposive-rational action), an activity
which is guided by technical information.
A successful transaction with the natural environment is
ultimately possible only on the basis of information which is
general izable and verifiable, i.e., empi r leal -anal yt ic
knowledge. It
is the end result of a procedure which includes
the construction of
theories, the deduction of law-like hypotheses
which can be tested,
operations of observation and measurement, and the
monitoring and
utilization of feedback. The cluster of
disciplines which gives rise
20 John Keane, "Habermas on Work and Interaction,"
New German
Critique, Number 6, Fall 1975, P* 88
.
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to this kind of knowledge is that which encompasses the natural and
technical sciences.
It is clear from the above that, while Habermas engages in a
meticulous critique of scientism, he does not intend thereby to
discredit the scientific endeavor itself, or the knowledge which it
generates. What he does want to insist upon is that the method-
ological rules which guide that endeavor, and the meaning of the pred-
ictions advanced by it (that is, their inherent technical
exploi tabi 1 i ty) , both refer to a specific aspect of reality, an
aspect deriving from the interest in increased technical control.
... Empirical-analytic sciences disclose reality insofar as it
appears within the behavioral system of instrumental action. In
accordance with their immanent meaning ... statements about this object
domain are thus designed for a specific context in which they can be
applied - that is, they grasp reality with regard to technical control
that, under specified conditions, is possible everywhere and at all
times. 21
Pract i ca 1 -Cogn i t i ve Interest . This denotes the second moment of
human activity which Habermas has disclosed: social life, and its
transmission via the process of encu 1 turat i on . Ordinary everyday
behavior, our ability to act and interact appropriately, depends on
a wide-ranging and reciprocally-established understanding. We have
to know how to interpret other people's behavior, and how to make our
own similarly intelligible. The 'interest' revealed here is in the
2 1 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 195
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maintenance, expansion and transmission of
such, it prefigures a situation of "mutual
social harmony". 22
that understanding and, as
consensus within constrained
The activity which reflects this interest is interaction (also
referred to as communicative action). For this, language is an
essential mediation, just as tools represent the mediation for labor.
It is through language that we can agree upon and institute the norms
which define reciprocal expectations about behavior (a process
Habermas refers to as establishing
' i ntersubject i ve understanding').
This points to an important difference between the rules which govern
the two sets of activity: whereas technical rules depend on
scientifical ly
-verifiable propositions, normative rules are contingent
upon i ntersubject i ve recognition.
The knowledge relevant to this domain of interaction is of an
interpretive kind. As characterized by Keane, it is concerned to
answer the question, "How can the social world be rendered intelligible
and meaningful to its interacting participants?" 23 In addition, it is
a knowledge which seeks to appropriate cultural and historical traditions
in such a way that they will inform attempts to fashion future modes of
social interaction. Habermas employs the category 'hermeneutic
sciences' to indicate the disciplies which furnish this kind of
knowledge
.
22 Keane, 1 oc . c i t
. ,
p. 88
2 3 ibid.
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According to Radnitzky, the term 'hermeneutics' was coined in
the early seventeenth century, and was used originally to refer to the
art of interpreting texts, especially those of a legal or religious
kind. Since then, hermeneutics has come to be associated with issues
of interpretation and meaning. Radnitzky characterizes these sciences
as
:
... making available the ends-in-view and intentions underlying
the actions of passed generations for the reflection and discussion in
which contemporaries try to reach an understanding of and an agreement
about possible objectives of action. 24
This is in express opposition to the current attempts on the
part of the social sciences to model themselves after the natural
sciences. Such a self-understanding, according to Habermas, "defends
sterilized knowledge against the reflected appropriation of active
traditions and locks up history in a museum". 25
Hermeneutic inquiry, then, discloses reality according to the
interest in preserving and expanding intersubjectivity. It its very
structure, it is an inquiry oriented towards achieving a consensus,
against a background of tradition about the possible aims and means of
act i on
.
24 Radnitzky, op. ci t
.
,
p. 201
25 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 316
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This analytic separation of instrumental and communicative
action represents the core of Habermas' critique of scientism. For
it is the loss of awareness of this distinction that has enabled
modern science to usurp the power of 'final arbiter' in the matter of
'valid' knowledge. Similarly, it has promoted the formulation of
action based on a technological imperative, with a corresponding
repudiation of any normative or practical imperative.
The isolation of a second, equally legitimate, form of
knowledge, a knowledge not gleaned through the methodology of modern
science, makes possible the erection of a bulwark against the onrush
of technology, and the resurrection of a 'practical politics' designed
to restore control over their lives to the men and women who live them.
It is important to note in this regard Habermas' insistence that the
analytic separation of technical and practical knowledge, work and
interaction, does not entail a functional separation: clearly the
dimensions are interrelated. Both activities contain the seeds of
human emancipation - from material want, and from constraint and
domination. At the same time, as Habermas demonstrates in his
discussion of modern science, the derivation of technical knowledge
depends ultimately on the "ground of intersubjectivity in which
investigators are always already situated" 26 - in other words,
instrumental action must always be understood as embedded in a
26 ibid., p. 137
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thoroughly interactional framework. Technical knowledge is indeed
indispensable to the development of the human race - it does not,
however, provide the 'telos' of that development. Habermas describes
that in the following:
... The goal is "providing a rational basis for the precepts
of civilization": in other words, an organization of social relations
according to the principle that the validity of every norm of
political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in
communication free from domination. 27
The Emancipatory Interest . It is in the striving towards the
attainment of such a goal that Habermas discerns the manifestation of
a third 1 knowl edge-const i tut i ve interest 1
,
the emancipatory-cognitive
interest. The two 'interests' just considered were discerned in
particular spheres of action, i .e. work and i ntereract i on
,
basic to
the continued existence of the human species. The emancipatory
interest is similarly situated in a 'transcendental' framework - the
medium of ordinary language.
... The human interest in autonomy andrespons b lity** is not
mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out
of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language.
Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us.
Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal
and unconstrained consensus. 28
27 ibid
.
,
p. 284
28 ibid
. ,
p. 314
* It is important to note that the phrase 'autonomy and responsibility
1
is a translation from the German word Mund i gke i
t
,
as is the phrase
'emancipation.' The literal meaning of the term is 'a legal coming-
of-age.
'
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This is an interest, then, concerned to enhance the autonomy of
individuals and to abolish social domination and repression; it aims
to identify, clarify, and finally dissolve the impediments to the
achievement of 'communication free from domination'.
Developments in the spheres of technical and practical
knowledge are not un i -d i rect i ona 1 : as Lenhardt has suggested, 29 it
is obvious at this point in history that technology, as well as
improving food production and extending medical knowledge, also
creates the conditions for warfare and ecological disaster.
Similarly, the development of pract i cal -moral knowledge has not
remained immune from distortion: social structures have historically
and variously produced "intolerance, pressures to conform,
mystification of the bases of power and inequality, outright deceit,
and pathological modes of communication". 30 It is this kind of
subterfuge which the emancipatory interest, for the sake of
establishing institutional structures which promote social and
political freedoms, seeks to expose.
The activity in which this 'interest' most consistently
manifests itself is reflection (especially as this was described
earlier). It is via this mechanism that human beings can come to
29 Christian K. Lenhardt, "Rise and Fall of Transcendental
Anthropology", Philosophy of Social Sciences , Volume 2, 1972, p. 239
3 o ibid.
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understand their own historical self-constitution, an understanding
which releases them from the 'hypostatized present', which enables
them to comprehend the ideological basis of the apparently 'natural'
and 'legitimate' forces which structure their lives. Such a
process can transform the 'unreflected consciousness', promoting new
perceptions and insights, and leading to the possibility of
appropriately changed behaviour.
Habermas refers to the disciplines which yield this knowledge
as 'critical social sciences', of which psychoanalysis is a paradigm.
While superficially similar to a process of hermeneutic inquiry,
psychoanalysis takes as its object domain a dimension considered
external to the focus of hermeneutics - that of systematic distortion.
Whereas hermeneutics explores the conscious intentions of its subjects,
psychoanalysis attends to internally produced distortion, seeking to
render its meaning transparent.
The significance of such 'critical social sciences' emerges
in Habermas' unique investigation of psychoanalysis and its
implications for social theory. He attempts to reconceptualize
psychoanalysis as a process of linguistic analysis (in other words,
he is presupposing that all experience, whether internal or
i ntersubject i ve
,
is, in principle, linguistically expressible),
a process which methodologically incorporates the experience of self-
reflection. From this perspective, symptoms, which are intra-
psychic expressions of a conflict between instinctual needs or wishes
32
and perceived social prohibitions against their expression, take the
form of a 'privatized language': the unacceptable needs are banished
(that is, repressed) from the realm of public communication. The
split-off symbol has not lost total contact with the public language,
but the 'grammatical connection' has gone underground. The 'grammar'
and 'syntax' of the privatized language can now be identified in
dream symbols and symptom formation. Through the dialogue
established between patient and analyst, the psychoanalytic method
seeks to have the symptom, the individual's private symbol,
reconstituted in the public language shared by both parties.
Not only is the meaning of the symptom obscure at a public
level, however, for it also remains oblique to the subject. The
language of the unconscious is as inaccessible to the ego as it is to
the outside observer. This means, however, that the ego continues
unaware of its formative role in the development of the symptom, and
its function in maintaining its split-off existence. It is this
dialogue in particular - that between the ego and the id - which
psychoanalysis seeks to institute (the process of sel f-ref lection)
.
The analyst functions less as an interpreter of the symptomatic
behaviour, and more as a teacher, one who "teaches the subject
to comprehend his own language". Certainly the analyst offers
interpretations in his struggle to help reconstruct the lost pieces
3 1 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 228
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of the patient's history; but, and this is a crucial aspect of Habermas
appropriation of Freud, the accuracy of that interpretation is not
completely determined "by what the patient says or how he behaves " 32
in response to it. The 'correctness' of the interpretation is
corroborated "only by the successful continuation of a self-
formative process, that is, by the completion of self-reflection". 33
Habermas quotes Freud in this regard:
I
... A plain "Yes" from a patient is by no means unambiguous.
It can indeed signify that he recognizes the correctness of the
construction that has been presented to him; but it can also be
meaningless, or can even deserve to be described as "hypocritical",
since it may be convenient for his resistance to make use of an
assent in such circumstances in order to prolong the concealment of a
truth that has not been discovered. The "Yes" has no value unless it
is followed by indirect confirmations, unless the patient, immediately
after his "Yes", produced new memories which complete and extend the
construction. Only in such an event do we consider that the "Yes"
has dealt completely with the subject under discussion. 34
So the patient has to be able to 'know and recognize 1 himself
in the interpretation offered. This points to a fundamental
difference between this kind of activity and the kind generated by
technical knowledge. The latter discovers causal connections which
form the base for efforts at increased control over the natural
environment. Analytic insight, on the other hand, directly affects
the causal connections themselves, ultimately dissolving them, and
3 2 ibid
.
,
p . 266
33 ibid .
34 ibid
.
,
p. 269
3*4
overcoming their disabling influences. Understanding those causal
connections simultaneously involves an explanatory power: the
motivations become transparent, and the entire symptom construct
attains communicability.
The representation of the 'emancipatory interest 1 in this
context is the interest in self-knowledge (Habermas calls it a
"passion for critique" 35 ), which arises out of the experience of
suffering, and which impels the patient, though never without
ambivalence, to seek and use therapeutic help in the first place.
Inserted within a broader societal framework, Habermas
argues, the psychoanalytic paradigm clarifies, on the one hand, the
interest in emancipation from social and political constraints and
the establishment of structures which will preserve that emancipation,
and, on the other, the obstacles to the attainment of that goal.
The crucial role of self-reflection in the dissolution of symptoms
is paralleled at this level by the role of a critique of ideology.
This discussion maps the contours of Habermas' attempt to establish
an epistemological foundation for critique, and for critical
theory
i n genera 1
.
From the Freudian point of view, libidinal and
aggressive
3 5 ibid.
,
p. 23*+
35
needs threaten the requirements of self-preservation. The ego,
attempting to mediate these conflicting demands, is joined in its
task by the superego, representing the intrapsychic form of an
external authority structure. This external authority, according
Freud, has an economic base. As he puts it,
to
economic
members
members
... The motive of human society is in the last resort an
one; since it does not possess enough provisions to keep
alive unless they work, it must restrict the number of its
and divert their energies from sexual activity to work. 36
i ts
The collective solution to the required instinctual
renunciation is the establishment of institutions: this framework
secures the organization and division of labor, and the distribution
of the goods produced. The stabilization of this institutional
framework is ensured through a system of social norms which operate
either as coercive measures (e.g., sanctions against breaking the laws),
or as a system of 'substitute-gratifications' which not only reconcile
individuals to their renunciations and offer some recompense, but also
come to serve as legitimations for the prevailing norms themselves -
they become "rationalizations of authority". 37 These "mental assets
of civilization", as Freud calls them, 38 include religions, value
systems, forms of art, and so forth.
q c Quoted in Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
,
p. 275
37 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
,
p. 279
3 8 Quoted in Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 279
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Given that the instinctual renunciation required varies
according to the conditions of economic scarcity, it is Habermas'
position that increased technological output should reciprocally
allow for decreased renunciation. From this perspective, the degree
of repression asked of individual members of the society is an
historically variable factor.
The degree of socially necessary repression can be measuredby the variable extent of the power of technical control over naturalprocesses. With the development of technology, the instutionalframework, which regulates the distribution of obligations and
rewards and stabilizes a power structure that maintains cultural
renunciation, can be loosened. 39
The class struggle can be understood in this context. At
the point at which a surplus of goods (i.e. more than is necessary
for the survival of the society) is produced, the society is faced
with deciding the mechanism and rationale of distributing that
surplus. Insofar as that distribution is organized according to a
class structure, then specific renunciations are required of one
class of the society. Simultaneously, the normative framework has to
be structured so that the class in question will accept those (now
unnecessary) restrictions, and, at the same time, accord the
existing relations of power their requisite legitimation.
3 9 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
,
p. 280.
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At this level of analysis, institutions can be comprehended as
a "power that has exchanged acute external force for the permanent
internal compulsion of distorted and self-limiting communication". 40
Similarly, the cultural traditions which cement the unnecessary
loyalty to an anachronistic institutional framework (insofar as
technical progress renders out-dated the extent of repression it
exacts) are the ideological foundations which continue to legitimate
an oppressive social structure. Self-reflection (on a societal
level) has the capacity to penetrate this ideological smoke-screen,
particularly at that point in time when further technological
advancements threaten to challenge the necessity of continued
restrictions. It can reveal the 'distorted communication structures'
on which the continuation of the particular set of power relations
depends
.
Habermas' identification of a knowledge- constitutive interest
in emancipation implies a changed relation of theory and practice, a
relation profoundly different from that generated, for example, by a
technical interest. Whereas the criteria of 'success' for empirical
sciences are already inherent in their hypotheses, the only criterion
of success for a critical science is successful emancipation.
Wellmer, for example, describes critical theory as being:
4 o ibid., p . 282
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ref,ective recognition of thoie whospeak and act. for it
,
and it can prove itself only in
successful social practice which erodes a fraction of actual
constraint.
Just as therapeutic help is only utilizable once a patient
has acknowledged both his suffering and his need for assistance, so
critical theory can only help promote a dissolution of oppressive
social structures if individuals recognize their social suffering,
its historical contingency, and their 'interest' in its eradication.
And similarly, just as the accuracy of the psychoanalytic
interpretation is determined finally by whether or not it elicits
further self-reflection on the part of the patient, so the 'truth'
of critical theory is established only by its capacity to initiate
a reflective process that results in a liberating praxis.
To this end, the critical social sciences are concerned to
"determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of
social action as such, and when they express ideologically frozen
relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed". 42
41 Albrecht Wellmer, The Critical Theory of Society . New York:
Seabury Press, 197^, P-
42 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 310
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The Critique of Marxism
Habermas' theory of knowledge-constitutive interests was
developed co-extensive with, and very much in relation to, his
critique of Marxism. This critique is one of the most controversial
aspects of his work; it was, and remains, a crucial piece of his
theoretical substructure, even though his specific concerns have
developed far beyond the category of 'interest' as such.
The emancipatory power of reflection is at once asserted and
denied in Marxist thought, according to Habermas; this ambiguity
can be traced to a basic categorical confusion in the theory, a
confusion deriving from Marx's assertion of the primacy of labor in
man's self-formative process.
The category of labor was central for Marx from the time of
his earliest writings. In opposition to Hegel, who conceived of man's
self-constitution as a spiritual activity, Marx invoked a thoroughly
materialist basis for man's development.
... Man is directly a natural being ... endowed with natural
powers of life - he is an act i ve natural being ... As a natural,
corporeal, sensuous, objective being, he is a suffering, conditioned,
and limited creature, like animals and plants ... To say that man is a
corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural
vigor is to say that he has real, sensuous objects as the objects of
his being or of his life, or that he can only express his life in real
sensuous objects. 43
43 Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 18A*4 . New
York: International Publishers, 1972 , p. 181
Marx wants to assert that the real world is a world of nature,
and that man constitutes himself through his interactional activity
with that world of nature. That activity, labor, is a "condition of
human existence that is independent of all forms of society, a
perpetual necessity of nature in order to mediate the material exchange
between man and nature, in other words, human life". 44
The way in which men produce their means of subsistence (i.e.,
the mode of production) simultaneously represents a particular mode of
life. Moreover, the forms and content of knowledge are directly
related to man's exchange with his natural environment:
... The fact is ... that definite individuals who are
productively active in a definite way enter into ... definite social
and political relations ... The production of ideas, of conceptions,
of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material
activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life.
Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this
stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour ... Morality,
religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding
forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of
independence. They have no history, no development; but men,
developing their material production and their material intercourse,
alter, along with this, their real existence, their thinking and the
products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness,
but consciousness by life. 45
It is here that the ambiguity to which Habermas wants to draw
44 Quoted in Habermas, Knowledge and Interests
,
p. 27
45 Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader . New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 1972
,
pp. 118 - 119 .
attention arises. By making all 'mental production' dependent on
"material production", by apparently denying consciousness any
independence, history, development, Marx has, according to Habermas,
committed a conceptual error which has profound, and sometimes
fatal, consequences for the subsequent interpretation and application
of his thought. This insistence on the pivotal role of labor
implies, through its own internal logic, the ultimate collapse of
vital distinctions: between instrumental and communicative action,
between technical and reflective knowledge, between science and
critique. It makes political emancipation finally dependent on
technological progress.
Habermas is here drawing out the implications of what he
considers a suppressed dimension, a "latent positivism" 46 in Marxist
thought. He is not suggesting that this represents the whole of
that thought, nor even its basic intent. In fact, for the most part,
Habermas argues, Marx's use of the term 'labor' had, as its referent,
the two elements of work (forces of production) and interaction (sets
of social relationships arising out of the activity of production).
Their dual importance to the development of the species was
certainly recognized. Clearly, too, Marx understood that
emancipation did not rest solely on developments in the technological
sphere - his numerous references to the need for a ' pract i ca 1 -cr i t i ca 1
activity', if revolution was to succeed, certainly attest to that.
He writes, for example, in The Civil War in France,
4 6 Wellmer, The Critical Theory of Society, pp. 67-119
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Habermas does not wish to deny Marx's seminal perception of
the fundamental character of man's relationship to nature, nor of its
status as the activating force of history. He says himself, "It is
the development of the forces of production that provide the impetus
to abolishing and surpassing a form of life that has been rigidified
and become an abstraction." *» But, to the extent that Marx takes
the activity generated in this engagement (that is, instrumental
activity) as paradigmatic for all forms of human activity, and
simultaneously, to the extent that he locates the source of all
knowledge and consciousness in that same productive activity, then the
crucial differences obtaining between instrumental, communicative,
and reflective activity are lost, and their specific individual
contributions to the development of the species obfuscated.
Particularly alarming, as far as Habermas is concerned, is that the
enormous potential contained in reflective activity (and the critique
of ideology thereby engendered) for assuming a motivating force for
change on its own account is summarily eliminated.
This conceptual ambiguity is reflected, for Habermas, in the
47 Tucker
,
op. c i
t
.
, p. 558
48 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 43-
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fact that in Marx's writings, two versions of the not ion that man
constitutes himself through labor can be discerned. One one hand,
"at the categorical level", 49 man's sel f-format i ve history is
construed as being mediated by productive activity only. On the
other, "at the level of (Marx's) material investigations", 50 man's
evolution is understood as occurring in two distinguishable, if
closely related, dimensions: productive activity and the structure
of social relationships. At this level, both dimensions are
considered fundamental to the movement of history.
This apparently small and subtle distinction of meaning has
troublesome consequences. The epistemological implications of the
reduction of reflective action to the level of instrumental action,
for example, are far~reaching: the natural sciences, in their turn,
become paradigmatic for science in general, and critique can be
assimilated, almost without trace. Habermas suggests that Marx was,
in fact, enamored of the scientific process, quoting him to the
effect that: "Natural science will eventually subsume the science of
man just as the science of man will subsume natural science: there
will be a single science." 51
Habermas, interpreting this as a "desire for a natural science
49 ibid. P- 52.
5 0 ibid, P- 53
5 1 ibid, P- A6
finds it "astonishing" 53
:
Of man",” shing"”: it represents a major and
crucial misunderstanding of the differences in objectives and
methods of inquiry between natural science and critique. To the
extent that a 'science of man' approaches the self-understanding of
a natural science, human beings become objects, to be viewed from
the same technical perspective as other objects of nature. Human
behavior becomes something to be observed, tested and rendered 'law-
I 1 ke ' * Its meaning and intention is dismissed in the name of rigor,
and re-conceptualized according to what can be measured.
The political implications of this reduction are no less
disturbing to Habermas. If society is understood as evolving via
the mediation of productive activity only, then emancipation must be
dependent for its realization on progress in that sphere. The
unlikelihood of such a correlation is clearly demonstrated in the
present historical situation - outstanding technological achievement
has not been matched by heightened freedoms for the general
population. In fact, if Habermas 1 analysis proves correct, progress
in the external realm is more likely to be accompanied by restriction
i n the internal .
Nevertheless, the conviction that human emancipation
52
5 3
ibid
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arrives' with the abolition of private property has given rise, as
Wellmer points out, to two, equally objectionable, conceptions of
socialist praxis: on one hand, the belief that the breakdown of
capitalism is inevitable (because of its own internal economic
contradictions), can legitimate a position that revolutionary activity
is unnecessary. On the other, it can legitimate a situation in which
a political elite can attempt to 'legislate' a socialist state into
existence without regard for, or participation by, the members of
that society. 54
Finally, this same epistemological blind-spot explains, for
Habermas, the faltering nature of twentieth century Marxism's efforts
to understand and confront the con tinually evolving structures of
capitalism. At least one of the major distinguishing characteristics
of advanced capitalism, as was argued earlier, is the increasingly
ideological role played by science and technology. Insofar as
Marxism collapses critique into science, it has no way to shed any
light on that development; accordingly, it cannot penetrate and
expose the 'rationality' of assimilating society's development to the
logic of scientific-technical progress; and finally, it has no
effective way to understand or protest the progressive de-politicization
of the public in the name of that 'rationality'. Before a
scientifically-legitimated society, a scientifically-formulated
54 Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation", 1 oc . c i t
.
, pp. 78-79
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Marxism must remain mute, lest its protest seem romantic and
'old-fash i oned 1 .
These sel f- 1 imi t i ng tendencies, immanent in Marxist thought,
can only be transcended, Habermas believes, by an explicit
reformulation of the notion of the self-constitution of the human
species, such that it combines both "self-generation through productive
activity and sel f-format i on through cr i t i ca 1 -revol ut i onary activity". 55
That reformulation is cogently articulated in the following quotation:
... While instrumental action corresponds to the constraint
of external nature and the development of the forces of production
determines the extent of technical control over natural forces,
communicative action stands in correspondence to the suppression of
man's own nature. The institutional framework determines the extent
of repression by the unreflected "natural" force of social dependence
and political power, which is rooted in prior history and tradition.
A society owes emancipation from the external forces of nature to
labor processes, that is, to the production of technically exploitable
knowledge ... Emancipation from the compulsion of internal nature
succeeds to the degree that institutions based on force are replaced
by an organization of social relations that is bound only to
communication free from domination. This does not occur directly
through productive activity, but rather through the revolutionary
activity of struggling classes. 56
55 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 55
56 Habermas, op. ci t
. ,
p. 53
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Comment and Critique
Habermas' analysis of Marxism is, it is generally conceded,
a brilliant attempt to expose the conceptual flaws in that theory
which he believes have severely hampered its ability to mount an
effective critique of the current functioning of capitalist societies.
At the same time, however, his theory of knowledge-constitutive
interests, on which that critique depends, is not without flaws of
its own. 57 When it first appeared, it provoked intense and wide-
ranging critical review, from Marxists and non-Marxists alike. It
must be said that, in this regard, Habermas is a gallant
theoretician: he is entirely responsive to critical evaluation, is
willing to acknowledge lapses and obscurities in his argument, and
to undertake the appropriate revisions and clarifications. The next
stage of his work, in fact, took form very much in response to the
critical reception accorded Knowledge and Human Interests
. Some of
the major themes which emerged in that critique will be detailed here,
and Habermas' response will be explored in subsequent chapters.
57 See particularly Review Symposium on Habermas
,
Philosoophy of Social
Sc i ences
,
Volume 2, 1972, pp. 193~270
The following draws on the articles presented in the Symposium,
particularly that of Fred Dallmayr, "Critical Theory Criticized:
Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interests and its Aftermath" pp. 211-229
at Habermas
One major criticism that has been levelled
concerns his failure to deal adequately with the implications
flowing from his differentiation between instrumental and
communicative action. Some reviewers suggest that he has not
demonstrated the necessity for such a distinction at an
epistemological level, but most recognize the potential contained in
that distinction for a critical analysis of advanced capitalism.
One can indeed appreciate the care with which Habermas separates
scientific and technological development from that concerned with
communication and interaction - the problem is that the very precision
of that separation might ultimately undercut its value. Habermas
insists that his distinction is analytic rather than functional
relationship; but he does not go on to explain in a satisfactory
manner the functional relationship that does obtain between the two
spheres of action. It seems that in his pre-occupation with
logically separating the two dimensions, he leaves us with just that -
a separation. The danger involved here is that the careful isolation
of a sphere labelled 'productive activity 1
,
subject to technical
rules and oriented to expanded control, can portend the tacit
acceptance of a thoroughly alienated workplace. After all, a
scientific and technological rationale has often been used for the
'innovations' which sustain that very alienation: mechanization,
rou t i n i zat i on
,
the 'scientific management' movement of Frederick
Taylor. 58
5 8 See the discussion of Taylorism in Harry Braverman, Labor and
Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth
Century. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1 97^
,
pp. 8 5 ~ 1 5^+ •
us
There are two (related) parts to this critique: first,
Habermas does not bring the methodology and principles of modern
science under any kind of critical purview; his critique is restricted
to science's overreaching itself, to its invading the sphere of
communicative action. He seems, in so doing, to eliminate the
possibility of specific socio-hi storical influence on those principles.
This has alarmed social theorists, particularly those of a Marxist
persuasion, who have been arguing for an internal transformation of
science and technology. From their vantage-point, science projects,
from its very essence, images of domination and control, and they
urge a revamping of its internal structures such that it could become
more 'humane', more oriented to the demands of social emancipation.
Herbert Marcuse, one of the major proponents of such a transformation,
pictures it in this way:
... (Science's) hypotheses, without losing their rational
character, would develop in an essentially different experimental
context (that of a pacified world); consequently, science would
arrive at essentially different concepts of nature and establish
essentially different facts. 59
Habermas has, in fact, expressly rejected this call for a
'new science'. In explicit response to the above quotation, he has
wr i tten
:
Quoted in Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society . Boston
Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1970, P- 86.
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aid
h
of
£ t0 aC
^'
eVe s® lf;Preservation through social labor and with themeans that substitute for work, we could renounce technology
different
' one
3
"
°
°Ur techn°'°9y ’ in fa ''our of a qualitatively
Habermas accuses Marcuse, and presumably others who argue in
a similar fashion, of falling prey to "the promise, familiar in
Jewish and Protestant mysticism, of the 'resurrection of fallen
nature' 61
The second aspect of this critique, clearly related to the
first, is that, insofar as Habermas equates 'work' with 'instrumental
activity', he does seem to abandon 'work' to the dominion of those
scientific and technical principles. Instrumental activity is
concerned with increased control, he argues; given that, it is not
clear how he could develop a critique of those tendencies which have,
in the name of that increased control, allowed for the institution
of such technological efficiencies as Taylorism. His lack of
reference to actual working conditions, and how they have been
affected by technological 'improvements', strengthens the suspicion
that his analysis could allow for a totally mechnized and efficiency-
orientated workplace.
60 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society
,
p. 87
6
1
ibid
.
,
p . 86
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The apparent equation of work and instrumental action raises
another difficulty. It suggests that individuation seems restricted
to the dimension of communication and interaction. While few would
deny the current paucity of creative and fulfilling work opportunities,
many are anxious to explore methods for their restoration. Habermas,
in his zeal to defend the internal functionong of science and
technology, appears to offer little in this regard.
Finally, Habermas' emphasis on expanded control over nature
as the 'end' of instrumental activity has been brought under fire -
it seems to imply a relationship to nature in which the latter is
regarded merely as an object of manipulation (in one reviewer's
rather graphic terms, "as a thing, a bitch to be cajoled, raped, and
whipped" 62 ). There is rarely a sense of engagement in Habermas'
formulation of this relationship; rather, he suggests a mutual
hostility. He clearly understands the disruptive effects of an
untrammelled exploitation of natural resources, and certainly sees
the responsibility for this belonging to a technology-run-riot;
presumably, he envisions a remedy emerging not only from greater
public involvement and discussion, but also from the feedback generated
in the scientific process itself (such as the present evaporation of
traditional energy sources is providing). But as Keane asks in his
discussion of this matter, "Does not the end of this ecological
62 Keane, 1 oc . c 1 1
. ,
p. 98
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destruction presuppose the idea of a natural science which, in its
very conceptual structure, seeks a non-repress i ve mastery of external
nature? The thrust of the question appears to be that Habermas'
conception of science does not allow for such an attitude.
A careful reading of Knowledge and Human Interests indicates
that the above critique is somewhat overdrawn; at the same time,
there is a definite lack of explication of the relationship between
the various spheres of action he has identified, and his analysis
suffers for it. There are certain clues, however, as to how this
explication would be formulated, and some of the above fears
assuaged. For example, at one point in his comparison of the
spheres of instrumental and communicative action, Habermas refers to
the former as a "limiting case" of the latter:
... This limiting case has the following distinguishing
features. Language is separated out of its embeddedness with
interactions and attains monologic closure. Action is severed from
communication and reduced to the solitary act of the pupos i ve-rat ional
utilization of means. And individualized experience is eliminated in
favor of the repeatable experience of the results of instrumental
action. In short, the conditions of communicative action do not
apply. 64
It would appear, then, that Habermas understands instrumental
action as rooted in the wider framework of communicative action.
b 3 ibid.
6 H Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 193
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With this as a basis, an analysis could be constructed which would
subordinate decisions about the utilization of science and technology
to the more comprehensive purposes and objectives of the society.
Accordingly, for example, the workplace need not be abandoned to the
ravages of technology; the development of non-a I i enated working
conditions could constitute an over-riding concern. Technological
issues would be encapsulated within a wider-ranging normative frame-
work.
Tiie articulation of such a relationship is no easy matter,
and Habermas' failure to attempt it in any substantial way leaves
many questions unanswered. His separation of these two spheres of
action is fundamental to his attempt to revitalize Marxist theory
and to provide an epistemological basis for a practical, and
ultimately a critical, knowledge. It seems likely that his work
does allow for a specification of the functional relationship between
tiie two spheres; its articulation is necessary both in order to
sustain the thrust of his own critique of Marxism, and in order to
elucidate the possibilities of an effective political practice.
A detailed discussion of such issues is obviously necessary
for Habermas' work to have the impact that he intends. He takes up
this project, cultivating the seeds planted in Knowl edge and Human
Interests
,
in his later investigations - the results of this work are
explored In Chapter Three.
5*4
A second major focus of critica, attention has been the
category of 'interest' itself - most reviews. un , e$5 sImp|y
approbatory, » comment upon its generally unclear formation.
Much of that lack of clarity stems from Habermas' according to the
category what he calls a
'quasi-transcendenta.
' status. with this
characterization, he is trying to capture the idea that the
interests' are not simply
'anthropological', nor are they simply
historical' - rather they are some combination of the two. They
derive from nature, but they are also totally reflective of the
social organization by virtue of which human beings raise themselves
out of nature. Knowledge, from this perspective, does not merely
serve to keep nature at bay; it also treats of the quality of that
self-preservation. 66
In accordance with this ' quas i
-t ranscenden ta I
' standing, the
interests' are not to be understood as individually or psychologically
based - rather, they are univeral, tied to the species as a whole;
they are not empirically verifiable - they can only be deduced from
the self-formative history of the species; they are not 'subjective
elements' which have to be eliminated in search for 'objective'
knowledge - rather, they make the achievement of that 'objective'
knowledge possible. It becomes easier, in fact, to identify what the
See, for example, Fred Dallmayr, "Reason and Emancipat ion: Notes
on Habermas", Man and Wor 1
d
,
Volume 5» Fall 1972, pp. 79-109.
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 312-313
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'interests' are not
,
than it
Habermas says of them,
is to be clear about what they are.
. ,.
.
*•* they can be neither comprehended like empiricalinclinations or attitudes, nor be proposed or justified i-i, .
values in relation to norms of action nl variable
deep-seated anthropological interests' in the attempt to'cl aHf'y ^he"^onst.tunon" of the facts about which theoret i cal'
This attempt to locate the 'interests' in what Dallmayr calls
"depth structures of human experience" 68 does seem responsible for
their enigmatic characterization. The effort to straddle nature and
history with one concept is fraught with difficulty - anthropological
structures are generally thought of as constant, invariant, and, as
such, anathema to the point of view that man is historically formed.
Attempting to render an 'invariant' accessible to historical
transformation only compounds the difficulties.
As Dallmayr points out, Habermas is open to attack from
'both camps' as it were - on one hand, he is accused of being
speculative and metaphysical; on the other, the charge is that he is
too empirical and a-h i stor i ca 1 . 69 Such wide-ranging response
reflects the obscure nature of the concept, and indicates the
67 Habermas, Theory and Practice
,
p. 21
68 Dallmayr, "Critical Theory Cri ticized" loc. ci t.
, p. 212
6 9 ibid.
,
p. 213
56
difficulty involved in generating a comprehensive critique of it.
Lenhardt suggests that Habermas, in his enthusiasm to create
a mechanism by which to establish the validity of the notion of
interaction vis-a-vis work, neglects to render the notion of 'interest'
"fully transparent". 70 Lobkowicz argues, a little more harshly, that
Habermas merely asserts the validity of the category, and then
marshals various insights to support it which could only perform that
function if the validity of the category was accepted in the first
Place. 1 Whatever the truth of this situation, the concept is
—
rtai n1y ln need of clarification if Habermas' epistemological thrust
is to be sustained. This is especially important for his attempt
to establish critical theory as a legitimate theoretical endeavour.
As before, Habermas has acknowledged that this critique of his
category of 'interest' has justification, and has proceeded to
reconcep tua lize it in the light of these concerns.
The third major criticism to which Knowledge and Human
Interests has been subject centres on Habermas' use of the psychoan-
alytic model as a paradigm for a critical social science. The
objections have focused on the implications for political activity,
and have taken one of two forms: the use of the model is seen as
70 Lenhardt, loc . c i t
.
,
p. 239
71 Nickolaus Lobkowicz, "Interest and Objectivity", Ph i 1 osophy of
Social Sciences, Volume 2, 1972, p. 196.
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either encouraging blind impulsive militancy, or as defusing
revolutionary activity altogether.
The first objection crystallizes around Habermas' argument
that in the activity of self-reflection, knowledge coincides with the
interest in autonomy and responsibility (or emancipation). He writes,
"Self-reflection is at once intuition and emancipation, comprehension
and liberation from dogmatic dependence". 72 Critics suggest that the
postulation of such a convergance collapses two different processes:
theoretical reflection on one hand, and decisions about concrete
political activity on the other. Obfuscation of the difference, they
argue, can legitimize random and dogmatic activism. 73 Habermas,
who had expressed abhorrence over the militant activism of the student
movement 74
,
has acknowledged the need for a more careful separation
of these issues, and this concern figures largely in his subsequent
attempts to formulate the relationship between theory and praxis.
The second objection, that Habermas' use of psychoanalysis
actually deflects the thrust of political activity, is more clearly
focused on his appeal to the therapeutic aspects of the model.
Several commentators have objected, for example, that the therapeutic
72 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
,
p. 208.
73 Dallmayr, "Critical Theory Criticized", 1 oc . c i
t
.
,
pp. 219-220.
74 See Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, Chapters 1-3.
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model assumes a shared concern for the patient's welfare on the part
of both participants in the interaction. Such good will can hardly
be said to exist in the clashes of opposing social groups. On the
contrary, their mutual conflict is entrenched, and not to be
spirited away through conversation and reflection. That the ruling
class, for example, might willingly engage in genuine dialogue with
other groups in the society seems preposterous, and implies a total
misunderstanding of social and political realities. Bu superimposing
the structure and intention of the psychoanalytic dialogue onto
social interactions, Habermas runs the risk of transforming
i r reconci 1 i abl e conflicts into a breakdown of communication, a
"temporary disruption of mutual comprehension". 75
Other commentators have pointed out the potential for
manipulation in the therapeutic model, and the consequences implied
for its use at a social level. It is necessary only to recall the
caricature of the therapist who, through labelling his patient as
'resistant' can maintain a position as 'definer of the situation', to
understand the thrust of this critique.
To a certain extent, it would seem that much of the alarm
expressed here stems from misunderstanding of Habermas' intention.
It is not at all clear, for example, that he saw the resolution of the
75 Dallmayr, "Critical Theory Criticized", loc. ci t. , p. 223
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class struggle analogously to the process of 'cure' in psychoanalysis.
Still less it is clear that he intended, as Floistad perceives it, for
social scientists (to) act as social therapists". 76 At the same
time, the misunderstanding seems tied, again, to a lack of clarity
on Habermas' part as to the implications for political activity
contained in his use of psychoanalysis as a paradigm.
In subsequent essays, particularly the Introduction to
Theory and Practice, 77 he proceeds to articulate more clearly, and
with appropriate qualifications, the usefulness of psychoanalysis for
developing praxis. (This is elaborated in a later chapter).
The Introduction tried to set a framework for Habermas' attempt
to reconsider the relationship between theory and praxis. This
chapter has focused on how that attempt began: the theory of
knowledge-constitutive interests sought to establish an epistemological
foundation for a critical theory which might inform praxis. As is
clear from the critical reviews of Knowledge and Human Interests, that
initial formulation was not entirely successful. First, the
category of 'interest' was not satisfactorily explicated; his
exposition of the functional relationship of instrumental and
communicative action was deemed inadequate; and, finally, the use of
7 6 • •Guttorn Floistad, "Social Concepts of Action: Notes on Habermas'
Proposal for a Social Theory of Knowledge", Inquiry, Volume 13,
1970, p. 180.
77 Habermas, Theory and Practice
,
pp. 1-40
60
psychoanalysis as a paradigm for a critical social science, while
certainly provocative, met with resistance from many critics. The
lack of a firm conceptualization is reflected in the frequent
misinterpretation of the notion of an emancipatory interest. Some
reviewers, for example, have somewhat arbitrarily decided that it is
merely an extension of the pract i ca I
-cogn i t i ve interest 78
What IS missing here is an understanding of the
importance for Habermas' position of his attempt to secure critical
theory in an epistemological ground. Knowledge and Human Interests
was a valiant attempt to do that - it did not succeed, but much of
the analysis becomes the substructure of his later investigations.
Themes from this first major publication will emerge, if much
changed, throughout the rest of his work.
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See, for example, Melvyn Alan Hill, "Jurgen Habermas: Social
Science of the Mind", Philosophy of Social Sciences, Volume 2.
1972, p. 253-
~
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CHAPTER
A COMMUNICATION THEORY OF SOCIETY
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, Habermas has been
thoroughly responsive to the critical reviews of Knowledge and Human
^lterests - He has n°t> of course, conceded every point, but he
certainly seems to have recognized the major weaknesses detected in
his theory, and has sought to sharpen his constructs accordingly.
His direct response to critics, articulated most carefully in
"A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests 11
,
1 presaged a
reformulation of his theory which both absorbed and transcended his
original insights. In a certain sense many of the criticisms
levelled at Knowledge and Human Interests are obviated by his
subsequent work - for example, the category of 'interest', so central
to that book and so problematic in its conception, is now relegated to
a comparatively minor, though still influential, position. Its
theoretical burden being reduced, the necessity for its clarification
recedes accordingly.
In a very broad sense, Habermas' present theoretical concerns
are best considered as a reformulation of Marx's theory of historical
materialism. Viewed through the lense of the distinction between
1 Jurgen Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests ",
Philosophy of Social Sciences, Volume 3, 1973, pp. 1 5
7
-
1 8 9
.
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instrumental and communicative action, Marx's theory is transformed
into a theory of social evolution which, Habermas believes, avoids
the difficulties he revealed in that original theory. It should be
noted at this point that 'evolution' here is used in the sense of
"cumulative processes which allow a direction to be perceived" 2 -
the term does not connote in this context an historically necessary
progression of events, but rather a logically necessary one, built
around the dual processes of the development of productive forces, and
the development of normative patterns of social interaction. The
'end-point', if it can be so characterized, of this logically
necessary evolutionary development is a form of social organization
in which theoretical and practical issues are differentiated, and
rational decisions made, on the basis of reflective activity, about
both of them. This recalls a quotation from Knowledge and Human
Interests
,
used in Chapter One, and pertinent here:
... The goal is "providing a rational basis for the precepts
of a civilization": in other words, an organization of social
relations according to the principle that the validity of every norm
of consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in
communication free from domination. 3
This quote points to the importance of language and
communication in Habermas' schema. The achievement of 'communication
2 Jurgen Habermas, "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical
Materialism", Theory and Society
,
Volume II Number 3, 1975, p- 291.
3 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 284.
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free from domination' (the object of the
'emancipatory interest')
remains a unifying thread in the transition from the theory of
knowledge-constitutive interests to a theory of social evolution, for
fully rational decisions can only be made in that context. In this
sense, Habermas' communication theory of society, to be considered in
this chapter, provides the lynch-pin for the theory of social evolution
it demonstrates, he believes, the historical possibility of a
rationally constituted social formation. That demonstration relies
on the argument that the idea of reason is embedded in the very
structures which make communication possible (i.e. the structures of
intersubjectivity). An investigation of those structures, Habermas
believes, reveals normative principles of speech which, if made
explicit, contain an image of a social organization forged around the
traditional ideas of truth, freedom and justice (he refers to this set
of normative principles as a 'communicative ethic'). From this point
of view, language contains a 'rational imperative'.
... I ... make the strong assertion that the idealizations
contained in the possibility of linguistic communication itself are
not accidental; and by no means do they express only a particular
historical form of reason. Rather, the idea of reason ... is
contained necessarily in the way in which the species of talking
animals reproduces itself. Insofar and as long as we perform any
speech acts at all, we are subject to the linguistic imperative of
what I should like to derive from the situation of possible speech as
"reason". 4
4 Jurgen Habermas, "Towards a Communication Theory of Society: A
Preparatory Conceptual Analysis", Lectures delivered at Princeton
University, 197^+, (unpublished manuscript).
The 'rationality' which is being uncovered here is a
substantially different rationality, though equally legitimate, than
that usually understood, and reflects Habermas' conviction that
"practical questions admit of truth". 5
While acknowledging Hume's declaration of the impossibility
Of logically deriving prescriptive statements from descriptive ones,
Habermas does not subscribe, in contrast to most subsequent
philosophical tradition, to the belief that moral controversies
cannot be decided on the basis of reason. Rationality, as we are
accustomed to understanding it, refers to the process which contains
all the hallmarks of Habermas' 'instrumental action': calculab i 1 i ty
,
efficiency, simplicity, etc. The additional conception of
rationality which Habermas offers is one that refers to a process by
which a goal is decided upon - this form of rational undertaking can
only occur if individuals engage in public and unrestricted discussion
of the principles and norms which presently guide the conduct of their
lives, or which have the potential to do so.
It is the normative basis for this kind of rationality which
Habermas seeks to lodge in the structures of communication.
In order to substantiate his somewhat awesome claim, Habermas
Jurgen Habermas, Legi timation Cri sis . Boston, Massachusetts:
Beacon Press, 1975, p. 111.
5
65
attempts to reconstruct the essentia.
,y intuitive knowledge which has
been mastered by all competent speaking and acting subjects. (The
notion of 'competence' in this context refers to a dual ability - the
ability to master the linguistic rules necessary for the production of
speech acts 6
; and the ability to secure and maintain the
interpersonal context in which the communication takes place.) Such
a reconstruction will take the form of an 'ideal type': that is, it
will presuppose an entirely linguistic organization of speech and
interaction, taking no immediate account of the various ways in which
communication is inevitably distorted, either from within its own
structures, or by external constraints. In such an organization,
motive and action would stand in direct correspondence to each other.
Not only will this idealized version of an interaction situation
disclose the normative principles referred to earlier, it will also
enable the perception and conceptualization of the mechanisms by which
communication becomes distorted. (One of the criticisms of Habermas'
earlier work was that he provided no satisfactory explanation of how
this might occur.) The whole process is made clearer, and its
implications for praxis hinted at, in this quotation:
See Jurgen Habermas, "Some Distinctions in Universal Praqmatics".
Theory and Society, Volume 3, Number 2, 1976, p. 1 55 .
The speech act is regarded as the elementary unit of speech (rather
than say, a single word). It represents the smallest (verbal)
utterance sequence which is comprehensible and acceptable to at least
one other competent actor within a communications context.
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This quotation is significant at this point in several ways:
the fact that it is reminiscent of his earlier work gives some
indiciation (to be clarified below) of the shift from the
identification of knowledge-constitutive interests to the
reconstruction of rules according to which we create the possibility
of communication; second, and more specifically, it captures, albeit
in a complex fashion, Habermas' attempt to clarify and develop the
notions of reflection and critique introduced in Knowledge and Human
I nterests . In the Postscript to that book, Habermas claims that his
original conception of reflection obscured the fact that there are two
distinct aspects of this term: on the one hand, there is reflection
on the conditions which make language, cognition and action possible
(this takes the form of a rational reconstruction of generative rules)
and on the other hand, there is reflection on unconsciously produced
7 • •Quoted in Lenhardt, "Rise and Fall of Transcendental Anthropoloqy
loc. ci t
.
. p. 2^2.
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produced constants to which a particular subject, or group of
subjects, has succumbed, and which appear in the form of 'objective'
circumstances. Reflection in this latter sense - the kind which
occurs in a psychoanalytic interaction, for example - achieves the
"critical dissolution of subjectively constituted pseudo-objectivity". *
It was this conception which informed Habermas' discussion of the
emancipatory interest in Knowledge and Human Intor^t-c
This differentiation, captured in the terms 'reconstruction'
and 'criticism 1
,
is further specified:
a
)
Criticism is brought to bear on objects of experience
whose pseudo-objectivity is to be revealed, whereas
reconstructions are based on "objective" data like sentences
actions, cognitive insights, etc., which are conscious
creations of the subject from the very beginning.
b) Criticism is brought to bear on something particular -
concretely speaking, on the particular self-formative
process of an ego, or group, identity - whereas
reconstructions try to understand anonymous systems of rules
which can be followed by any subject at all provided it has
the requisite competences.
c) Criticism is characterized by its ability to make
unconscious elements conscious in a way which has practical
consequences. Criticism changes the determinants of false
consciousness, whereas reconstructions explicate correct
know-how, i .e. the intuitive knowledge we acquire when we
possess rule-competence, wi thout involving practical
consequences. 9
0 Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interest",
loc. cit ., pp. 182-183.
9 ibid
.
,
p. 183
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This rather extended discussion of reflection has been
undertaken because It Is basic to the elaboration of Haber*.,,
commun I ca 1 1 on theory (Insofar as this theory „ an attempt to
reconstruct the generative rules which make communication possible
-d thus to derive a 'communicative ethlC), and consequent ly
.
ha,’
Important Implications for the development of praxis. For the
critical sciences Identified In Knowledge and Human
on the successful reconstruction of general rule, of competence - a,
was suggested above, such a reconstruction provides a theoretical
basis Tor identifying and explaining systematically distorted
communication. Moreover, It provides a standards against which a
critique of Ideology can be developed. The course of that
reconstruction, and of the derivation of a 'communicative ethic'
based on it, Is abridged In the following extract from Thomas
McCarthy; detailed elaboration or each step In the argument will
follow In the remaining section of the chapter.
, ,
.. ‘I*
The analysis of speech shows it to be oriented towardho Idea of truth. The analysis of 'truth' lead, to he not on o? adiscursively achieved consensus. The analysis of 'consensus showsths concept to Involve a normative dimension. The analysls’of thenotion of a grounded consensus ties it to speech station wl'lcll Isrue from all external and Internal constraints; that Is, In whichthe resulting consensus Is due simply to the force of the betterargument. Finally, the analysis of the Ideal speech situation shows
,
'™ V' assumptions about the context of Interaction in whichspeech Is located. The end result of this chain of argument Is that
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the very structure of
life in which autonomy
speech involves
and responsibil
the
ity
anticipation of a
are possible. 10
form of
1 o Thomas A. McCarthy.
Paul Connerton (ed.),
Ltd., 1976, p. J»05.
"A Theory of Communicative Competence",
Critical Sociology
, New York: Penguin
i n
Books
The exposition which follows is drawn
lectures on communication theory which
University in 197 /4 .
argely from Habermas'
were delivered at Princeton
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^Peech : Lts Orientation to Truth
Habermas
' attempt to demonstrate that rationality inheres In
the structure of communication rests on a specific understanding of
the nature and function of language. That understanding runs something
like this: man's capacity to express in symbolic terms his responses
to the physical and social environment in which he finds himself is
fundamental to his continued existence as a species. These symbolic
expressions, and the conceptual interpretations attached to them,
become mediating factors which structure man's view of the environment
and provide the basis for his action with regard to it. They are the
medium for the transmission of cultural tradition, and thus constitute
the essence of the socialization process.
Moreover, language provides the basis for the emergence of
the 'self', and thus for the development of individuation. According
to this position, (most significantly formulated by George Herbert
Mead), the development of the 'self' is dependent upon its first
becoming an 'object to itself; that is, it must first recognize
and internalize the attitudes of others towards itself. In this way,
it develops the capacity for 'self-reflection' - it can be both object
and subject. This process takes place through communication
, for it
is in that form of behaviour that an individual can become an object
to h i mse 1 f
.
L
Now this focus on the primacy of language in the
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socialization process and, as part of t-h** „that process, the development
of the self, lacks some appeal. While we might more wil,i ngly accept
an individual becomes
'socialized' vja the^ Qf
we are rather more attached to the idea that the 'self' is anr a
to the activity of communication. Habermas' position (which
represents a symbolic i nterac t ion i st point of view, on the other hand,
that the 'self' can only be accounted for in terms of
communication processes. Consciousness, or
.elf-interpretation,
depends on language.
"Language is the ground of intersubjectivity,
and every person must already have set foot on it before he can
objectivate himself in his first expression of life, whether in words,
attitudes or actions". 11
There is a dialectical relationship operative here, between
the linguistically structured processes of socialization and
individuation. On the one hand, language is the medium in which
meanings are shared, identifications established, and 'community'
secured. On the other, language allows individuals to maintain
some distance from each other, and thus to "assert against each other
the inalienable identity of their egos." 12
1
1
Habermas Knowledge and Human Interests
,
p. 1 57
12 ibid.
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validUv ;;\
The communit V that is based on the i ntersubject i vehdity of linguistic symbols makes both possible: reciprocalidentification and p reservation of the non- idem- T t-y Q f one withanother
-
^
the dialogue relation, a dialectical reL 1 1
,
hgenera) and the individual, without which ego identity cannot be
5
conce
, ved
,
, s rea i zed
. Ego i dent i tv and common i ca tlon i n ordtna rvlanguage are complementary concepts. ^
Language, then, is a co-operative act. It arises, says
Mead, “out of co-operative activities such as those involved in sex
parenthood, herding and the like". 14 It is not in any way an
individual experience; it is not to be analyzed as a process of
communicating private meanings. Again to quote Mead, “We want to
approach language not from the standpoint of inner meanings to be
expressed, but in its larger context of co-operation in the group
taking place by means of signals and gestures. Meaning appears
within that process". 15
For language to arise, then, there has to be an
' i ntersubject i ve constitution of meaning' as Habermas calls it: that
is, two or more subjects have to agree on the same meaning for a
particular symbol before communication becomes possible. Thus,
communication, by its very nature, contains an orientation towards
the achievement of mutual understanding, an understanding which is
13 ibid.
,
pp. 157-158
14 Quoted in H.S. Thayer, Meaning and Action: A Critical History of
Pragma t i sm . New York: The Bobbs-Mer r i 1 1 Company
,
1968, p. 241
.
1
5
ibid.
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made explicity through the consensus of the participants. Habermas
is not simply arguing that communication is a tool by which we arrive
at mutual understanding, but, more basically, that consensus is
already implied in the very notion of communication. "Our first
sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and
unconstrained consensus." 16 By implication, communication is not
just a matter of producing linguistic utterances about states of
affairs; it also involves the continual generation and maintenance
of interpersonal situations in which intersubjectivity, or mutual
understanding, is made possible.
This is what Habermas calls the "double structure" of speech;
every speech act consists of a propositional content (the states of
affairs about which communication is taking place) and an
illocutionary component (which establishes the nature of the
interpersonal relationship existing between the participants). 17
This "double structure" is illustrated by the fact that the same
propositional content can appear with varying illocutionary force:
for example, "I assert that p"; "I hope that p"; "I command that p";
"I promise that p". A speech act is said to be successful "if the
i ntended relationship between a speaker and a hearer is brought about
16 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
,
p. 31^*
17 Note the similarity between this and the work of Watzlawick et a 1 .
See Paul Watzlawick, Janet H. Beavin and Don. D. Jackson, The
Pragmatics of Human Communication. London: Faber 1968.
1U
if H understand and accents t-ho'a p the contents uttered in the
communicative role which is indicated by S; fot
promise, an assertion, or an order". 10
>r example, as a
The intuitive knowledge (or competence) mastered by
individual must include, then, not oniy the ability to appiy
linguistic rules for the satisfactory generation of sentences, but
also the ab.l.ty to structure the interpersonal situations in which
ordinary language communication is possible. This dual ability is
referred to as the 'communicative competence' of the subject.
The notion that communication contains an impulse towards
consensus is the foundation for a more specific claim: that speech
is oriented to truth. (Such a claim is germane for Habermas'
attempt to demonstrate that rationality inheres in the structures of
communication.) For the consensus that makes communication possible
consists in the mutual acceptance, on the part of interacting
participants, of certain claims to validity which are attached to all
communicative utterances:
Of th i ‘:;.
We Can S
?
eak ° f truth here on, y in the very broad senseo the legitimacy or justifiability of a claim that can be fulfilled
^
ThUS We
u
Say
’
for examPl e
,
that an option or assertiontrue, that a hope, wish or guess is correct or justifiable; that
a promise or announcement has been properly made; that advice has
18 Habermas, "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics", loc. cit.
p. 156. •’
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honestly been given; that a measure has
description properly made. 19
been properly taken
;
a
In everyday interaction, such claims are usually considered
to have been fulfilled; unless we have evidence to the contrary, if
someone makes us a promise, we assume that s/he intends to keep it;
if someone expresses a hope or wish, we assume that s/he is sincere
in doing so; if someone asserts that something is the case, we
assume that s/he actually believes what s/he is professing to believe
It is only on the basis of such assumptions that mutual understanding
and communication continues to be possible.
Habermas distinguishes four classes of claims to validity,
which are built into the structures of all possible speech: they
converge, he maintains, "in the single claim to rationality". 20
ljru_th* Assertions and explanations about states of
affairs or objects in the world imply a claim to truth - for
example, the statement "Saccharin causes cancer in rats"
carries such a claim with it. A truth claim is attached to
the propositional content of a speech act: that it is a
universal validity claim (i.e., that it is built into the
structures of all possible speech) stems from the fact that
19 Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
,
Lecture 2, p. 7-
ibid.
,
Lecture 5, p.l.
2 o
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every speech act possesses some propositional content
(whether explicit or implicit). The claim is not fulfilled
if the state of affairs either asserted or represented in an
explanation does not exist as stated.
2. Legitimacy
. All normative oriented utterances (such as
orders, promises, advice) imply a claim to legitimacy. For
a speech act to be successful, it must be performed in
accordance with, and in the recognition of, a particular
normative background - it must be embedded in a socio-
culturally accepted set of social practices. Thus, for
example, if a teacher metes out some form of punishment to a
student who has misbehaved in class, s/he does that against
a normative background which legitimates that interaction.
The illocutionary force of speech acts ensures that this claim
is universally built into the structures of speech, for it is
this which establishes the interpersonal relationships
between participants. The claim to legitimacy is not
fulfilled if the prevailing norm underlying the utterance is
not accepted - for example, if X denies that Y has a right to
give him an order.
3 • Vera c i ty . All utterances that are intentional imply a
claim to veracity: that is, a speaker who expresses some
intention does so with an associated claim that that
77
k.
intention is in fa<-*, tact, meant. Veracit-v
1
1
v ac.ty, says Habermas,
rr"
the trans
—f— ty representing
itself in speech' 1 21 c* • .P C"
• S.m.lar intentions are a u„
if 50 exPressed
,
t not as explicitlv ifW C| y» if the speaker is makinn5 , 9 an assertion
or a promise
- thus t-h^the cla.m to veracity isa lso universally
contained in all speech. The claim •, is not fulfi|| ed
, f the
intentions implied did not exist in , k«.s the speaker in the manner
in which they were represented.
Comprehen s i b i ] i t v \j ; + u
• With every communicative utterance
the speaker combines the claim that it can he aL c b understood in
e spec i f
,
c situation. This claim is not fulfilled, for
example, if speaker and listener do not have command of the
same language, or if language disintegrates, such as in the
distorted I i ngu i st i c pa t terns associated with psychosis.
The Significance for our perception of and relationship to the
world of these four claims to validity emerges insofar as they
a'low us to make linguistic reference to certain crucial aspects of
our social life which we intuitively recognize -
"the objectivity of
external nature, the normative character of society, the intersubject-
ivity of language, and the subjectivity of internal nature". «
2 1
22
Habermas,
"Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics", loc, cit.
.
ibid.
,
p. 161
.
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Habermas clarifies this
"reality sui generi" 23
and establishes the primacy of speech as a
in the following extract:
... In speech, there is consistent references to all fourdomains - external nature, society, internal nature, ^speechitself. Thus, we grant objectivity to those experiences which canbe expressed explicitly as propositional content Objectivity Is
n spL^h
ara
“:
u
r
‘ he
:
ode in wh !‘h objectified^, it^pearseec . Tr th is the claim we maintain with respect to theobjectivity of experiences. The societal reality of values and normsoners '"to speech through the illocutionary components of speechacts, as it were, through the performative attitude of the speakerwhile internal nature manifests itself in speech through theintentions expressed by the speaker. We have introduced normativityand subjectivity to denote the way in which the domains of a non-
object i f i ed society and a non-obj ect i f i ed internal nature appear.Legitimacy and veracity are the corresponding validity claims. Inthis way, the universal structures of speech not only secure
reference to objectified reality, but also allow for the normativity
of utterances as well as for the subjectivity of uttered intentions.
Finally, I use intersubjectivity" as a term for the commonality
between competent actors which is brought about through the under-
standing of identical meanings and the acknowledgement of universal
claims to validity. The claim which can be asserted with regard to
intersubjectivity is comprehensibility - this is the validity claim
which is specific to speech itself. 2 *
2 3 ibid
.
,
p. 1 6
1
2 4 ibid
.
,
p. 1 60
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discourse and the Consensus Theory of Truth
To re-cap i tu 1 ate for a moment,
a consensus-oriented interaction can be
assumption that the speaker raises four
s i mu 1 taneous
1 y
:
Habermas wants to claim that
maintained only under the
val idi ty claims
••• he claims truth for a proposition • i
content of the sentences used in an utterance
" P ' Semat ' C2 5
In the course of conversation, we assume that these various
claims are being fulfilled. As was pointed out, however, one or more
of the claims can be disputed, at which point, communication breaks
down. In that circumstance, various measures are required if the
underlying consensus is to be re-established, and interaction resumed.
The specific forms of resolution vary according to the claim in
question: the comprehens i b i 1 i ty of a statement can be redeemed in the
course of further interaction, designed to sort out, for example,
differences in linguistic usage. The claim to veracity is similarly
redeemed through further interaction, designed this time to ascertain
whether the speaker is actually co-operating, or merely pretending to
do so in the interest of some strategic intent.
25 ibid.
,
pp. 159-160.
80
It is somewhat more complicated, however, if the claims
quest, on are claims to truth or
.legitimacy. The establishment of
their validity, Habermas says, requires a shift to a very specific
form of interaction which he labels discourse
, a kind of meta-
communication, the sole purpose of which is to judge the truth of the
opinion or the correctness of the norm. While this process seems not
unreasonable where truth claims are concerned, the idea that normative
questions can be rationally determined sits less easily. Habermas
argues, however, that we cannot explain the binding character of
norms without recourse to the conviction that consensus on a particular
norm could be effected "with reasons". No matter how counter-
factual the activity of discourse may be, without such recourse we have
no way to account for the "decisive difference between obeying
concrete commands and following i ntersubjec t i vely recognized norms"
We behave according to a system of normative co-ordinates as_if those
norms could be "discursively redeemed" (i.e. "grounded in consensus of
the participants through argumentation" 28 ) if necessary.
27
Discourse, then, is a form of communication in which
reservation is expressed concerning the existence of facts, and the
appropriateness of norms. "Thus, facts are transformed into states
2 6 Habermas, Legi t imat ion Crisis
, p. 105.
2 7 ibid.
,
p. 1 0*4.
28 ibid.
,
p. 105.
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of affairs which may or may not be the case, and norms are transformed
Into recommendations and warnings which ma y be correct or appropriate
but a, so incorrect or inappropriate". *• Depending on whether the
discourse is aimed at establishing the truth of an opinion or the
acceptance of a norm, Habermas refers to a 'theoretical' and a
'practical' discourse respectively. The goal, however, is the same:
coming to a rationally motivated decision about the particular claim.
Habermas describes this admittedly "unreal form of communication"
thus
:
... Discourse can be understood a<; t-h^f fn™
that is removed from contexts of explr?en« and'a^nln".:" 1 ' 0"
assertions
aS
r
UreS
' the bracketed validity claims of, recommendations or warnings are the exclusive object ofdiscussion; that participants, themes and contributions are notrestricted except with reference to the goal of testing the valid i tv
i^exercised^^n^th^
3
' "° force
,
exce P t that of the better argumentIS e rcised, and at, as a result, all motives except that of theco-operative search for truth are excluded. If under these conditions™ 6
»
US " anses then this consensus expresses a "rational
In other words, the idea of discourse presupposes the
existence of a 1 genera 1 i zab 1 e ' interest, shared by all participants.
Such a supposition does not deny the existence of particular
interests, but the search is aimed at identifying the general interest
which underlies (or overrides) more individual orientations. This
2 9 Habermas, Theory and Practice
,
p. 19 .
30 ibid
-
31 Habermas, Legi timation Crisis, pp. 107-108
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allows a differentiation between sets of norms which, in that they
represent particular interests only, contribute to the stabilization
of relationships of force, and sets of norms which express the genera,
will, a "common i nte res t ascertained without deception". ”
If the notion of 'discourse' is to have any credibility, it
n-ust be developed within the framework of a 'consensus theory of truth'
Truth, according to such a position, can only be discursively decided.
*
"I can attribute a predicate to an object if and only if every other
person who could enter into discourse with me also would attribute
the same predicate to the same object." 33
This is no minor argument that Habermas is making here - he
is explicitly setting himself against several current theories of
truth which command wide allegiance. His paper, "Wahrhei tstheor ien", 3 “
which contains a detailed explication of his own theory of truth and
extensive critique of other theories, has not yet been translated.
Consequently, the following will concentrate on presenting the rudiments
of his theory, rather than attempting to situate it in relation to
other such theories.
32 ibid
- * P- 108.
“ Truth is here being used as a paradigm for all validity claims.
3 3 Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
,
Lecture 5, p. 8.
3 4 See a discussion of Habermas' theory of truth in Thomas McCarthy,
"A Theory of Communicative Competence", loc. cit.
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The need for a 'consensus theory of truth' was first aliuded
to in the "Postscript to Knowledge Human interesrc as Aj part
of his effort to clarify the nature and function of the know, edge-
constitutive interests, Habermas now seeks to distinguish clearly
between a theory of object constitution and a theory of truth.
other words, there is a difference, he argues, between making a state-
ment about the objects of our experience and claiming that the
statement so made is true.
A theory of object constitution seeks to explicate the way in
which reality is experienced - here, the role of the knowledge-
constitutive interests is central. As will be remembered, this
theory suggests that the way in which we apprehend the world is a
function of our relationship to natural processes (instrumental
perspective) and our relationship to other human beings
(communicative perspective). Objectivity of experience in this sense
means that the experience is i ntersubject i vel y shared and
acknowledged - it does not imply that the quality of truth is inherent
in that experience. Truth does not derive from the conditions which
underlie the objectivity of experience, but rather is arrived at
through consensus resulting from discussion in which the prevailing
influence is the force of the better argument.
35
Habermas,
loc. cit.
"A Postscript to Knowledge and Human I nterests 11
.
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The objectivity
count on the success or
proposition stated in di
by reasons to recognize
justified. 36
of experience means that everybody canfailure of certain actions; the truth of a
^h!
U
r
S
M!
ea
?
S
.
that everVbody can be persuadedthe truth claims of a statement as being
Aga in:
Experience supports the truth claim of assertion
° this claim as long as no dissonant experiences occur,truth claim can be satisfied only through argument. A clin experience is not yet by any means a justified claim.
s; we hold
But this
aim founded
3 7
Clearly, if truth is discursively (and thus rationally)
achieved, there has to be some way to differentiate a 'true' or
'rational' consensus from a 'false' or 'i rrat ional ' one. This is not
simply a logical requirement, but an aesthetic one as well, for if
such a differentiation cannot be made, the possibility of an enforced
consensus is left entirely open.
In his exploration of this, Habermas begins by reducing the
truth condition that was earlier established, viz., the potential
assent of all others. In the first place, there are, in reality,
only a few persons whose participation one can enlist in judging a
pa rticular assertion's claim to validity; second 1 y , the more confidence
one has in the competence of those particular people to make the
36 ib i d
-
>
P- 170.
3 7 Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
,
Lecture 5, p. 7.
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appropriate evaluation, the more likely it is that the judgement will
be accepted. Hence, the truth condition now assumes the form:
I may assert p of x if every other competent judge would agree with
me in this assertion". •• The prob|em now> of cour$ej to eltib)|ih
the meaning of 'competence' in this connection.
After considering various options, Habermas concludes that
this must also be decided discursively. | n other words, there is
no independent criterion by which to d i s t i ngu i sh a t rue f rom a false
consensus which would not itself require discursive justification. 39
... The truth of a statement cannot be decided without
reference to the competence of those who might possibly judge, and this
competence cannot be decided without an evaluation of the veracity oftheir expressions and the correctness of their actions. The idea of
true consensus requires that the participants in discourse be able todistinguish in a reliable manner between being and illusion, essence
and appearance, and is and ought; for only on this condition can they
be competent to judge the truth of propositions, the veracity of
utterances, and the legitimacy of actions. Yet in none of these three
dimensions can we specify a criterion that would allow an individualjudgement of the competence of possible judges or participants in
deliberation. Rather the competence to judge can itself be judged
only on the basis of the very consensus for whose evaluation criteria
were to be found. 40
Despite this inability to ascertain a reliable criterion of
judgement, human beings do behave as i
f
they can arrive at agreement
3
8
ibid.
,
p
.
9
.
39 ibid., p. 1 k.
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in the course of conversation, and certainly credit themselves with
the capacity to distinguish a genuine consensus from a deceptive one.
Habermas argues that this can only be explained by hypothesizing that
in every discourse, participants presuppose what he calls an 'ideal
speech situation'. In other words, they interact on the assumption
that they are discussing under conditions which guarantee that the
consensus they achieve will be a genuine one.
.. ..
*'• My thesis is that only the anticipation of an ideal sDeechsituation guarantees that to any consensus attained in fact we mayattach the claim of rational consensus. At the same time thisanticipation is a critical standard with which every factually
sel wh«her
n
r-
US
"^ int0 "““‘Ion and examined toe eth it is a sufficient indicator of real agreement. 41
In other words, participants in a discourse operate with the
assumption that agreement can be reached simply on the basis of the
force of the better argument, and not because of accidental or
intended constraints on the discussion. Naturally, such an anticipation
of a communication structure free from constraint must be a counter-
factual one, but to the extent that Habermas can successfully demonstate
its logical necessity, it can exert great pressure as a critical
standard for discussions and decision-making. A major supporting
argument is offered at the level of the univeral properties of speech
itself - if, in fact, the ideal speech situation is logically
anticipated in the activity of discourse, it should also be possible
4 1 ibid.
,
pp. 15-16
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to demonstrate that it is theoretically actual izable by means of the
mastered abilities of speaking and acting subjects (i.e., their
communicative competence). It should again be noted that what is
being explicated here is an
_ideal_ situation - it disregards, for the
moment, the question of whether and to what extent systematic
distortion actually occurs.
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A
'Communicative Ft- hie'
Reference has been made throughout this chapter to
0f the
^-w"unicati ve competence of the ideal speaker. The
quotation, in which Habermas distinguishes his concept from
narrowly conceived Unguisti^ompete^ of Chomsky's, «
„
to summarize what has been said so far.
the notion
fol lowing
the more
1 1 serve
an appl i ca t ion
'
I inWted^y^emp?r^caf^condf t
^l^un
j
ca f ' on as
competence. On the contra™
° K ons of linguistic
ordinary-language communication is Uself plr^cf
0
^
0^" 1
"!
competence of the ideal i
' art
‘ the 9eneral
speech, i.e., the application nf 1*° °- ^
words
» a situation in which
principle 1‘tZi:^'
JirbisHrH- "t* 1qualifications of speech and symbolic interaction (ml -u u • \
which we may call communicative competence Thu<;
6
^
av [°ur)
,
competence means the mastery of an ideal speech s i tuatTon !
^
^
abs ' J
competence* ,s Chomsky's name for the mastery of an
rana a?
° f based on an innate language apparatuseg rdless of how the latter is in fact used in actual speech.is competence is a monologic capability; it is founded in thespec i es-spec i f i c equipment of the solitary human organism ... Iconsider this model to be monological because it consistently
attributes the inter-subjectivity of meaning - that is, the mutual
sharing of identical meanings - to the fact that sender and receiver
each an entity for itself - are previously equipped with the sameprogram.
"
Jurgen Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", in
Peter Dreitze1
’
Recent Sociology
.
Number 2, New York: Macmillan
19/0, p. 131
.
*+ 3 ibid 138 .
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These "basic qualifications of speech and symbolic
interaction" correspond to "general structures which appear in every
possible speech situation, which are themselves produced throuqh the
performance of specific types of linguistic expressions, and which
serve to situate pragmatically the expressions generated by the
linguistically competent speaker". '* Habermas refers to this set
of linguistic expressions as 'pragmatic universals', and it is
through their analysis that he proposes to reveal the normative
principles that are embedded in the structures of communication.
Habermas has identified five classes of pragmatic universals
which, taken together, represent a speaker's communicative
competence
:
'• Personal Pronouns (and the i r der i vat i ves) wi th the a i
d
of which we can bring about interpersonal relationships.
They provide a way for a subject to identify him/herself in
relation to an Other.
2 . Forms of Address and of introduction (such as offering
greetings) which indicate the structure of the roles assumed
by speakers, hearers, and potential participants. These,
too, help to establish interpersonal relationships.
4 4 McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence", loc. cit
P- *472.
”
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Deictic Expressions (expressions of place and time,
articles, demonstratives, etc.) which provide a way to
identify the objects in the world about which we wish to
converse. "In each language, mechanisms are available
which allow us to classify, serialize, localize, and
temporal i ze the objects of possible experience." 45
Performat
j
ve Verbs (such as assert, promise, order,
etc.) which determine the sense of the utterance (insofar as
it is to be understood as an assertion, a promise, and so on),
the relationship of the speaker to it, and the relationship
obtaining between speaker and hearer.
Non-Performative I ntentiona l Verbs (such as wish, want,
feel, etc.) which reflect the intentions, attitudes, and
experience of the speaker, and thus function as a
representation of subjectivity.
A complete theory of communicative competence would require
careful examination of the five different classes of expressions.
So far, however, Habermas has concentrated his attention on the
per forma t i ves
,
and this, for several reasons:
|»
Habermas, "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics," loc . c i t
.
,
p . 1 61
.
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- First, they are involved, implicitly or explicitly, in
every speech act (through the illocutionary force of
utterances), so they can be used to classify speech acts in
genera 1
.
Second, this choice reflects his commitment to the belief
that the ability to structure situations of intersubjectivity
is fundamental to communication.
- Finally, this class of speech acts is seminal to making the
determinations involved in (1) the domains of external
nature, society, internal nature, and language; (2) the
validity claims of truth, legitimacy, veracity, and
comprehensibility; and (3) the distinguishing of a true from
a fale consensus - all three of these intersect in the
situation of discourse.
The classification of performative verbs proceeds as follows:
Constat ives (such as state, assert, describe, explain)
which express the meaning of the cognitive employment of
sentences. These speech acts imply a claim to truth.
Regu 1 a t i ves (such as order, demand, forbid, propose,
oppose) which express the meaning of the pragmatic employment
of sentences. They refer to the normative infrastructure in
which the communication takes place, and thus imply a claim
to 1 eg i t i macy
.
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B£EreSentatlVe5
'
s-h believe, hope, fear, disclose,
betray, pretend) which are used with propositional contents
containing intentional verbs (e.g. like, wish, want) to
explicate the meaning of the self-representation of the
speaker to the hearer. These speech acts imply a claim to
verac i ty
.
Communicatives (such as say, express, ask, mention)
which serve to express the pragmatic meaning of speech as
such. They explicate "the meaning of utterances qua
utterances". 6 As such, they imply a claim to
comprehens i bi 1 i ty
.
It was stated earl ier that this class of speech acts is
fundamental to distinguishing the domains of external nature, society,
internal nature, and language. We experience these domains with a
certain degree of 'giveness' - as objectivity, normativity,
subjectivity, intersubjectivity. As Habermas points out, the
importance of grasping that there is a validity claim attached to each
domain 1 ies in the fact that we can thereby set our experience of each
one in a different perspective - a perspective which includes the
possibility of the negation of the form in which those different
domains present themselves. In other words, we are now able to
46 Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
,
Lecture 4, p. 27.
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consider the possibiiity that what we think is true can, in fact,
turn out to be illusion; that although we behave according to a
normat Rework which we consider iegiti mate, that legitimacy may,
in fact, rest upon coercion or mystification (i.e., it would not be
verified in the process of discourse); and, finally, that even though
a speaker appears to represent his true intentions or attitudes, he
">ay, in fact, be consciously misleading his listeners, or be
suffering from self-deception. * 7 The abi I i ty to make such
distinctions - between being and illusion, between is and ought, and
between essence and appearance - is essential to successful
communication, and absolutely fundamental to engaging in discourse.
The employment of constat i ves makes possible this
distinction between being and illusion - such speech acts separate a
public world of intersubjectively acknowledged interpretations from a
private one of personal opinions and impressions. The employment of
regu I at i ves allows for a distinction between the seeming and the
actual validity of the normative background against which people behave
towards each other. It enables judgement as to whether what is (e.g.,
a particular social order) is grounded in general approbation, or
merely parades as such. The employment of representatives allows for
a distinction between the "completely individuated being" and the
"linguistic utterances, expressions and actions in which the subject
4 7 Habermas, "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics" loc. cit.,
p. 164.
'
9*4
ppears, and that in turn can become the object of
That is, representative speech acts allow for a Hicf
i st i net ion between
propositions". 48
essence and appearance.
Final ly, these three distinctions, ^ ^
poss.ble the central distinction between a rational (tree) and an
irrational (false) consensus. The distinction, in turn, reflects on
the mean of speech itself, which is expressed by means of the last
class of speech acts, the commun i cat i ves .
At this point, it is possible to specify how an idea, speech
situation is possible by virtue of the speech acts that every
competent speaker can perform. It will be recalled that the design
of an ideal speech situation requires that the communication structure
is free from internal constraint (it must also, of course, be free from
the coercive pressure of external influences, but this is being
bracketed for the moment). This will be worked through fairly
carefully, for it is here that Habermas identifies the normative
principles he perceives as embedded in the structure of communication.
He begins this way:
struct,, r/;; \f
hOU,
!J
Uke t0 demonstrate that the communicationuctu e tself produces no constraints if and only if there is asymmetrical distribution of the opportunities for all possibleparticipants to choose and perform speech acts. For then there isnot only universal interchangeability of dialogue roles, but also
48
Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
. Lecture 4
, p. 30.
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effective equality of opportunities to take these roles- that i c ^perform sopprh ir-%ii . • . ^ > Lneti i s ^ to
opportunity to employ commun i caU ves!
' that* i s" ^bring about^
^
constatives (and the group of reguiatives rcS IT^o^n^ionsand warnings) - that is, if there is an equal distribution ™
opportunities to make interpretations, assertions, explanations andjustifications, and establish or refute their claims to validity - thent is possible to create a basis on which no prejudice or unexaminedopinion can permanently be kept from examination and critique ""4 9
These two requirements guarantee unlimited discussion - but
according to Habermas, an ideal speech situation also requires that
that discussion be free from domination. In other words, we have to
assume, and need some way to ensure, that speakers deceive neither
themselves nor their listeners. As Habermas points out, this means
that the ideal speech situation reciprocally requires characteristics
of action : "The freeing of discourse from coercive structures of
action and interaction, which is required for the ideal speech
situation, is obviously conceivable only under conditions of pure
communicative action." 50
Thus, participants in discourse are required to have the
same opportunity to employ representative speech acts, i.e., to
interpret and express their needs, intentions, feelings, as clearly
as possible (including the translation of non-verbal expressions into
linguistic forms). This 'unimpaired self-representation' implies
49 ibid.
,
Lecture 5, PP- 1 7 ~ 1
8
so ibid.
,
p . 1 8
.
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characteristic:
reciprocity of behavioral expectationsa-g participants. Privilege. in the sense that son* norm s are
solect.vely expected or applied, is excluded. Equal oon rt i pportunity in
use of relative speech acts secures this requires
- that is
ab.l.ty to allow and forbid, to „ake and extract promises, to
account for one's conduct, and demand that others do the same .
Taken together, these
"counterfactual conditions of the
ihea. speech situation- contain the i mage of an idea, for. of life.
These are the nor„,ative principles to which Habensas' entire analysis
has been tending.
1 . In the case of unrestrained discussion (in , : uprejudiced opinion cannot be taken up or criticized) itpossible to develop strategies for reachinq ’
1
unconstrained consensus; ^
On the basis of mutuality of unimpaired self-
representafon
(wh i c h includes the acknowledgement of theself-representation of the other ns woin •: • .
to achieve a significant rapport despite Jhl inviolable'
6
i stance between the partners, and that means
communication under conditions of individuation.
In the case of full complementarity of expectations(which excludes unilaterally constraining norms)
,
the
c aim o universal understanding exists, as wel
1
*as thenecessity of universalized norms.
These three symmetries represent,
conceptualization of what are traditionally
truth, freedom and justice. 52
i nc i denta I 1 y
,
known as the
a 1 i ngu i st ic
ideas of
51 ibid
-
, P* 19.
52 Habermas, "
PP. H3-1W
Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence"
(emphasis added).
loc
.
c i t
.
,
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Thus, the ideal speech situation finally intersects with an
ideal action situation (the concept of 'pure co^unicative action').
The consensus theory of truth is matched by a consensus theory of
legitimate action: "each theory presupposes the other". 51
Just as we assume that the validity claims attached to
speech are being fulfilled, so we assume, unless there is evidence to
the contrary, that a person with whom we interact is cognizant of,
and accountable for, his actions. We assume that if pressed, s/he
could explain why s/he took a certain course of action rather than
another. Habermas develops this assumption further, by distinguishing
two (again counterfactua
1 ) expectations:
1 * The expectation of intentional i ty . We expect that a
person will comply with a certain set of norms in an
intentional and conscious fashion. If circumstances suggest
that that expectation is unfounded, and if we then begin to
attribute unconscious motives to a person's behaviour, then
we have left the "level of intersubjectivity" 54 and are
treating the other person as an object. At this juncture,
communication has been interrupted (it may, of course, shift
to meta-communication, or it may break off altogether).
53 Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
,
Lecture, 5, p. 20.
54 ibid
.
,
p. 22.
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2 .
We expect that a person
will comply with only those norms that s/he considers
Justified; furthermore, we assume that that person would
feel capable of discursively justifying that norm if it be-
came necessary.
These two expectations, then, refer to a consensus that is
(ideally) attainable in a pj^cUcal discourse.
"The meaning of the
claim to validity of norms of action consists
... in the promise that
the factual behaviour of subjects can be shown to be the responsible
action of accountable subjects." 55 Correlafiv.lvc i t i ve
1 y , we can assume
that if, in a situation of discourse, it was demonstrated, either to
ourselves or others, that, in following a particular norm, we were
not meeting the two stated conditions, then we would abandon that
norm, and change our behaviour appropriately.
Habermas is adamant that, even though this model of pure
communicative action is counterfactual
,
we cannot avoid behaving as if
it were real.
... on this unavoidable fiction rests the humanity
of intercourse among men who are still men." 56
55 ibid
-
»
P- 23.
Quoted in Thomas McCarthy, "Translator's Introduction" to Habermas
Leg i t imat ion Crisis, p. xv.
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Ideology as Distorted Communir^
i on
So far, the discussion of discourse has proceeded by way of
its idealization; the careful delineation of such an idealized form
is necessary, since its anticipation provides the ground for
judgement as to whether or not the consensus arrived at in discourse
IS genuine. Little reflection is required, however, to realize that
that idealized version is, as Habermas describes it, counterfactua I
.
Communication is not a disembodied activity: it takes place within
a matrix of concrete psychological, social and political structures
which impinge upon it to varying degrees. In the present historical
situation, the possibilities of achieving the kind of mutual
understanding or intersubjectivity to which Habermas has been
referring are increasingly pre-empted; we are confronted, instead,
either with situations of enforced consensus, or with the insistence
that consensus is simply unattainable on an ever-growing number of
issues. According to Habermas, technological rationality reigns
supreme; communicative rationality is suppressed. Our inability
to communicate according to the potential indicated in our
communicative structures takes on, as Shapiro puts it, a "second
nature"; 57 we accept without question increasingly deformed systems
of communication.
5 7 Jeremy Shapiro. "Reply to Miller's Review of Legitimation Crisis",
Telos, Number 27, Spring 1976, p. 173.
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This analysis leads directly to the question of ideology,
for the iatter is defined, from Habermas’ perspective, as a set of
normative beliefs which are adhered to, even though subjecting them
to discourse would demonstrate that they were neither legitimate nor
desirable. Yet his analysis to this point has implied that
normative structures prevail only so long as they are considered
legitimate. So the process by which patently unjust and irrational
assumptions come to hold sway over our everyday reality, and indeed
function to stabilize existing relations of power and domination, is
a phenomenon which requires explanation.
Habermas is in a powerful position to do just this, and it
is here, as Wellmer points out, that the superiority of his theory of
communicative competence over other linguistic philosophies is
evident. 58 Because it treats of the immanent relationship which
every society has to the idea of truth, it enables a transcendence of
the self-interpretation offered by a society and its individual
members; it theoretically preserves the possibility that individuals
deceive themselves about their social relations and about the meaning
and intention of their behavior. Other linguistic philosophies
remain attached to the se 1 f
-presentat i on : they have no recourse other
than to what people actually say about themselves. In so doing,
Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation", loc. cit.
58
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Habermas argues, they make
linguistic organization of
of 'perfection". 59
the inadmissable assumption that "the
social interaction has attained a state
By contrast, Habermas' theory provides an inherent communic-
ative ethic, compared to which, the structure of social relations has
only ever fallen short. He articulates a perspective which can
identify and probe the inconsistencies between verbal expressions,
non-verbal expressions, and actions; which can pinpoint a systematic
inhibition of communication, whereby specific areas of concern are
excluded from public discussion; and which can expose as false or
enforced, an apparent consensus about societal beliefs, values and
norms. On this basis, Habermas can develop an impressive critique
of ideology and false consciousness.
As mentioned several times in the first chapter, Habermas
understands advanced capitalism as entailing the collapse of the
practical into the technical: science and technology assume the
predominant ideological force. The management of a highly complex
and multi-faceted economic and social system which is operating
according to the imperatives of a capitalist dynamic requires the
suppression of moral and practical questions, and on a more explicitly
political level, the downplaying of a genuine democratic process.
Quoted in Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation", loc. cit., p. 92.
59
102
social issues are more easily contained and controlled by re-
label them 'technical' issues, for which technical solutions,
designed by 'experts', must be found; the public, offered the
compensations of increasing prosperity, mobility, income security,
and a variety of educational, social and medical benefits for certain
sectors, is steadily
' de-pol i t ic i zed '
- people lose their political
function. Except for occasional participation in electoral
processes, public input into decision-making is deemed irrelevant.
This shift must be made plausible - compensations certainly help, but
there has to be a more strongly legitimating world-view to which
'rational' appeal can be made, if popular loyalty is to be maintained.
Historically, such legitimation has come from the institutional frame-
work of the society, from traditions and values which have provided
personal, social, and political meaning to activity. The present
historical circumstances, however, cannot wait on the slow, if
inexorable, march of such traditions; it must, if it is to maintain
itself in its present form, create its own legitimation. It does
this out of science and technology; systems theory, with its
specification of points of intervention, prediction of consequences,
and so forth, is representative of the new ideology.
It is the singular achievement of this ideology to detach
society's self-understanding from the frame of reference of
communicative action and from the concepts of symbolic interaction and
replace it with a scientific model. Accordingly, the culturally
defined self-understanding of a social life-world is replaced by the
self-reification of men under categories of purposive-rational action
and adaptive behaviour. 60
Habermas, Toward a Rational Society
,
pp. 105-106.
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Where once the institutional
fashioned scientific and technological
is now reserved. Moral and practical
techno 1 ogy
.
framework contained and
developments, the relationship
action bends to the winds of
It is the function of ideoloav thanu gy
,
then to maintain popular
loyalty to the prevailing social order and Its self-presentation.
To achieve that, it must both withhold substantial numbers of
normative issues from pub, ic discussion, and, at the same time,
justify that withholding. This analysis of ideology involves a
certain de-emphasis of content; Habermas argues that content alone
cannot explain the binding force of ideology, nor its immunity from
public consideration and debate. Rather its force is independent of
its semantic content: ideology has its roots in "obstacles" to
communication that are located in the structure of communication
itself". Habermas explains further:
The validity of these (ideological) world views is
formation"
8 C™™ n '“ tion structure that excludes discursive will-
precT seW Tf'tuJ
Earners to communication which make a fictioni ely o he reciprocal imputation of accountability, support atthe same time the belief in legitimacy that sustains the fiction andprevents its being found out. That is the paradoxical achievement ofideologies, whose individual prototype is the neurotic disturbance 62
Such barriers to communication function to suppress the
discovery and articulation of ' genera 1 i zab 1 e interests', and it is here
Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
,
Lecture 6, p. 19.
62 Quoted in McCarthy, "Translator's Introduction", l oc . cit. p. xv.
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that a critique of ideology finds Its mark. Usinq thu g e normative
principles revealed in the strum. r«c ructures of communication (the
'communicative
baseline, critica, theory can generates
comparison with the normative P r,nc,p,es operative at the present
time. Such an investigation would be guided Habprmy ia a, e as suggests, by
the question,
... How would the membpr<; r»f = i
stage in the development of productivp fn
s V stem
.
at a given
bindingly interpreted their needs (inH h
^ C
L
S
’ 3Ve co ’' ect ively and
accepted as Justified) If 2 ^
h,ch
1
norms they have
organization of social Intercourse thro"
^ deC
!
ded
with adequate knowledge of the limitin
U9
' s
f
urslve wi 1
1
-forma t ion
,
imperatives of their soctety? ”
9 Cond,t '°" s ^nd functional
Through reconstructing the progressive deformation of pure
intersubjectivity and corresponding suppression of discussion and
dialogue, critical theory can expose the false base on which the
legitimacy of the social order rests. It is here, in this
advocacy role that Habermas is describing that the 'interest'
in emancipation most conspicuously reasserts itself. | t is
stimulated by the gap between what is posited for us in our
communication structures, and the form which our communication and
action takes at the present time. Critical theory can create an
awareness of the difference between formal and substantive democracy.
(j 3 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 113.
64 ibid
.
,
p. 117.
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Comment and Critiq ue
Consideration of the viability of the communication theory of
society, both in terms of its status as a basis for political action
and in terms of the theoretical burden it must bear in Habermas'
overall scheme will be undertaken, via a discussion of its implications
for education, in the later chapters of the dissertation. Before
proceeding, however, to the last major theoretical element of
Habermas' work (his theory of social evolution, which incorporates
and extends the theory presently under discussion), some clarification
and comment, preparatory to the final assessment, seems desirable.
This is especially so because of some rather consistent
misinterpretations on the part of reviewers of particular aspects of
the communication theory. It is true, at the same time, that such
misinterpretation reflects genuine ambiguities and problems in the
theory, while these will be indicated here, more extensive discussion
will await the final chapters.
Habermas' understanding and use of language, and his attempt
to formalise the 'normative imperative' contained within it, is
highly complex, and draws on a considerable acquaintance with the fine
points of linguistic theory. Consequently, a complete appreciation
and evaluation of that attempt could only be undertaken with a
secure grounding in that tradition. Such an appraisal has yet to be
attempted, at least in English; reviews have so far been more global,
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focussing on the larger concepts, such as discourse, employed in the
theory. The foil owing remarks are in keeping with that focus.
It is important to recall at the outset that Habermas' aim
in this theory is to reconstruct the conditions which make language,
cognition, and action possible. As such, the theory has no
necessary practical consequences, and is certainly not intended as it
stands to offer specific directives for political action. what it
does offer is a baseline, a standard against which to consider the
nature and activity of communication, both historically and
contemporaneously: it is the lacuna revealed between what- i s-poss i bl
e
and what-exists-now which provides the impetus for political action.
The failure of several reviewers to grasp that Habermas' communication
theory is not intended as a political program has prompted several
misdirected critiques of his work. One of the more common
criticisms, for example, is that Habermas has, once again, (i.e. as
he was charged with doing in Knowledge and Human Interests ) reduced
social and political conflicts to the level of a breakdown in
commun i cat ion
.
Such a critique rests on the assumption that Habermas'
argument is that if we all began 'communicating correctly', social
and political domination would disappear. In a certain, very
simplistic, sense, this is true; if it were poss ible to achieve a
social organization which guaranteed to every individual both the
107
ability and opportunity to speak, to express opinions and needs, to
question, and to demand accountability and responsibility from
others, it does seem likely that a genuine, if cumbersome, democracy
would be operative in the society. But Habermas is certainly not
suggesting that social transformation is effected through sorting
out the mechanics of correct conversation. 65
The confusion emanating from the mistaken assumption that
the communication theory is intended to represent a political
programme can be clarified by reconsidering what prompted the theory
in the first place, and principally, Habermas' motivation for
attempting to separate the realms of communicative action and
discourse. It took form as an explicit response to objections
raised about his theory of knowledge-constitutive interests. In
any essay which articulated the shift from his earlier theoretical
formulations, he wrote the following:
... In the investigations up to this point, I have brought
out the interrelationship between knowledge and interest without
making clear the critical threshhold between communication (which
remains embedded within the context of action) and discourses (which
transcend the compulsions of action). 66
He wants to make it clear, then, that while knowledge
65 See James Miller, "Review of Legitimation Crisis", Telos, Number
25, Fall 1975, pp. 210-220.
b6 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 19-
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maintains some relationship to action, it is not on the level of a
"direct derivation from the imperatives posed by the praxis of life". 67
Obviously, the opinions and norms which become the subject of
discursive interaction do arise from various forms of experience
and action: and, similarly, the knowledge which emerges for discourse
has specific contexts of application, again related to the realm of
experience and action:
... statements about the phenomenal domain of things and
events (or the deep structures which manifest themselves in terms of
things and events) can only be translated back into orientations for
goa 1 -d i rected rational action (in technologies and strategies);
statements about the phenomenal domain of persons and utterances (or
about the deep structures of social systems) can only be translated
back into orientations for communicative action (in practical
knowledge). 68
While it is evident, then, that there is a strong connection
between action and discourse (and, incidentally, it is the
knowledge-constitutive interests which provide the unifying links),
that connection does not "remove or resolve ... the differences between
opinions about objects based on experience related to action on the
one hand, and statements and facts, founded on discourse that is free
of experience and unemcumbered by action on the other". 69
The differentiation explicitly responds to a major critique
60 ibid.
6 9 ibid
.
,
pp. 20-21
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of arid Hum^n
—
[_nt^rest£, namely, that this formation has
collapsed the differences between theoretical reflection and
decisions about action. The former (i.e., theoretical reflection),
requires a "relentless discursive validation of claims to validity" 7 “
(and corresponding dissolution of opinions and norms which are shown,
again discursively, to be unjustified); through such a process,
'truth' is established. The latter (i.e. decisions about action)
requires "the risk of taking sides, and thus, precisely, the
relinquishment of the neutral role of a participant in discourse". ”
This sharp demarcation of the domains of action and
discourse has elicited critical comment from a number of reviewers.
It is difficult, so the argument goes, to conceive of an
interaction situation which, as Habermas would have it, is "free
of experience and unemcumbered by action". Not only is this
conceptually difficult to grasp, but it suggests an intense
formalism, unappealing to more aesthetic sensibilities. It hints
at logic - precise, ruthless in its progression, and quite removed
from the concerns, motives, and emotions of ordinary people. It is
reminiscent, in fact, of the scientific rationality which Habermas
set out to expose in the first place: in that respect, it appears to
replicate the very divisions he sought to transcend.
70
'bid
.
,
p. 15.
7 1 ibid.
He has been so criticized. Hirschberg. |„ his discussion
of discourse aimed at establishing the legitimacy of norms, writes
that the conceptualization of such a form of interaction implies
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expressed and fulfilled In the future which Is not affected by andsubject to, my wants, needs, and desires. 72
Hirschberg goes on to argue that
,
"* t ^1e
["
eson that Habermas (has) excluded wants, desiresinterests, from discourse is that he accepts the positivist
understanding of these concepts; that is, that wants, needs, anddesires are blind, irrational, that they spring from the ever
inconstant and inscrutable emotions, that they do not listen so to
speak, to reasons. 73
It is greatly overstated, however, to say that Habermas denies
the impact of the needs, wants, and desires of participants in
discourse. He explicitly writes in an article entitled "Some
Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics" that the restrictive condition
involved is
72 Larry Hirschberg, "Some Criticisms of Jurgen Habermas'
Cognitivist Linguistic Ethics", unpublished paper, p. 11.
that the actual
communicative experiences
is considered irrelevant
brought into "discourse"
it. 74
process of experience (including the
and^tha?
m the performance of speech acts)t experimental contents may befrom outs.de, but may not be generated within
Moreover, in his discussion of the development of ego
identity, he is adamant that internal experience and its expression
are fundamental: "ego- ident i ty demands not only the cognitive mastery
of general communication levels, but also the ability to bring one's
needs to the fore in this communication structure". 75
It is not at all clear then that he considers such needs, or
the emotions attached to them, blind or irrational. He ^s suggesting
that the conditions of discourse require participants to examine the
extent to which their privately experienced needs, wants or desires
are ' genera 1 i zabl e
'
(or universal), rather than particularistic; part
of this process involves examining the ways in which those experiences
are distorted, whether as a result of unconscious influences, or
because of more specifically cultural pressures such as derive from
norms of privilege. These issues can, Habermas argues, be tested in
discourse - participants are not asked to abandon emotion and
motivation, but rather to engage in a process of transferring
their "subjective desires into general izabl e desires". 76
74 Habermas, "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics" loc cit
p. 165.
*’
7 5 Jurgen Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity", Telos,
Number 2*4, Summer 1975, p. .
76 Habermas, Leg i t i mat ion Crisis
,
p. 109.
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What seems missing In this transformation, and It Is here
that HI rschberq's critique exerts some pressure, Is the quality of
the emotion attached to private experience. There seems little
consideration In Habermas' discussion of the concept of discourse for
the expression ol anger, Indignation, sorrow, excitement; in the
Intersection of the particular and the universal, of Individual and
community, It Is the quality of Internal experience which slips
through the grid. At the same time, Habermas Is clearly concerned
with the retention and expression of Individual Identity within the
wider framework of community: "An autonomy which robs the ego of a
communicative access to Its own Inner nature, also signals an
unfreedom." / "
77
Ibid.
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Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity", loc. c I t
. ,
p. 55.
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i n
Concern expressed over the loss of individual experience
d.scursive interaction is ref, active of the broader problem of the
relationship of the individua, and the communiry in Habers schema.
Seizing on language as the medium in which both individuality and
community are preserved, he has endeavored to work out at a
theoretical leve, some middle ground between a social theory based on
particulars and incorporating the dim hope that some form of
universality may materialize (such as liberalism), and one which
imposes a form (a un, versa! ),n the expectation that individuality
will eventually emerge in the shuffle (such as totalitarianism).
In attempting an explicit reformulation of this
relationship, Habermas must contend with all the problems involved.
For people steeped in the traditions of liberalism, the idea of a
'general izable interest', incorporating and transcending particular
interests, is anathema. In the face of a culture in which
individual experience can claim a primacy which is virtually
unassailable, Habermas is arguing for a shift from a monologic
consciousness to a dialogic one, but which at the same time,
maintains the autonomy of the individual. In this framework,
discourse requires that experience, beliefs and values, rather than
their validity being simply assumed, be assessed and validated through
argumentation. Private meanings are no longer sine qua-non; but
neither is the individual submerged in the over-riding quest for
commun i ty
.
mHabermas' intention in drawing this sharp distinction between
communicative action and discourse is clear - he is attempting to
conceptualize an interaction situation in which the force of the better
argument is the dominating factor in decision-making. without such
a distinction, without arguing that the discussion must be "free of
experience and unencumbered by action", the ideal speech situation
runs the risk (from Habermas' point of view) of collapsing into a
contest between vested interest groups. Yet it is also clear that the
theoretical status of this conception, as well as its practical
possibility, are highly contentious. At the very least, Habermas
must specify the shifts involved in the transition from interaction
to discourse, and the process by which the knowledge generated in
the latter is translated back into the realm of action. McCarthy,
mindful of the difficulties associated with Habermas' precise attempt
to separate these two spheres, suggests the substitution of a
piecemeal model" 79 according to which "the move from action to
discourse would not amount to the total shift of communication
structures which Habermas seems to describe it as being". 80 How
this shift would affect the issues with which Habermas is concerned,
however
,
has not been considered in any depth. Until further
clarification is forthcoming, there will continue to be confusion
over the exact relationship between theory and action in Habermas'
thought
.
79
« o
McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence," loc. cit., p. ^93
ibid.
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Cone I us i on
It was asserted early in the chapter that the idea of reason
is inherent in our communication structures - that is, Habermas is
not explicating a "particular historical form of reason" but rather
one which is "contained necessarily in the way in which the species of
talking animals reproduces itself". This contention defines the
thrust of his entire theory, and its mere assertion is not sufficient.
Accordingly, Habermas needs to demonstrate that both the models which
reflect this idea of reason - the ideal speech situation, and the
model of pure communicative action, have been presupposed and
anticipated throughout human history. The historical variations in
cultural prescriptions regarding behavior compel, for Habermas,
... only one possibility of defending the claim to
universality that I have put forth for the model of pure
communicative action. First, we would have to show that the
structural change of world views obeys an inner logic, such that the
systematic variation of a basic pattern can be reconstructed. Over
and above this, it would have to be possible to derive from the
social evolution of world views a un i versa 1 i s t i c morality based on
the basic norms of speech and the ideas of the responsibly acting
person developed in the model of pure communicative action. 01
He faces a similar problem with the situation of discourse,
and it is one that is more historically tangible. Clearly, discourse
has not been a universally institutionalized form of interaction: in
o 1 Habermas, Lectures on Communication Theory
,
Lecture 6. pp. 11-12
classical Greece, discourse was considered a legitimate activity for
the purpose of examining mythical and religious world views; but it
was not until the seventeenth century, for example, that technical
knowledge was subjected to discursive examination; and it was around
the same time period that discourses were institutionalized such that
claims to validity relevant to political decisions could be considered
With this development, Habermas says, a "political public sphere came
into being, and in connection with this, representative forms of
government - bourgeois democracy". 02 Thus, if Habermas wants to
argue that the ideal speech situation is always presupposed and
anticipated in our communicative activity, he has to be able to
explain why discourse has not always been a prominent aspect of social
systems. Similarly, he has to be able to explain why the ideas of
the bourgeois revolution remained just that - ideas, which at this
point in history, are virtually devoid of substance.
The theory of social evolution attempts to establish the
universal character of the ideal speech situation and the model of
pure communicative action. It does this by locating their develop-
mental logic within a concrete historical, social and political
context. As such, it draws on, incorporates and extends many of
the original insights of Knowledge and Human Interests
. It is an
ambitious, almost flamboyant project, amounting to an attempted
11 ? Habermas, Theory and Practice
,
p. 26.
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reformulation of Marx's theory of historical materialism,
represents the last major theoretical component of Haberma
evolving oeuvre to be considered in the dissertation.
s
It
still
CHAPTER
A THEORY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION
Habermas
' theory of socia. evolution, which draws on his
earner work in know.ed 9e-consti tutive interests and on communication
theory, represents an attempt to re-conceptua
1 i ze Marx's theory of
historical materialism. For Marx, the fundamental element in the
developmental history of the species (and thus for the theory of
historical materialism generated by it) is the concept 'mode of
production', that is, the particular way in which human beings
produce their means of subsistence. Mode of production refers both
to the development of the actual productive forces (labor, capital,
equipment, etc.) and to the organizational forms in which the
activity of production goes on (referred to by Marx as relations of
production). He makes this clear in the following:
,
.
-.-The mode of production must not be considered simplybeing the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuaRather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, adefinite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life ortheir part ... What they are, therefore, coincides with their
production, both with what they produce and how they produce. 1
as
s
.
A particular mode of production is characterized by a
1
Karl Marx, The German Ideology
,
in Rober C. Tucker, The Marx-
Engels Reader
. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1972, p. 114.
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particular relationship between the forces of production and the
relations of production. A shift from one mode to another (e.g.,
from feuda. to capitalist) occurs because of the dynamic nature 0 f
that relationship: the forces of production give rise to certain
forms of social organization, which, in turn, modify the forces of
production. According to Marx, when the latter develop to a point
where the existing social organization can no longer effectively
contain them, a 'crisis' ensues, the result of which is that the
forces of production break those binds and produce, finally, a
higher form of social organization.
Habermas, drawing on his early differentiation between
instrumental and communicative action, has attempted to reformulate
this theory. The necessity for reformulation stems from Habermas'
conviction that Marx's theory, as it stands, (1) potentially implies
the reduction of social organizations to productive forces; and (2)
is susceptible to an
' economi s t i c
' interpretation - in other words,
the relations of production can be seen as inevitably economically
mediated. Habermas wants to argue that this is true only for
modern societies, and represents a particular (and therefore
t ranscendab 1 e) stage of the theory of social evolution rather than
an intrinsic feature.
A social system can be characterized, according to Habermas,
in terms of its ability to perform two essential tasks: "system
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integration" and "social integration". The former refers to the
necessity for a social system to maintain its existence vis-a-vis the
wider environment; the latter refers to the need for a social
system to provide meaningful interpretive schema, via a system of
norms and values, such that a secure social identity for individual
members of that society can be achieved. Thus Habermas re-labels
the Marxian notions of forces of production and relations of
production - the inaccessibility of this re-conceptual ization to
economic or any other reduction is apparent in this quotation:
r .
We speak of social integration in relation to the systems
rented T°nY n Speaking and actin 9 subjects are sociallylat . Social systems are seen here as 1 i fe-world s that aresymbolically structured. We speak of system integration wit-h a viewof the specific steering performances or se I t-regu 1 ated system.Social systems are cons idered here from the point of view of theircapacity to maintain their boundaries and their continued existenceby mastering. the complexity of an inconstant environment. Bothparadigms, life-world and system, are important. The problem is todemonstrate their interconnection. From the life-world perspective
we themat.ze the normative structures (values and institutions) of a
society ... From the system perspective, we thematize a society's
steering mechanisms and the extension of the scope of contingency
If we comprehend a social system as a life-world, then the steering
aspect is screened out. If we understand a society as a system, then
the fact that social reality consists in the facticity of recognized,
often counter factua
1 , validity claims is not taken into consideration.
This information allows Habermas to articulate more
rigorously the nature of the 'crisis' which heralds the shift to a new
mode of production. In this version, changes can occur at the
2 Habermas, Leg i t imat ion Crisis
, pp. A-5
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systemic leve, without necessarily threatening the continued existence
of the socia, system, i.e., without assuming the status of a
.crisis',
't is only when members of a society feel endangered at the level of
their social existence by those structural changes (i.e. when their
social integration is threatened) that one can properly speak of a
cns.s'. It occurs at a particular intersection of objective and
subjective forces.
existence'only'to^hrex^enl
l
^
9r
.
at]on ^danger continued
is, when the consensual foundations
^o^normative'sJructuJes'a^’
that
much impaired that the society becomes anomir r!*
8 S°
the form of a disintegration If™ tut ionl? ' S Stat8S a5S™8
It is at this point that the various pieces of Habermas'
theoretical puzzle begin to fall into place. For the theory of
social evolution sets out to give a concrete cast to the historical
progression of the two, interrelated dimensions along wich the human
species unfolds: the development of the forces of production (which
ensures system integration), and the development of normative
structures of human interaction (which pertains to social integration)
The former depends on technical knowledge which, according to
Habermas' analysis, incorporates "empirical assumptions that imply
truth claims, that is, discursively redeemable and fundamentally
criticizable claims". " The latter calls on pract ica I -mora
I
3 lbld
- > P- 3.
ibid., p
.
9.
4
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knowledge, and concerns itself with the interpretation of needs and
the legitimation of actions. This operates "through the medium of
norms that have need of justification" 5 u^ki i 1
1
. Habermas captures this
whole complex succinctly:
"The extension of (the social system’s)
autonomy is dependent on development in
... two dimensions - the
development of productive forces (truth) and the alteration of
normative structures (correctness/appropriateness)." 6
Unlike the determining relationship between the forces of
production and the relations of production postulated by Marx,
Habermas insists upon a more contiguous relationship. There is a
definite connection between the growth of scientific and technologica
knowledge and the movement of soc i o-cu 1 tu ra 1 life, but each
dimension follows an independent logic of development. Moreover,
that logic is a rationally reconstruct i bl e one, and it is the
tracing of such a pattern that concerns Habermas in his latest work
to be translated into English, Legitimation Crisis.
Habermas has characterized these patterns in terms of a
learning process. From this point of view, "the fundamental
mechanism for social evolution is to be found in an automatic
inability not to learn". 7 The growth of technical knowledge -
ibid.
, P- 10.
ibid.
,
P- 1 1 .
ibid. P- 15.
7
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generally if ^continuous, process
- stimulated by
th ' S ' earni "9 meChaniSm: 3" d developments reach the point
where the existing soda, or9an, nation cannot incorporate the. without
maj ° r diSrUPti °"- ‘ he to a new mode of production follows. At
this point, however, the postulation of a learning mechanism
responsible for the growth of technical knowledge is no longer of
assistance in explaining the particular for. of social organization
which is subsequently instituted in order to accurate the expanded
productive forces. It is not totally determined by the forces of
production; nor can it be satisfactorily explained as the result
of chance. Rather, Habermas argues, it reflects the result of
learning in a different dimension, the normative rather than the
technical. It requires knowledge of a pract lea I
-mora I kind, a
knowledge "which can seek its embodiment in structures of
interaction". 8
In Habermas' schema, then, world-views also follow a
directional pattern. Particular developments which would have to be
traced include the foil ow i n g
:
1
*
^ansion of the secular domain vis-a-vis the sphere of
the sacred;
2. A tendency to develop from far-reaching heteronomy to
increasing autonomy;
8 Habermas, "Toward a Reformulation of Historical Materialism"
loc. ci t.
, p. 293.
I 2^
3.
k.
5.
IS .h.
Increasing reflexivity of the mode of belief whirh ,
sv<;J
6en
f"
SeqUence: my th as immediately lived
00
:? f °r! e ? tat i°n ; teachings; revealedreHgion-rational religion; ideology. 9 * 9 ’
The kind of learning involved here is referred to as
•intersubjective’ or
-reflexive- learning: it
-takes place through
discourses in which we thematize practical validity claims that have
become problematic or have been rendered problematic through
institutionalized doubt, and redeem or dismiss them on the basis of
arguments". >• This is contrasted to non-ref lexive I earn i ng , wh i ch
occurs when normative validity claims are simply accepted or rejected
in lieu of discursive examination.
This indicates the movement from a situation in which tribes
understood themselves as differentiated from the (threatening)
universality of the cosmic order but allowed no sense of individualidentity for the members of the tribe, through to the development
of universal istic moral systems (that which is left from the
universal religions such as Christianity and Judaism - here the
connection to (3) is apparent). The latter provides the basis for
a world society which, at the same time, allows for individualistic
ego identities.
9 i
” Habermas, Legitimation Crisis
, pp. 11-12.
The similarity of this discussion to Kohlberg's work on moral
consciousness is fully acknowledged by Habermas, and he explicitly
incorporates Kohlberg's work in his discussion of the development
of ego identity. See Chapter 5.
10 ibid
- » P- 15.
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A particular societal organization can be placed on an
evolutionary continuum according to whether it ( 1 ) distinguishes
theoretical from practical issues ( i .e.
,
quest ions of 'is' and
'ought'); and (2) is at a stage of non- ref 1 ex i ve or reflexive
learning. A 'fully rational society' (i.e. one in which all norms
of political consequence are made in a situation of communication
free from domination) would be one in which theoretical and
practical issues were differentiated, and reflexive learning the
mode of operation. Such a society does not yet exist. The
present social organization has achieved the former condition, but
has excluded practical questions from discursive consideration on
the grounds that they are not "susceptible of truth". 11
Accordingly, "the institutionalization of general practical
discourse would introduce a new stage of learning for society". 12
Habermas has identified four major social formations:
primitive, t rad i t i ona
1 , liberal capi ta 1 i st , and advanced capitalist.
An examination of these four stages of social evolution will
illuminate the theoretical principles discussed in this section.
The primary focus will be on the latter two stages, for it is a
consideration of these forms
,
and an inquiry into the crisis
potentialities of advanced capitalism, that will help locate the
1
1
ibid
.
,
p . 1 6
.
1 2 ibid.
possible sources of the shift to an historically socia
,
organization (the 'fully rational society').
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The Analysis of Social Fo rma
t
i ons
ln £L' mit!ve social formations
. both social and system
integration are secured through the social rea
I
t ionshi ps of
family and tribe. In the face of an overwhelmingly hostile
environment, mythical » world images are generated which
provide the necessary schema of interpretation. Internal
disruption is less likelv- 'rricic' a-u-MKeiy, c s s
,
in this circumstance,
is externally engendered - natural disasters, wars
,
and so
forth.
The transition to a traditional social formation is
characterized by the growing domination of one class by
another. This is paralleled at an institutional level by
a separation between secular and sacred powers. Political
control is now transferred to the state (or kingdom)
,
which,
in its turn, is dependent on an infusion of mass loyalty for
its continued existence. The family loses economic functions
and some of its socializing functions. In line with, and
consequent upon, these institutional changes, tasks of social
1 3 The word "myth" here is not used in its present popular sense of
something widely believed but contrary to fact. Rather it is used
as Carl Sagan employs it: "as a metaphor of some subtlety on a
subject difficult to describe in any other way." Carl Sagan,
Dragons of Edon: Speculations on the Evolution of Human
Intel 1 i gence. New York: Random House, 1977, p.8.
and system integration are now performed by different
structures.
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While the steering capacity of this social formation is
greatly enhanced, this is achieved at substantial cost.
The separation of classes
,
one of which owns the means of
production and thereby dominates the other, allows for
burgeoning economic growth
,
but finally becomes a source of
conflict ultimately threatening to social integration.
For increase in the productive forces automatically raises
the extent of exploitation suffered by the oppressed class;
there is a resultant loss of legitimation afforded the
prevailing social order, and a 'crisis'
,
one that is
internally determined, develops.
In the next stage, that of liberal capitalism, the
oppression of the working class is rendered opaque it is
'de-pol iticized'
,
and domination is now no longer visible
in its previously naked form. This is achieved through the
appearance of an apparently 'rationalized' market system
which formulates a wage relationship based on the principle
of exchange of equivalents'
,
i.e.
,
income received for work
performed now attains the status of 'equivalent'. With
such a principle anchored in the legal system (which
supposedly guarantees the individual the right to a fair
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wage)
,
the conomic system can relinquish its dependence on
legitimation from the socio-cul tural system : rather, it
begins to generate its own legitimation.
'Exchange of
equivalents' becomes the ideological motif for the entire
social system - the economic system thereby assumes socially
integrative tasks.
This represents the emergence of the modern state; its
uncoupling from tradition means that it can now waive the
constraints of value-orientation and function instead on the
basis of a "strategic-utilitarian" 14 orientation, i .e.
,
maximization of profit, which is 'rationally' based and
justified on the grounds that benefits accrue to the entire
social system. Marcuse describes this well:
— The liberalist rationalization of economic life ... is
essential ly private . It is tied to the rational practice of
the individual economic subject or of a multiplicity of
individual economic subjects. In the end
,
of course
,
the
rationality of liberalist practice is supposed to demonstrate
itself in the whole and characterize the whole, but this
whole itself is outside the sphere of rationalization. The
harmony of general and private interests is supposed to
resu It of itself from the undisturbed course of private
practice. On principle, it is not subject to criticism, nor
does it fall within the bounds of rational projects for
practice. 15
14 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis
,
p. 21.
15 Herbert Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory
,
Boston,
Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1968, p. 17-
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This complex masks the reality, however, that class
domination still exists - surplus value still accrues to
those who own the means of production. It is the private
interest of a few which is still fundamental. The
obscurity is heightened by bourgeois ideology's appeal to
universal interests (pointed to in the guote from Marcuse)
,
which is buttressed by un i versa I i st i c value systems such as
those expressed in the 'Protestant ethic'.
On the one hand, this particular social formation allows for
major developments in both productive forces (technology,
etc.) and in normative structures (for the first time, there
is at least an appeal to un i versa 1 i st i c value systems, e.g.
,
all men are free and equal
,
have equal rights before the law,
equal opportunity for participation in the economic system,
and so forth. Such development stops short of Habermas'
'communicative ehtic'
,
however, as is clear from Marcuse's
quote, for the project as a whole is "outside the sphere of
rationalization"). On the other hand, howeve r, contrary to
both appearance and ideology, class domination is still
operative. Its concealment at a political level forces its
erupt ion
,
much disguised, elsewhere - at the level of
economic crisis.
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That economic crisis is the fir<;f .
in world history of a system crisis h
Perhap
?
onl v) example
In other words, it is the continually recurring economic
cr.ses associated with liberal capitalism which bespeak the
submerged class antagonism. ( I t is important to note in
this regard that, since the economic system has taken over
the task of social integration, crises in the former are
directly threatening to the latter. The social system is
far more vulnerable than ever before to disturbances in system
integration.) Crises, under these circumstances, acquire
the "objectivity of inexplicable, contingent, natural
events". 17 They cannot be apprehended for what they
represent; they have become inaccessible to reflection.
As long as the clash of interests remains unrecognized in
this way, Habermas refers to a "forcefully integrated"
action system.
Such forcefully integrated action systems are, of course, in
need of an ideological justification to conceal the
asymmetrical distribution of chances for the legitimate
satisfaction of needs (that is, repression of needs).
Communication between participants is then systematically
16 Habermas, Leg i t imat ion Crisis, p. 30.
1 7 Ibid.
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parties and be settUdt c '
a
T,T' tZl'”?'."assumes the ideolnnirai r y action. Instead it
intentions that subjects beMeve%hemsIwifirb^"66" theout and their as we cav , ir, • Ives to e carrying
interests. As soon as i ncompat i b! °i ryT
' V6S °
'
fundamen tal
conflict becomes manifest, and i r reconc ili abl e
C°" Scious
>
recognized as antagonistic interests >»
'Berests are
Habermas argues that the frequency and volatility of these
economic crises finally impels the state to intervene in
increasingly obvious fashion (this marks the shift to
advanced capitalism): it is at this juncture that the
opportunity emerges for those antagonistic interests to
become conscious again.
The distinctive feature of the shift from liberal to
advanced capitalism, according to Habermas, is the intervention
of the state into the process of reproducing the economic
system. With the high degree of capital concentration
associated with advanced capitalism (resulting from the rise
of national and multi-national corporations), weaknesses
begin to appear in the overall functioning of the economic
system. The state is forced to intervene to provide some
measure of stability for the business cycle (through such
mechanisms as price supports and guarantees; government
ibid.
,
p. 27.
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consumption, such as defense and space exploration;
regulating the flow of capital; and generally attempting to
juggle the competing imperatives of steady growth, foreign
trade, employment, etc.); to shore up the social infra-
structure necessary for continued economic expansion (such
as transportation, education, vocational training, health,
housing, etc.); to provide corrective measures to counter
the dysfunctional effects of the economic cycle (such as
unemployment, welfare, pollution control, etc.) and to
contribute in substantial manner to "(heightening) the
productivity of labor" as Habermas puts it.
19
This last aspect of increased state intervention in the
market is of major significance for Habermas' analysis of
advanced capitalism; it involves a major revision of Marx's
formulation of the labor theory of value. The latter,
Habermas argues, has come under increasing pressure because
of the apparent failure of Marx's prediction that the
rate of
profit must show a long-range tendency to decline;
moreover,
it provides no insight into what, for Habermas is
an
absolutely crucial aspect of advanced capitalism
-
2
"governmental policy in education, technology and
science".
1 ibid
.
, p . 55 •
l o ibid., pp. 56-57
13 *»
Habermas
1
revision of the classical labor theory of value
addresses both issues: he introduces (following O'Connor 21 )
the category of "indirect surplus value", produced by
"indirectly productive labor", or "labor applied to itself
with the aim of increasing the productivity of labor". 22
This "indirectly productive labor" is organized and managed
by the state rather than private enterprise, and involves
the promotion and support of scientific and technological
research, and of a system of education which produces similar
information and a highly qualified labor force - both
elements function to heighten the productivity of labor.
Such governmental activity, according to Habermas, alters
"the form of production of surplus value" - "in terms of the
theory of value, this fact is expressed in the cheapening of
constant capital and a rise in the rate of surplus value". 23
This revision makes it theoretically possible that an altered
form of the production of surplus value can compensate
for the tendential fall in the rate of profit;
moreover, the analysis allows for the possibility
2 1 See James O'Connor, The Corporations and the State
,
New York:
Harper and Row Publ i shers
,
197^, pp. 39~^*2
.
9 9
Habermas, Leg i t imat ion Crisis
,
p. 56.
2 3 ibid
.
,
p. 55.
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that the surplus value so produced is sufficient to
'appropriate' rate of profit, and at the same time,
level of real wages.
ensure an
a rising
Habermas argues, however, that this increasing regulatory role
on the part of the state finally works to crack the
ideological cement which supported the functioning of the
liberal-capitalist system, that is, the bourgeois ideology
of a self-regulating market based on fair and egual exchange.
This is because it amounts to a "re-coupling of the economic
system to the political", ** which in turn increases the need
for legitimation on the part of the members of the social
system. Because of the erosion of tradition under liberal
capitalism, the only source of legitimation is the bourgeois
ideological structure referred to above. An appeal to that
structure becomes dangerous, however, for insofar as it is
evident that the actual functioning of the economy differs
from its ideological base and that the results far from
approach the promise of that ideology, mass legitimation
is threatened. In the interests of continued functioning
of the present economic and social system, legitimation
must be secured without the contradictions becoming
1 themat i zed 1 .
2 ‘t ibid
.
,
p. 36.
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There is massive pressure, then, to ' de-pol i t i c ize
' the
public sphere: genuine participation in administrative
decision-making must be avoided. This has been achieved,
says Habermas, in two major ways. First, the de-
politicization requires justification. This is currently
undertaken through an appeal to technocratic systems
theories - the complexity of the entire system, the need for
technical expertise, national security and so forth, are all
invoked in the service of justifying the necessity for
administrative decisions to be made independent of the
motives and interests of the general population. Second,
de-pol i t icization is countenanced by two "motivational
syndromes" which underlie the legitimation afforded to the
social system. 25 The first is civic privatism*, which
consists in an attitudinal stance of concern with the
performance of the political system and its various rewards
(such as money, leisure time, security, etc.), but little
interest in active participation in that system. This is
supplemented by a fam i 1 i a 1 -vocat iona
1 privatism which denotes
a family-focused orientation, emphasizing consumption and
leisure, and a career orientation which accords with the
expectations generated by educational experience. The
25 ibid
.
,
p. 37.
These two "motivational syndromes" will be considered at greater
length in the section on Motivation Crisis . (See page 1^6)
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designation
"privatism" for
supportive function they hav
de po 1 iticization: they are
active political interest or
these attitudes clarifies the
e with regard to the process o
attitudes which stop short of
i nvo 1 vement
.
f
So long as the contradictions and antagonistic interests do
not become part of the public vocabulary, crises can be
managed without threat at the level of social integration,
and the requisite amount of legitimation continues to be
furnished to the economic and political system. Habermas'
argument suggests, however, that the juggling will become
more difficult: the inevitable increase in state
intervention into the social system threatens to 1 re-
politicize 1 the public. On the one hand, that increased
intervention generates an increased need for legitimation;
on the other, insofar as the state begins to seem more
active, and to the extent that it intrudes into
traditionally 'private' areas (particularly cultural areas),
the potential for public participation, questioning, and
protest expands. The basis for legitimation may be eroding
It is here, in these 'soft spots' of advanced capitalism,
that Habermas locates the source of potential crises.
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Possible Crises Tendpnr ies of Advanced Capital
i
sm
The complexity of the system of advanced capitalism is
manifested in the several sources of crisis which Habermas discerns:
he locates three sub-systems which operate as points of origin (the
economic system, the political system, and the socio-cui tural
system). Such a three-fold classification is significant, for it
captures schematically the tendency, specific to late capitalism,
for the initial disturbance to be suppressed, and then transferred
through the various sub-systems. When it emerges, it appears in
forms unrecognizable in terms of the original problem. The three
sub-systems, the various forms of crisis manifestation and their
relation to system and social integration are represented in the
following table:
Classification of Possible Crisis Tendenc i es 5
POINT OF ORIGIN SYSTEM CRISIS IDENTITY CRISIS
Economic System Economic Crisis
Political System Rationality Crisis Legitimation Crisis
Socio-Cultural System Motivation Crisis
* Source: Habermas, Legitimation Crisis
, p. 1^5.
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Habermas' analysis of the development of advanced capitalism,
and his specification of the possible crisis tendencies in this
particular social formation, are widely considered to be of major
significance. «• It allows him to suggest that economic crises need
not, as Marx had predicted, develop first into social crises and then
mt° political °nes
> but rather can be displaced to either the
political or the socio-cul tural system. Moreover, the
classification suggests that crises, while interrelated throughout the
sub-systems, can originate in other than the economic system. The
political impact of the analysis lies in its capacity to identify
pressure points which may prove amenable to sustained political
act ivi ty.
While Habermas had undertaken an extensive analysis of all
four crisis tendencies, the major focus in this dissertation will be
on the crises of legitimation and motivation. This choice is made
for several reasons: First, these crises represent distinctive
aspects of advanced capitalism, assuming a significance which they
have not had prior to the development of this particular social
formation. Second, it is here that Habermas has contributed most
to the ongoing investigation of the nature of advanced capitalism.
Third, it is these crisis tendencies which contain most potential (in
terms of their promotion) for political praxis, and thus are of most
2 6 See, for example, Trent Schroyer, "The Re-Politicization of the
Relations of Production", New German Critique, Number 5, Sprinq
1975
, pp. 107-128.
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relevance for a discussion of education.
Briefly, then, the economic crisis stems from the changed
economic circumstances (such as the massive concentration of capital
associated with the development of national and multi-national
corporations) and from the continued underlying pressure created by
class antagonisms (which erupts in the form of periodic economic
problems). Habermas distinguishes four categories of state
activity prompted by the imperatives of the economic system: 27
1 • The prerequisites of continued existence must be realized
(for example, the market system must be protected from
self-destructive side effects - anti-trust legislation is
an instance of this);
2- Market complementing adaptations (for example, the legal
system needs to adjust to new forms of business organization,
f i nanc i ng , etc . ) ;
3* Market-replacing actions (these occur in reaction to the
weaknesses of economic forces - the most important example
is the state's contribution to altered forms of production of
surpl us va 1 ue)
;
2 7 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp. 53 _ 5^-
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The state must ’•“pond to the dysfunctional consequences of
the economic system, and particularly those which elicit
politically effective reactions on the part of such groups
as environmentalists, unions, etc.
The rationality crisis follows directly from the economic
problems just enumerated: it emerges when the administrative system
fails in its task of juggling and fulfilling the contradictory
imperatives of the economic system. It represents the displacement
of problems in the market into the administrative system. The
rationality crisis is also intimately related to the legitimation
crisis, as is clear from the chart. With the political system
representing the connecting link, the rationality crisis is one of
output, while the legitimation crisis is one of input. The following
makes their relationship clear:
The state apparatus is ... faced simultaneously with two
tasks. On the one hand, it is supposed to raise the requisite amount
of taxes by skimming off profits and income and to use the available
taxes so rationally that crisis-ridden disturbances of growth can be
avoided. On the other hand, the selective raising of taxes, the
discernible pattern of priorities in their use, and the
administrative performances themselves must be so constituted that the
need for legitimation can be satisfied as it arises. If the state
fails in the former task, there is a deficit in administrative
rationality. If the state fails in the latter task, a deficit in
legitimation results. 28
28 ibid
.
,
p . 62
The legitimation crisis is central to Habermas' analysis of
advanced capitalism, for it is here that all the contradictions,
propelled by the internal logic of the system itself, emerge. Its
seminal importance is indicated in this quote from Schroyer: "Only
in the legitimation crisis is the crisis of system reproduction and
social industry thematized together; this is the logically necessary
condition for a revolutionary situation." 29
The political system of advanced capitalism, in order to
continue functioning in such a way as to maintain the continued
expansion of the social system, requires an input of mass loyalty
(that is, it requires widespread belief in its right to exercise
certain kinds of power and authority with impugnity). Whereas
under liberal capitalism that loyalty was cemented on the basis of
democratic principles supported by the ideology of a freely function-
ing market, advanced capitalism can no longer draw on this. It has
had to create a precarious balance between depoliticization, which
preserves nominal participation but little interest in political
activity, and the administrative requirements of furthering the
system as a whole. That balance is increasingly difficult to
maintain.
For, as has been suggested, state intervention is both
2 9 Schroyer, "The Re-Politicization of the Relations of Production",
loc
.
c i
t
.
,
p . 117*
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necessary to continued capitalist growth, and potentially
radicalizing in the same moment. The more the state intervenes to
ensure the continued expansion of the system, the more it requires
legitimation of the activity in the form of approbation from the
members of the soript-u-ce y, at the same time, however, that intervention
works precisely to place the structure and rationale of de-
politicization into question. Habermas contends that as long as
traditions and motivations are bound to norms that require
justification (even though that justification might be rarely
invoked), there arises a natural boundary beyond which the state
cannot pass without thereby precipitating public discussion and
questioning of these normative structures. This re-politicization
of the public sphere is exactly what the state must avoid.
Efforts at avoidance take the form of an attempt to remove
the actual functioning of the administrative system from public
perception and appraisal, and to replace it with a symbolic
functioning. Through the use of judicial hearings, consultations,
investigations, and so forth, an appearance of public participation
and involvement can be generated. In this process, certain other
issues can be diverted from public attention, and thus from discussion
and decision-making. This is an instance of what Habermas refers to
as "the political system (taking) over tasks of ideology planning". 30
3 0 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 70.
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Here, however, the state rues up against an impermeable barrier
because, according to Habermas, there cannot be "admi n i s t rat i ve
production of waning". •>
,n support of this pivotal assertion
that the cultural system is pecuiiariy resistant to administration
Habermas argues that culture, traditions, far from being created out
of the minds of advertising executives, evoive in an "unplanned,
like manner
, it is this unfolding property which enables
cultural traditions to "guarantee the continuity of a history through
which individuals and graoups can identify with themselves and with
one another
. Again, "traditions can retain legitimating force
only so long as they are not torn out of interpretive systems that
guarantee continuity and identity". » There are clearly limits, as
far as Habermas is concerned, to the attempt to compensate for
legitimation deficits through resorting to conscious manipulation.
Legitimating forces cannot be arbitrarily imposed without some form
of backlash.
That backlash, as suggested above, emerges in precisely the
activity the state seeks to suppress: public discourse. For the
state's attempt to implant legitimating norms reveals the contingency
31 ibid..
32
ibid..
33 ibid
.
3
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of normative structures as a whole. what was previously seen as
natural and legitimate, now appears as possibly fortuitous. Once
that nature-like character has been destroyed, traditions can only
re-anchored through a process of public discourse, and, presumably
those which cannot be discursively redeemed, would be abandoned.
be
A legitimation crisis can be averted if the state can
continue to satisfy the demands stimulated by its increasingly
visible role. These are often demands which might otherwise have
remained more quiescent: for more commodities, welfare benefits,
compensation, health and housing, occupational satisfaction, and so
forth. When such expectations cannot be fulfilled, or when former
provisions are withdrawn (as occurs when there is pressure from
economic and business sectors for fiscal restraint), the potential
for a crisis of legitimation rises sharply. It is reflected in the
beginning withdrawal of motivational commitment to the continued
functioning of the system. The intimate connection between
legitimation and motivation is revealed at this point.
A legitimation crisis ... must be based on a motivation
crisis _ that is, a discrepancy between the need for motives declared
by the state, the educational system and the occupational system on
the one hand, and the motivation supplied by the soc io-cu 1 tu ra 1 system
on the other. 35
3 5 ibid
.
,
pp. 74-75
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The mot ivat ion cris is concerns changes in the syndromes of
'civil' and
'familial-vocational' privatism, referred to earlier as
the major motivational- inputs from the socio-cul tural system to the
legitimation system. Civil privatism, on which depends the
successful de-politicization of the public sphere, consists in
interest in the performance of the political system, but not in active
participation in the process. This orientation towards the political
sphere is supplemented by fami 1 i al
-vocat ional privatism, which
concerns family-oriented consumption and leisure, and career interests
wh,ch meet both status needs and the expectations generated in the
process of education.
Habermas argues that, because of the internal logic of
advanced capitalism, these motivational patterns are gradually being
destroyed - first, because of the loss of traditions which provided
their basis; and second, because, as he puts it, "there are no
functional equivalents for the spent traditions, for they are
precluded by the logic of development of normative structures". 3
7
These two arguments will be considered in turn.
3 6 Habermas is aware that his discussion of 'motivation' takes a
comparatively narrow view of that concept. He has stressed the
need for more extensive work in this area, particularly with
regard to the soc io- 1 og i ca 1 and psychological aspects of
motivation and its relation to culture. He has recently attempted
this, drawing particularly on the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. See
Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity", loc. cit.
ibid
.
, pp. 75.
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The progressive erosion of traditions which
above motivational orientations stems, Habermas maintains,
from the very nature of those traditions: they represent
a mixture of capitalist and pre-capitalist elements. Thus,
for example, the bourgeois revolutions contained demands for
full citizen participation in the political process. The
continued growth of capitalism demanded, on the other hand,
less than active participation on the part of the populace -
this was secured by drawing on such pre-capitalist traditions
as respect for the authority of the ruling group.
Similarly, fami 1 i a 1 -vocat i ona
1 privatism is a mixture of
values: individualism and utilitarianism on the one hand,
and traditions generated by religious structures on the
other. As traditional world-views, and particularly those
of a a religious nature, cease to be motivationally
effective, bourgeois culture's dependence on them becomes
more evident, and their decline more threatening to social
identity. 38
2 . There are four aspects of Habermas' argument that the
socio-cul tural system is ultimately unable to reproduce the
requisite privatistic syndromes.
3 e Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 78.
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First, he argues that not only are the pre-bourgeois
traditions which support civil and fami l ial
-vocat ional
privatism declining, but they are being "non-renewabl
y
dismantled" 3 \ Such traditions are increasingly at
variance with the expansion of instrumental action: in
other words, there is a concomitant decrease in
communicative action. Indications of this instrumental
encroachment include: sc i ent i zat i on of professional
practice; growth of the service sector, such that human
relationships assume a commodity form; administrative
regulation of spheres of life previously regulated in an
informal fashion; commercialization of culture and
politics; and the expansion of scientific and
psychological techniques into areas such as child-rearing,
thereby affecting the socialization process as a whole. 40
With this increasing rationalization, traditions lose their
ability to offer meaningful interpretations and break up,
retaining only subjective appeal. Moral values lose their
relation to truth, and assume a relativist cast. Lost,
too, i s the utopian vision contained in religious and
traditional world-views.
39 ibid
., p. 79
4 0 ibid
., pp. 79-8O
Second, Habermas asserts that elements of bourgeois ideology
directly supportive of the desired motivational patterns are
also being dissolved because of rapid social change. For
example, the achievement ideology - the belief that social
rewards accrue on the basis of individual merit - requires,
if it is to be compelling, a situation of equal opportunity
for all members of the society to participate. Formerly,
the market was charged with this task; more recently, with
the obvious failure of the market mechanism, the educational
system has assumed the burden of supposedly providing equal
access to societal rewards. This fiction is increasingly
difficult to maintain, particularly at the present time when
educational achievements are clearly unrelated to later
occupational success, and the spectre of unemployment for
college graduates is very real.
Possessive individualism, another ideological support
mechanism, also encounters difficulty in maintaining its
bel ievabi 1 i ty. The conviction that the economic system could
function on the basis of free competition such that the social
good would be promoted through the untrammelled pursuit of
the individual good can no longer hold sway. Many
currently experienced needs are of a social rather than an
individual nature, and are simply not amenable to treatment
as commodities: housing, mass transit, health care, energy,
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and so forth. Moreover, there are growing segments of the
population who do not directly earn income, and are thus
less directly affected by the socializing effects of the
market: the aged, students, welfare recipients, and so
forth. Reduced working hours and consequent leisure
concerns also function to sever the population from direct
contact with the forms which gave life to the old
i deol og i es
.
Third, Habermas argues that certain residual elements of
bourgeois ideology - such as science and universal morality
- are, or have the potential of becoming, dysfunctional for
the motivational patterns they are supposed to reproduce.
The growth of science and technology, for example, while it
certainly spearheads the expansion of purpos i ve- rat i ona
1
action, also has some potential as a weapon of critique, and
consequent employment in the establishment of universal
discursive standards of rationality. The moral system,
originally enlisted in the service of the bourgeoisie, has
now evolved to the point where it turns back on the life-
giver and exacts the price of its abandonment. Originally,
bourgeois morality was based on principles, which derived in
large part from the universal religions (principally Judaism
and Christianity). When certain of those norms were no
longer functional for the expanding capitalist enterprise,
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the more congenial were lifted out of traditional structures
and formalized in a body of law. Morality based on
principle still makes an ultimate claim to universality; in
their application, the separation between the two sets of
norms becomes more overt. At least according to the
developmental logic of systems of social norms, this conflict
is resolvable only when the val idity of ah norms is tied to
discursive wi I I
-format ion
. The memory of the universally
applicable system of morality promulgated by liberal
capitalism cannot, Habermas maintains, simply be erased:
... the moral system can no more simply erase the memory of
a collectively attained state of moral consciousness, once
practical discourses have been permitted, than the
scientific system can retreat behind an attained state of
accumulated knowledge or block theoretical progress once
theoretical discourses have been institutionalized. 41
Habermas is certainly aware that a motivation crisis could be
avoided by the complete "uncoupling" 42 of the cultural
system. "By 'uncoupling 1
,
I mean a situation in which
culture remains an object of private enjoyment or of
professional interest, and is even admi n i strat i vel y placed
under conservation as a kind of free preserve, but is
separated from socialization processes." 43 This would
4 1 ibid.. PP . 87-88
4 2 ibid.
. P- 90.
4 3 ibid.
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allow, in turn
,
for
from its dependence
social system.
the freeing of the administrative system
on legitimation from members of the
Against this possibility, and this is the fourth step in the
argument, Habermas argues that
-fundamental convictions of
communicative ethics" and "experimental complexes of
counter-cultures" 44 have already achieved motive-forming
power. In other words, the progressive instrumental
rationalization of inner nature has not proceeded to the
point where resistance to the dominant ideology is
impossible. This is indicated, for Habermas, in the
substantial ly increased trend towards critical reflection of
the "socially tendered patterns of interpretation" 45
. He
discerns this happening in its most concentrated form at the
developmental stage of adolescence, and it exerts pressure,
he believes, against the likelihood of a continuing
"conventional outcome" 46 of this stage. He lists the
following indicators in support of this assertion:
expansion of the educational system is lengthening trainig
periods and making possible for increasing proportions of the
population a psycho-social moratorium in early adolescence
(from the thirteenth to the sixteenth year) and an extension
of this phase (in extreme cases, to the age of thirty);
4 4
4 5
ibid.
ibid.
46 ibid.
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- improved formal schooling of
increases the probability that
patterns of interpretation and
arise and intensify the problem
cogni t ive capaci t ies
dissonances between proferred
perceived social reality will
of identity;
- development of egalitarian famil
of child-rearing techniques typical
promote processes of socialization
with adolescent problems;
y structures and spread
of the middle classes
that tend to burden youth
- loosening of sexual prohibitions made possible bypharmaceutics works itself out (as does the temporary
direct T " d '! ferentiated according to strata - fromly economic pressures) in such a way that
scone V,f
at '°n
?
rOCeSS
?
5 free ° f anxiety, with an expandedp o experimentation, become more probable for
adol escents
.
These factors, together with the fact that it is at the stage
of adolescence that people develop the communicative skills
necessary for discourse, prompt Habermas to look to this
sector of the population as a "promising locus for
developing motivation and legitimation crisis" l+8
.
4
7
ibid
.
,
p
.
91.
4 8 n •Boris Frankel, "Habermas Talking: An Interview", Theory and
Soc i ety
,
Number 1, 197^, p. 57.
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Comment and Critique
The theory of social evolution is difficult to assess at
this stage of its development. It is at once highly speculative and
content-laden, providing one of the richest analyses of advanced
capitalism currently available. A detailed assessment must await
upon its further specification: this discussion will focus on some
of the more suggestive themes and, at the same time, will highlight
some of the troublesome issues.
First, the general attempt to delineate a theory of social
evolution is beset with many difficulties. Any such attempt is
immediately embroiled in the controversy surrounding the idea of
progress in history, and most particularly, the mechanism underlying
such progress. Habermas does not address himself to these broad
issues, but it is difficult to mount a substantial critique of his
work on this basis, for the issues seem virtually irresolvable at
this point. It is clear, however, that his articulation of a
possible new stage of social organization, based on a communicative
ethic, depends entirely for its substance on the evolutionary theory
he has outlined. To the degree that the latter remains clouded in
terms of any empirical content, the former must remain on the level
of speculation.
The necessity for further specification of the theory of
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socia, evolution is particularly crucial with regard to Habermas'
attempt to demonstrate the developmental nature of systems of
normative knowledge. This is one of the most suggestive aspects of
his work, but it requires extensive elaboration if its potential is
to be actualized. The relationship between the development of
normative knowledge on the one hand, and that of the productive
forces on the other, needs further explanation, particularly at the
point of 'crisis', and subsequent shift to a different stage of
social organization. The associated postulation of separate
learning mechanisms is similarly of potential significance,
particularly in the area of developing an effective political
praxis, and its exposition would be enriched greatly by the
adducement of relevant historical data. Held and Simon note at
least one consequence of the failure to locate the thesis in a
more concrete social and historical situation:
Habermas wants to talk of a logic of development of
communicative interaction and world-views that cannot be reduced to
the logic of the development of work and productive forces. In so
doing, his argument carries with it a certain tendency to legitimate
certain forms of distorted belief structures, and hence, repression,
in history as having been necessary at various evolutionary stages/
It becomes extremely important for Habermas to elaborate when, in
any given society he considers, a specific form of ideology is
legitimate and when it is surpassed, that is, what is the relationship
between necessary and unnecessary social repression in changing
social epochs? 49
4 9 •David Held and Lawrence Simon, "Toward Understanding Habermas",
New German Critique
,
Number 7, Winter 1976, p. 1^1.
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As was stated earlier, however, Habermas' analysis of the
social formations of liberal and advanced capitalism is a compelling
It represents a substantial improvement over previous attempts
to extend the original Marxist understanding of capitalist
development, and in particular, the transition from one stage to
another. His classification crisis tendencies in advanced
capitalism not only expands comprehension of its functioning, but
also greatly enlivens the possibilities of an effective political
prax i s
.
Particularly significant for twentieth century Marxism is
the articulation of the legitimation crisis, for, if Habermas'
analysis proves correct, it is here that some political leverage
might be gained. Insofar as problems of legitimation threaten to
thematize issues of both social and system integration, they
become the major 'soft spots' of advanced capitalism. Recent
United States history seems to bear out Habermas' diagnosis.
Certainly the last fifteen years has been marked by a
gradual decline in the belief in the legitimacy of the dominant
soc i a 1 and po litical institutions in this country. The wide-spread
civil disturbances characteristic of the late sixties was only the
most overt expression of that disillusionment. Daniel Moynihan
stated the problem clearly in a 1 969 memorandum to then President
Nixon: "What is at issue is the continued acceptance by the great
157
mass of people of the legitimacy and efficacy of the present
arrangements of American society and of our process for changing
those arrangements." 50
The concern was justified, for there had indeed been an
astonishing loss of faith in the American political system. It
began with American involvement in the Vietnam War, continued through
the revelations of Watergate, and lingers even now with disclosure of
C.I.A. activities against Chile and Cuba. Perhaps for the first
time in its history, American action in the cause of freedom can
muster little in the way of patriotism or commitment. Disenchantment
has proceeded equally at the domestic level: where once continued
affluence exerted a strong integrating force, there is now, on one
hand, a growing demand for quality - of consumer goods, or life style,
and of occupation. On the other hand, the recent economic crisis
has served to further undermine the conviction that not only will
prosperity continue to increase, but that all social needs will be
attended to in the process. Exorbidant prices, rising company
profits, and cutbacks in social services combine to expose the
ideological self-presentation of the economic system.
Habermas' analysis of the process by which the state tries
with decreasing success to negotiate the conflicting imperatives of
Quoted in Claus Mueller, The Politics of Communication . New York:
Oxford University Press, 1973, P- 5«
50
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"-Politicization and continued economic expansion has received
support front other sources. c.aus Mueller, in his booh The Politics
SLCo^unication, has thoroughly researched the political and legal
changes of the past ten to fifteen years with Habermas' analysis
explicitly in mind. Drawing on a Habermasian idea of 'distorted
communication', which he defines as "all forms of restricted and
prejudiced communication that by their nature inhibit a full
discussion of problems, issues and ideas that have public relevance"”,
he sets out to demonstrate how the political system has systematically
attempted to limit public communication in order that its own
'nterests prevail. He attests to many instances of the government's
efforts to control the nature and extent of information available to
the public. Representative of his citations is the following
paragraph.
candiHi
T
I
1e Pm S a0d po,icies of constrained communication were.d y stated by Justice Lewis F. Powell, two months prior to Msappointment to the Supreme Court by Nixon, in a confidential
memorandum that was circulated by the United States Chamber ofCommerce among high echelons in the business community. It wasrecommended in this memorandum that individuals and groups with
ZliH^ni'?'" 1 V ' eWS ° f American h^iness should be "penalized
Of MH ? ?
’"us i nessmen should influence universities for reasonsbalancing faculties, and textbooks should be "evaluated" as part
Wr n a ":ou 5 effo ^' in which "the wisdom, ingenuity and resources ofAmerican business (ought) to be marshalled against those who would
estroy it . Television programs should "be monitored in the same waytnat text-books should be kept under constant surveillance This
applies not merely to so-called educational programs ... but to the
ally "news analysis" which so often includes the most insidious type
of criticism of the enterprise system. 52
’ 1 Mue ller, op. c i t
. ,
p. 19.
52 ibid., p. 89 .
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Mueller, too, notes the shift to an attempted 'technocratic'
legitimation which, severed from traditional norms and principles,
creates a symbolic void which must be filled by some new rationale.
Efficiency, with consequent increased affluence, is the logical
legitimating principle, but as Mueller, like Habermas, points out,
this means that the individual's belief in legitimacy is tied much
more closely to the actual performance of the system. The state is
then far more vulnerable to economic and social disruption.
Mueller's generally scholarly analysis concludes at the same point as
does that of Habermas.
It appears that (this) particular constellation of economic,
social and political forces ... renders advanced capitalist societies
vulnerable or soft' at a point which hitherto seemed secure: the
transmission from one generation to the next of values and socially
and politically motivating symbols which induce acceptance of
authority. 53
Certainly the motivational reactions to this constellation
are widespread. There is probably, as Mueller notes, much greater
unwillingness to participate in the value systems which support the
functioning of advanced capitalism than at any previous time. There
are any number of indices to suggest this, beside the more overt
examples such as student protest, communal living experiments, health
foods, etc. In addition, there are signs such as increased worker
absenteeism, on-the-job sabotage, increasing numbers of people seeking
5 3 ibid., p . 11.
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part-time employment, and the break-up of traditional family
structures. All these tendencies intersect at the point where
undermine the dominant concerns for affluence and status. They
bespeak a desire to return to relationships and work situations
are non-exploi tat i ve, and which can find expression in forms and
interpretations other than those provided by the dominant social
model s
.
they
wh i ch
What is not clear, however, is the extent of the damage.
While there are indications that, as Habermas puts it, "fundamental
convictions of communicative ethics" and "experimental complexes of
counter-cultures" have achieved motive-forming power, there is little
to suggest at this point that that changed motivation will have any
significant effect on the present functioning of the social system.
The recent economic disruption, for example, has clearly exerted
renewed pressure on young people to acquire skills that will enable
them to find a job - in other words, there is pressure to return to
the dominant social models. Similarly, while the number of wedges
driven into the gap between American rhetoric and its reality
increases almost daily, the general public reaction seems to be one
of possive acceptance. The crisis of motivation, then, seems not
yet to be having a sustained political impact.
This leads to a consideration of one of the most seminal
aspects of Habermas' discussion: the assertion that "there is no
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admin i s t ra t i ve production of meaning-. ThIs „ of fundamenta
,
importance because according to Habermas, it imposes a natural iimit
on the state's ability to impose legitimating structures on the
members of the society. As people 'run out', so to speah. of
meanmg, the state attempts to compensate by providing 'value', i.e.,
more commodities. When 'value' runs out, according to Habermas, a
’
notivationa, crisis will be in full swing, and it is at this point,
presumably, that the crisis will assume a political form. Again,
however, such a crucial assertion, one which is fundamental to the
argument that the crisis of legitimation and motivation must increase,
necessitates more extensive investigation and analysis.
One other feature of the analysis which has received
relatively scant attention from reviewers, despite its centrality
to Habermas' formulations, is his revision of Marx's labor theory of
value, and particularly, the argument that there has been an
alteration in the form of the production of surplus value
.
55 His
clearest statement regarding this appears in his book Toward a
Rational Society:
The institutional pressure to augment the productivity of
Habermas, Legitimation Crisis
, p. 70.
55 One exception to this is Peter Laska's article "Habermas and the
Labor Theory of Value", New German Critique
,
No. 3, Fall 197 /4
,
pp. 15^-162. See also John Keane, "On Belaboring the Theory of
Economic Crisis: A reply to Laska" New German Critique, No. A,
Winter 1975, pp. 125-130.
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labor through the introduction of new technology has always
existed under capitalism ... With the advent of large-scale
industrial research, science, technology, and industrial utilization
were fused into a system. Since then, industrial research has been
linked up with research under government contract, which primarily
p romo t es scientific and technical prog ress in the military sector.
From there, information flows back into the sectors of civilian
production. Thus, technology and science became a leading productive
force, rendering inoperative the conditions of Marx's labor theory of
value. It is no longer meaningful to calculate the amount of capital
investment in research and development on the basis of the value of
unskilled (simple) labor power, when sc i ent i f i c- technol og i ca
1 progress
has become an independent source of surplus-value, in relation to
which the only source of surplus-value considered by Marx, namely the
labor-power of the immediate producers, plays an even smaller role. 56
Habermas is not alone in perceiving the enormous contribution
to continued capitalist ascendancy which government financed research
and education makes - in such changed circumstances, it seems
necessary to go beyond Marx's foot-noted comment in Volume 1 of
Cap i ta
1
to the effect that "science, generally speaking, cost the
capitalist nothing, a fact that by no means hinders him from
exploiting it", 57 and to consider in much greater depth the economic
and social impact of science and technology.
But Habermas does not seem entirely certain as to
of this relationship. It is not clear, for example, that
remained committed to the statement in the quotation above
the nature
he has
that
Habermas, Toward a Rational Society , p. 10A.
57 Karl Marx, Capi tal , Volume 1.
Publishers, 1967, P- 509-
New York: International
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"scientific-technological progress has become an independent source
of surpius-vaiue"; whiie he has nowhere repudiated it, there have
been suggestions of modifications. Thus, for example, he has been
increasingly insistent that technological innovations are always
dependent on labor for their actualization, and thus for their
ability to contribute to the generation of surpius-value. obviating
somewhat the force of the idea that scientific and technological
progress is an independent source of value.
in spite of such modifications, however, the most immediate
result of the revision would seem to be that the direct connection
between labor and the creation of surplus-value, so central to
Marx's analysis, has been abrogated. In the Marxian schema, value is
congealed labor, and, as such, it represents a social relation of the
most precise kind - the antagonistic relationship between capital and
1 abor
.
This draining of labor from the category of value, a
theoretical necessity stemming from the revision, is matched at a
terminological level in Habermas' use of the categories of 'science'
and 'technology', and this suggests a lessened regard for the labor
which is contained in such categories. In Habermas' work, they take
on a life of their own, much as 'commodity' did for the political
economists Marx criticized in Das Kapi tal
. It could similarly be
said, in fact, that Habermas' characterization of the relationship
16 A
between science, technology and surplus-value assumes "the fantastic
form of a relation between things" 58
. Interestingly enough, one of
Habermas' major contributions to an understanding of advanced
capitalism is his examination of the extent to which science and
technology have become ideological forces; he continues to deny,
however, their social and historical form.
The uncoupling of labor and surplus-value simultaneously
represents, as suggested before, the uncoupling of labor and capital,
resulting in a serious dilution of the antagonistic nature of the
relationship which obtained between them in Marx's analysis. Under
Habermas analysis, capital 's rel iance on surplus labor diminishes
greatly; and the limit to capitalist accumulation - which Marx
perceived in the fact that every worker had to spend at least part of
a work day in necessary labor - seems no longer operative. And, in
fact, as we have seen, this is an important piece of Habermas'
argument that the source of the crisis necessary for capitalism's
demise is no longer to be found in the economic sphere, but rather in
the sphere of legitimation.
As part of this shift, Habermas argues, the class struggle
no longer possesses that form; it has metamorphosed into a class
compromise. Central to this is the idea, available if we accept
58 Marx, op. c i
t
.
,
p. 72.
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Habermas
'
revision of the labor theory of value, that within an
expanding capitalist system, the surplus can
both a rate of profit satisfactory to capital
a rising level of real wages.
be sufficient to ensure
»
and, at the same time,
From Marx's point of view, the relationship between capital
and labor can only be one of fundamental conflict, "an antinomy'
t'9ht against right" 59
. For Habermas, advanced capitalism can bring
about a situation in which that "right against right" is transformed
'"to a bargain of mutual benefit. While he is adamant that the
conflict is in fact latent, the outward appearance hints, for him, at
the possibility of less-than violent transition to a higher form of
social evolution: "From this perspective, class conflict loses its
revolutionary guise, (and) a progressive democratization of society
is not excluded from the outset, even within the economic order of
capital ism" 60
.
This is perhaps the most significant implication of Habermas'
revision of Marx's labor theory of value: it theoretically allows
for a shift from the latter's conviction of the need for revolution
to the possibility of a non-violent graduated progression toward the
'fully rational society'.
59 ibid
.
,
p. 235-
Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 233.
It has been a common criticism of Habermas* work that his
theoretical constructions leads to a position of theoretical
conservatism. While this seems a premature judgement, it is
certainly true of Habermas, as of his colleagues in the Frankfurt
School, that he has been unable to address satisfactorily the
question of which group in society now bears the revolutionary burden
previously shouldered in Marxist theory by the working class.
His earlier work on the emancipatory interest involved a
transcendence of class interests as such - we must penetrate, he
wrote, "beyond the level of particular historical class interests to
disclose the fundamental interests of mankind as such, engaged in the
process of self-constitution" 61
. Given this position, and his
commitment to 'communication free from domination* for all men and
women, it becomes not only difficult, but also inappropriate, to
identify a 'revolutionary subject*. Habermas claims privileged
access to truth for no man, nor for any particular group or class of
men. Such a position is frustrating if one is interested in a
direct derivation of political praxis from Habermas' work. It is an
issue if the charge of political conservatism is to be successfully
countered
.
This leads, finally, to the question of Habermas'
6 1 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, p. 113 -
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-conceptual ization of the relationship of theory and praxis. His
initial formulation, based largely on the model of a psychoanalytic
dialogue, was widely criticized, as will be recalled from Chapter
One. The development of his communication theory, together with the
outline of a theory of social evolution, allow him to make a more
precise determination of this relationship. He summarizes the
original critique made against him in the following way:
that
... from the conservative side, the misgivings readily arisea transferring of the doctor-patient model to political praxisof large groups would encourage the uncontrolled exercise of force on
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because the pacifist illusionse t e critical insight will by itself destroy thedominating dogmatism of existing institutions. 62
Drawing on the differentiation between reconstruction and
critique on one hand, and action and discourse on the other, Habermas
now attempts to specify his understanding of the relationship between
theory and praxis; he remains, however, particularly concerned to
retain the centrality of the activity of reflection he found so
striking in the psychoanalytic model. He describes it in this way;
The meditation of theory and praxis can only be clarified
if, to begin with, we distinguish three functions which are measured
in terms of different criteria: the formulation and extension of
62 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 16.
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From this perspective, the theory can have as its referent
all members of the society, and this, despite the fact that numbers
of them (and particularly members of the ruling class) do not
participate in the activity of its generation. In such a situation
of course, genuine confirmation of the theory remains unattainable
until such time as all are able to participate in the interaction
situation of discourse.
In distinguishing discourse from what he calls the
organization of processes of enlightenment 1
,
Habermas argues that
the latter 'can (initially) be confined to the groups distinguished
by their situations of interest" 64
.
The theory serves primarily to enlighten those to whom it is
addressed about the position they occupy in an antagonistic social
system and about the interests of which they must become conscious in
this situation as being objectively theirs. Only to the degree that
organized enlightenment and consultation lead to those groups toward
which this is directed actually recognizing themselves in the
interpretations offered, do the analytically proposed interpretations
63 ibid.
,
p. 32.
64 ibid.
,
p
.
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The organization of enlightenment, then, can be considered
successful to the extent that it initiates processes of reflection.
Failure to achieve this suggests that the theory is in need of
correction.
The third aspect of the relationship between theory and
praxis concerns the organization of political action. Habermas is
very clear at this point that such organization cannot be directly
derived from the theory.
-'While the theory legitimizes the work of
enlightenment, as well as providing its own refutation when
communication fails, ... it can by no means legitimize a fortiori the
risky decision of strategic action." 66
Habermas' major concern here is to demonstrate that the
generation of theory and the organization of action are two separate
processes, despite their mediation via the organization of
en 1
i ghtenment . Theory cannot be subjected to the requirements of
political action; nor can it be asserted dogmatically over the
head, as it were, of the people to whom it is addressed.
6 5 ibid
.
,
p. 32
.
6 6 ibid
.
,
p. 33.
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Habermas is (almost painfully) aware of the necessity for
''tak a partisan position- with a,
, the conseguences thereby
incurred. There comes a moment of choice for groups which consider
tHemseWes
'theoretically enlightened': they must choose
"with a
to their opponents, in each instance between enlightenment and
struggie. thus between maintaining and breaking off co™, cation-
Because Habermas can theoreticaily presuppose a (counterfactua,
)
-interrupted reiationship between opposing groups, he can insist
that oniy discursive interaction between a,
, participants (which is
-Possible at that point in time) can decide the truth of the theory
Prom this perspective, political activity becomes a "moment of a
coliective process of education or consciousness formation which is
not yet concluded" 69
.
It seems clear from the above, and from other of his
writings, that the breaking off of communication and dialogue
- such
as occurs when there is a resort to militant struggle - is
distasteful to Habermas. He opts instead for a process of 'radical
reformism' which he defines as "an attempt to use the institutions of
present day capitalism in order to challenge and to test the basic or
kernal institutions of this system" 7 '. Inserted into his theory of
ibid
.
, p. 36.
08 ibid
.
, p. 38 .
6 9 ibid
.
,
p. ZjO.
See Frankel, "Habermas Talking: An Interview", | oc
. ci t.
. p . 53.
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social evolution, this amounts to actively attempting to create
legitimation and motivation problems in the society, that is. to push
for the re-politicization of the public sphere. Of major relevance
for this dissertation in this regard is the following cogent.
'.One
might point out today that in advanced capitalism, changing the
structure of the general system of education might possible be more
important for the organization of enlightenment than the ineffectual
training of cadres or the building of impotent parties. .71
71 Habermas, Theory and Practice
, pp. 31-32.
CHAPTER IV
EDUCATION: THE FORMATION OF A TECHNOCRATIC CONSCIOUSNESS
The Possibilities for Praxis
One of the more consistent charges levelled at Habermas is
that his work contains few guidelines for a political praxis, and as
was just noted, that it actually shifts concern away from the concrete
realities of social and political life. while some, such as Hiller,
see the work as nothing more than a "provocative cul-de-sac" 1
,
most
commentators have reserved judgement at this stage, making clear at
the same time, however, that the theory is badly in need of an
infusion of practical politics if it is to make good its promise.
John Keane, for example, writes:
Until a theory of organization is built into the dialect of
distorted and unrepressed interaction, Habermas' critical theory will
suffer the ironic fate of all preceding critical theory. It will be
left without either the rationale or the means of revolutionizing late
capi tal ist society. 2
It is certainly true that Habermas offers little in the way
1 Miller, "Review of Legitimation Crisis", loc. cit., p. 220.
2 Keane, "Habermas on Work and Interaction", loc. cit.
,
p. 100.
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Of a concrete program as that is frequent, y understood. part
,
this stems from his commitment to the belief that the oniy people
who can legit imatel y decide on the particuiars of strategic poiitica,
action are those who are willing to engage in it. and to risk the
consequences of that engagement. This implies a strong critique of
the image of the revolutionary vanguard, formuiating and impiementing
a political strategy with little regard to the needs and interests of
the people on whose behalf it is supposedly acting.
, t stems
,
too>
from his previously noted lack of faith in militant activity as a
possibility, given the nature of advanced capitalist societies. He
says in an i nterv i ew wi th Boris Frankel
,
„
.
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3 breakdown of ba sic functions of theys , beginning with fuel and ending in water, etc. 3
It does not follow from this, however, that Habermas offers
nothing in the way of guidelines for political action; rather, it
will be argued here, the object of the political impl i cat ions of his
theory differs from that frequently associated with the notion of a
practical politics'. Habermas' political program concerns the
formation of consciousness, and of the institutional structures which
shape and support it. It is here, for Habermas, that the source of
Frankel, "Habermas Talking: An Interview", loc. ci t.
, p. 58.
F rom
genuine individual and social transformation is to be found,
this point of view, destruction of the form (the visible
institutional representations of advanced capitalism) will not
necessarily impinge at all on the content (the internalized
consciousness which supports and reproduces it).*
To place this within the context of Habermas' re-formulation
of the relationship between theory and praxis, it can be argued that
the political implications of his work are most clearly visible at
the stage designated 'organization of processes of enlightenment',
rather than at the stage of the development of political strategy.
Only when people are able to understand themselves, through engaging
" Controversy over this issue has a long history. One of the more
recent significant contributions to the discussion has come from
the Frankfurt School's analysis of the failure of Soviet Communism
as being a function of (at least in part) the mistaken assumption
that changed social conditions necessarily effect a changed
consciousness in the members of the society. Habermas' work on the
developmental logic of world-views can add considerably to the
strength of this analysis. In a recent article on Russian
popu lists, Aileen Ke 1
1 y captures the con t rove rsy in a very graphic
fash i on
:
Against Bakunin's credo that violent destruction of the
existing order was the quickest path to utopia, (Herzen)
argued that those who seek to raze the field of history
to ashes are overgrown students, living in a world of
abstractions, unaware that "this field with all its wheat
and cockle is the immediate ground of the people, of all
its moral life, all its habits and all its consolations".
The popular consciousness, as the product of the past,
contains the contradictions of the past. 4
Aileen Kelly, "Good For the Populists", New York Review of Books
,
Volume XXIV, Number II, June 23, 1977, P- lA.
4
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- ' "tersubj ect i ve activity, as the makers
of history can they act consciously to transform their present
historical circumstance. The form of that attempted transformation
will depend on who is involved, when, and with what purpose in mind.
It is certainly possible to critique this as a program for
political action, but it is inaccurate to argue that Habermas'
theory does not contain, or cannot generate, such a program.
As was mentioned at the end of the previous chapter,
Habermas has, in fact, explicitly endorsed a program of radical
reformism, a policy he defines as "an attempt to use the
institutions of present day capitalism to challenge and to test the
basic or kernel institutions of this system" 5
.
In the interview referred to earlier, Habermas mentions
specific examples of what he considers the most effective kind of
political action in advanced capitalist societies (he is careful to
point out that this will vary from country to country, depending on
the particular situation): organizaing wild-cat strikes and
inserting workers' demands into clearly political frameworks;
mobilizing larger sections of the population on specifically
political issues; taking the more liberal or progressive politicians
Frankel
,
"Habermas Talking: An Interview", 1 oc
. c i t
.
,
p. 53.
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at their word and pushing for promised changes and reforms "without
any concern for the vested interests of economically and politically
dominating groups" 6
. In other words, Habermas is concerned to
exploit all possibilities of promoting motivation and legitimation
crises in the society. This follows very naturally, of course, from
his analysis of the possible sources of breakdown in late capitalist
soc i ety
.
Habermas has, at various times, referred to the educational
system as one of the institutions most amenable to this policy of
radical reformism. He was explicitly concerned with such
possibilities during the student uprisings of the late sixties; and
his subsequent work contains numerous references to the educational
system, so it has continued to be of significance for him
theoretically. He has recently indicated his intention of becoming
more involved at a practical level.
I will get involved in curriculum issues for high schools ...
I think that these material questions of what the children will learn
are relevant if the hypothesis is correct that the educational system
will be the promising locus of creating legitimation and motivation
problems in this capitalist system. 7
Developing a theory of education based on Habermas' work
6 ibid
.
,
p. 54.
7 ibid
.
,
p. 57.
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would seem to be a fruitful endeavor on a number of counts: first,
U WOUld PrOVide 3 mec ^an i sm by which to consider the possibilities
contained in that work for the generation of a political praxis;
second, because there are numerous implications for education
throughout his work (both explicit and implicit), a systematic attempt
to draw them out and constitute them as a theory would provide a
perspective fromwhichto reflect back on the theory itself; and,
finally, a Habermasian theory of education, radical in aim and
content, would contribute to the body of theory known as philosophy
of education. The significance of that contribution will be
considered according to its ability to (I) extend the critique of
education which emerged so dramatically in the late sixties and early
seventies; (2) shed light on the apparent faltering of that critique
in the past few years; and (3) further the search for a genuinely
radical education.
Accordingly, this chapter will examine, through the lens of
Habermasian categories, the present functioning of education in
America, and provide a perspective from which to view recent
critiques of that functioning. The following chapter will develop,
on the basis of the first three chapters, the rudiments of a
radically-motivated theory of education.
be made
It should be noted at this point that while reference will
in the following discussion to the system of education in
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general, the primary focus win be on education at the high school
and college level. This emphasis responds to Habermas' conviction,
based on his work both on the development of communicative competence
and on the crisis tendencies of late capitalism, that it is
adolescents in particular who are in a position to develop critical
perspectives on the society which are both far-reaching and telling.
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The Formation of Technocrat ir. Con sc i ousness
It Will be argued in this chapter that Habermas' theory of
knowledge-constitutive interests, despite the difficulties associated
with it, provides a useful overall framework for a discussion of
current educational structures and activities. More specifically,
his distinction between instrumental and communicative acitivity
serves to anchor a critique of that operation. The argument which
will be developed is that the current educational project is one of
fashioning a 'technocratic consciousness': it seeks to create
'technical man
',
speak i ng and acting subjects who are completely
assimilated to a scientific and technological society. This stands
in contrast to an educational endeavor concerned to develop what
might be called a 'communicative consciousness'; education, from
this point of view, would have as its primary orientation the main-
tenance and expansion of intersubjectivity. It would be concerned
with the transmission and mediation of social understandings - of
values, traditions, beliefs - with a view to enabling students to
participate in deliberation and rational decision-making about the
future functioning of their social world. A critique of education,
then, would pursue the process by which education has been perverted
by the migration of purpos i ve- rat iona 1 systems of action into those of
an interactional kind; it would promote the kind of reflective
activity which would lead to the action necessary to re-const i tute the
appropriate relationship between communicative and instrumental
activity in education.
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It may be helpful at this point to re-state
distinction that Habermas draws between instrumental
communicative action:
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The former relationship treats of manipulation and control.
The process of theory construction, hypothesis testing, observation
and measurement culminates in the formulation of information which is
verifiable, general izable, and ultimately, technically usable. It
searches out the regularities of nature, such that they might be
understood more clearly and utilized more effectively.
The latter relationship is of a different order: here we
encounter other human beings, "speaking and acting subjects", it is a
relationship of communication and interaction rather than of control.
Such interaction both aims at and reflects some kind of mutual
understanding; it is representative of the broader social under-
standings that we share and on the basis of which we structure our
lives. Accordingly, the knowledge generated in this encounter is
8 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 8.
1 8
1
interpretive rather than informative: it is not a deduced predictable
knowledge, coming at the end of a series of carefully controlled
movements; rather it draws on different traditions and beliefs,
mediating the nuances of those interpretations. It acts to broaden
the consensus obtaining between people about the possible ways and
mot i ves of living.
An idea of education as both representative of, and
pursuant to, the maintenance and expansion of intersubjectivity has
its roots in the Greek tradition; its current expression is most
clearly identified in the idea of a liberal arts education. Michael
Oakeshott, one of the most eloquent proponents of such an education,
describes it in these words:
... (education) is a transaction between human beings and
postulants to a human condition in which newcomers are initiated into
an inheritance of human achievements of understanding and belief ...
(Education is not) acquiring an aptitude for imitating current adult
human performances; it is learning to perform humanly. Education is
not acquiring a stock of ready-made ideas, images, sentiments, beliefs
etc.; it is learning to look, to listen, to think, to feel, to
imagine, to believe, to understand, to choose, and to wish. It is a
postulant to a human condition learning to recognize himself as a
human being in the only way in which this is possible; namely, by
seeing himself in the mirror of an inheritance of human understandings
and activities and thus himself acquiring (in the words of Leibniz)
the character of un m i ro i r v i vant ... acquiring the ability to throw
back upon the world his own version of a human being in conduct which
is both a self-disclosure and a self-enactment. 9
9 Michael Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration",
in R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (Eds.), Education and
The Development of Reason . Boston, Massachusetts: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1972, p. 22.
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In accord with this conception, the Greeks understood
education as a "serious and orderly initiation into an intellectual,
'mag, native, moral, and emotional inheritance" >• (and to that end, a
carefully worked out curriculum helped channel the thought and attention
of the learner); moreover, it was considered an "engagement to learn
by study"
. I n other words
,
educat ion requ i red effort
,
d i sc i pi ine
,
and concentration on the part of the learner. Thirdly, education
imp I ied "detachment from the immediate local world of the learner, its
current concerns and the direction it gives to his attention" 12
.
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bUt questions wh 'oh have never beforeto him; here he may acquire new "interests" and pursue themuncorrupted by the need for immediate results; here he may learn toseek satisfactions he had never yet imagined or wished for! 13
Finally, implicit in this idea of education is the notion of
a personal transaction between a 'teacher' and a 'learner* " 14
. The
teacher is one in whom the heritage of the culture takes on a concretely
living' form, and it is his/her function to impart it: "to teach is
1
°
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12 ibid
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13 ibid
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to bring it about that, somehow, something of worth intended by a
teacher is learned, understood and remembered by a learner" 15
.
The idea of inquiry contained in this conception of
education is strikingly similar to the kind of hermeneutical activity
which Habermas made so central to his discussion of the practical-
cognitive interest. 16 Scattered references to the hermeneutic
tradition in recent educational literature 17 indicate an embryonic
but growing interest in its more explicit incorporation into
educational philosophy. It would certainly be germane to any
formulation of a theory of education based on Habermas' work.
One of the more salient (for this discussion) features of
this Greek concept of education is that it explicitly sets itself
apart from what we would describe as technical or vocational
education. It has no extrinsic 'end' or purpose.
... for the teacher, it is part of his engagement of being
human; for the learner, it is the engagement of becoming human. It
does not equip the newcomer to do anything specific; it gives him no
15 ibid.
16 See Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests , pp. 1 6
3
-
1 7 1 -
17 See, for example, Dwayne Heubner, "Toward a Remaking of
Curricular Language", in William Pinar (ed.), Heightened
Consciousness, Cultural Revolution and Curriculum Theory.
Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 197^,
PP. 36-53.
1 8*1
and it points to’no
'
a
^
Vanta9e °« r other men,
participating in thi, ZIT
'
E“h
’
large part of an inheritance of human understandings!
0
*"
Sma " ° r
It seems quite clear at this point that education in America
has, as a primary focus, the equipping of students with the various
occupational skills necessary for effective participation in the
social order. From the point of view of the position just examined,
modern education has, in fact, acquired an extrinsic purpose; rather
than an initiation into understandings, education is now primarily an
initiation into the skills, activities and attitudes required for
that participation. From a Habermasian perspective, this bespeaks
(although it is not a necessary correlate of) a de-emphasis on the
communicative aspects of the educational endeavour in favour of the
instrumental. A brief historical glance at the shift will clarify
this. 19
Techn i ca 1
-vocat i ona 1 education was once not considered
education, but rather as an alternative to education for those not
able to enter the traditional schools and universities. It was
1 8 Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration",
loc
. c i t
.
, p. 26.
19 See especially Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement - Its
Frustration" loc. cit . Supplementary references include Michael
Katz (ed.) School Reform: Past and Present
,
Boston, Massachusetts:
Little, Brown and Company 1971 and Clarence J. Karier, Paul Violas,
and Joel Spring, Roots of Crisis: American Education in the
Twentieth Century
,
Chicago: Rand McNally Publishing Company 1973*
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considered at the time of its inception (in the early eighteenth
century) as the development of useful skills for the poor: while its
rhetoric was altruistic, its intent was more utilitarian. Such a
program would not only service the needs of the growing industrial
economies of Europe, but it would also further the integration of the
society (by extending more control over potentially disruptive
elements). Always responsive to the changing economic requirements,
these trade-schools', as they were known, expanded rapidly at the
time of the industrial revolution, gradually spawning institutions
which catered not only to the poor, but also to those entering the
newly created commercial positions necessitated by the burgeoning of
economic life. The need for widespread cheap education became
paramount for the continued expansion of the industrial and commercial
world; the call for public education has its roots here. Such a
call was frequently couched in the rhetoric of social reform,
invoking, as it did, concerns for justice and equality, but it was, at
the same time, closely tied to the needs of the newly evolving social
order. Two quotes from Horace Mann, one of the leading American
educational theorists of the time, illustrate well this dual under-
standing of the function of education as it was conceived in the mid
nineteenth century. Speaking in 18A2, he said:
Education ... beyond all other devices of human origin, is
the great equalizer of the conditions of men - the balance wheel of
the social machinery ... It does better than to disarm the poor of
186
their hostility toward the rich
; it prevents being poor. 20
In a speech in which he was trying to make a case to the
business community for public education, he said the following:
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The gradual assimilation of education to the economic world,
particularly as this has occurred since the late nineteenth century,
has been well documented over the last ten years by authors such as
Michael Katz, Clarence Karier, Joel Spring, Sam Bowles, and Herb
Gmt'S. 22 They have sought to demonstrate, and they have amassed
considerable evidence in doing so, that, contrary to the rhetoric of
American education, schools in America have not only had the teaching
of occupation skills as a primary concern, they have also inculcated
2 0 Quoted i n Samue 1 Bow les and Herb Gintis, Schoo ling in Capitalist
America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic
2 1
Life, New York: Basic Books, 1 976
. ,
p"! 28 .
Quoted in Clarence J. Karier, "Business Values and the
Educational State", C. Karier, P. Violas and J. Spring, op. cit.
p. 12 .
’
Katz, op. cit .; Karier, Violas and Spring, op. cit.; and Bowles
and Gintis, op. cit.
22
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the attitudes and values necessary for the continuation of the
Present economic (and poiiticai) system, and that, in addition, they
have functioned to
.aintain and re-produce a Cass structure which
,S at the ba5iS of that system's operation. contrast fo , .r>tra t claims
that education in America is "the nrpafgreat equal, zer of the conditions
of men", these authors arque that ns jy 6 n
> a Karier describes it, "The
school
... exists as an instrument of social and economic power for
the most influentia. and elite groups in society, and for the
political and social organizations through which the society is
managed" 2 3
.
One aspect of this transition that illuminates the argument
that it was a shift from communicative to instrumental focus is
pointed to in Walter Feinberg's analysis of the intellectual
foundations of twentieth century liberal educational policy.
Michael Apple, in his review of Feinberg's book, cites the author to
the effect that the major differences between educational
theorizing in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries was "the
extent that the requirements of sicence and technology found a place
in the theory" 24
. Educational theories of the nineteenth century
were ethically based; the focus of later theorizing, including
Karier, "Business Values and the Educational Stated, loc. cit.
p. 6. *
Quoted in Michael Apple, "Rationality as Ideology: Review of
Reason and Rhetoric
,
Educational Theory. Vol . ?fi. N..mh»r i
Winter 1976. p. 12**.
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discussion on human nature and the function of education was
conscious designed, Feinberg argues, "to meet shifting socia, and
technological requirements"”. The argument being developed here is
not intended to imply that education should return to the moral
values of the nineteenth century to secure a iegitimate basis for its
operations; it is to suggest, however, that the standards of science
have gradually taken over the role once enjoyed by the standards of
morality. This shift was celebrated in the early twentieth century
by industrialists and reformers alike - as far as the latter were
concerned, the application of apparently neutral scientific and
technological principles to the institution of education held
distinct promise as a way to ameliorate the more repressive features
of the society. That faith in the potential of science for
education remains virtually unassailed today.
Apple, in his review of Feinberg's book, succinctly describes
in the following quotation the appeal of science for educational
theorists, and at the same time points out how science, as a linguistic
system, has assumed the status of an ideological world-view for
education. (Note that while the quotation refers specifically to the
progressive reformers of the twenties, its content is equally relevant
in a modern context.)
2 5 ibid.
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.. ma ly not only did it justify educators* activity
... but italso helped attract recruits, committed individuals who would laborfor the cause. Furthermore, it acted as a hortatory device thatcould prescribe action that should be taken by various individuals
and groups. This was primarily a political use of language in whichscience and technology carried a logical imperative and an ideological
commitment needed to convince people to join a movement for
ameliorative institutional reform, 26
This is precisely the point at which Habermas' critique finds
its mark. Unlike some of the more intransigent adherents to the
Greek tradition of education, such as Oakeshott, Habermas would not be
indignant about the incorporation of scientific, technical, and
vocational enterprises into the institution we know as education. He
would not, for example, consider science a second-class form of
knowledge (as Oakeshott does) - he would view it, on the contrary, as
indispensable to the continued transformation of the world in which we
Apple, "Rationality as Ideology: Review of Reason and Rhetoric"
loc. ci t.
, p. 126.
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live, and thus to the projected emancipation of mankind. On the
other hand, he would be quite opposed to the assumption that
scientific and technical knowledge was the most valid, or valuable,
form of learning; and he would argue vehemently that to the extent
that the technical ethos begins to invade the conception of education
as an institution and as an activity, to that extent it becomes
instrumental. Education, for Habermas, must recognize that it is an
activity of communication; it must remain rooted in, responsive to,
and committed to the continued expansion of, i ntersubject i v i ty
.
Accordingly, it must reverse the present trend towards its
assimilation to the logic of scientific and technological progress.
Such a perspective enables us to discern more clearly that
the current educational project is indeed the formation of a
technocratic consciousness. Habermas captures the essence of the
latter in the following:
Technocratic consciousness reflects not the sundering of an
ethical situation, but the repression of "ethics" as such as a
category of life. The common, positivist way of thinking renders
inert the frame of reference of interaction in ordinary language, in
which domination and ideology both arise under conditions of
distorted communication, and can be reflectively detected and broken
down. The de-politicization of the mass of the population, which is
legitimated through technocratic consciousness, is at the same time
men s self-objectification in categories equally of both purposive-
rational action and adaptive behaviour. The reified models of science
migrate into the socio-cultural lif e -wo rid and gain objective powe
r
over the latter's self-understanding. The ideological nucleus of
this consciousness is the elimination of the distinction between the
practical and the technical. 27
2 7 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society
,
pp. 112-113.
191
Apple's quote makes it clear how the image contained in
science of a rational, predictable order could seem desirable to
educators; what was less clear to them, it seems, is that, contrary
to appearances and self-presentation, science and technology carry
implicit moral meanings of their own. It is this dimension, pointed
to by Habermas, which has remained impregnable to understanding and
critique. Science appears to eschew moral and normative issues; but
as Habermas has pointed out,
its underlying premise is the value of empirical scientific
theories, and this not simply hypothetically, but normatively. For
with its first analytic step, it already presupposes, normatively,
that behaving in accordance with technical recommendations is not
only desirable but also rational. 28
Progress, efficiency, industrial growth, and continued
ex pan s ion - these hall ma rks of capitalist society are po rtrayed, and
accepted, as rational, as natural. Within an educational framework,
this 'rationality 1 asserts itself in the assumption that the
educational system should have, as its primary goal, meeting the
intellectual and manpower needs of a highly complex, industrialized
and powerful nation. Any questioning of such 'rational' ends can only
be comprehended as romantic and old-fashioned.
Habermas has commented directly on this assimilation of
2 8 Habermas, Theory and Practice
,
p. 269-
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education to the technological needs of the society in an essay
entitled "The University in a Democracy - Democratization of the
University" in which he outlines the tasks he considers the
university has an obligation to perform vis-a-vis the society. 25
He uses, as a counterpoint, the following news item which appeared
in a German newspaper in January of 1 967
:
In the vicinity of Sde Boker in the Negev, Israel's larqedesert, Ben-Gurion wants to found a university town to serve the
exploitation of this desert area. The new town is being planned forten thousand stdudents and the corresponding number of faculty, andis to bring Israeli youth into contact with the development of’thedesert through the acquisition of the necessary knowledge of the
natural sciences and technology. It is intended primarily todevelop the trained personnel who will be necessary for future
industry in the desert. In particular, the development of such
industry will involve enterprises that require much scientific
knowledge and little raw material. 30
Habermas acknowledges that a university has a responsibility
not only to transmit technically utilizable knowledge, but also to
produce it; in contrast to educators such as Oakeshott, Habermas
would have no quarrel with these as necessary aspects of the education-
al enterprise. But he goes on to argue that there are three other
equally essential tasks which the university must perform if it is to
avoid the status of a mere instrument of the wider society.
29 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society
,
pp. 1-12
3 0 ibid
.
,
p. 1
.
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These tasks represent, for Habermas, the communicative
aspects of the educational endeavor, and thus are vital functions for
the university. Whether these particular tasks are performed
consciously or not, however, does not alter the fact that the
university, of its very nature, will continue to transmit and convey
communicative (moral) meanings. If a university defines itself, as
the Israeli one appears to do, simply with regard to fulfilling
productivity needs, it can obscure the fact that it, inevitably and
at the same time, influences communicative action. Such a university
will communicate a technical ethos: in an unreflected fashion, it
will transmit and legitimize a set of normative structures, indirectly,
and without the consciousness of its students. The abdication of an
explicit role vis-a-vis communicative activity on the part of the
university amounts to its progressive de-politicization: it becomes
31 ibid.
, pp. 2-3
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a tool for the system of social labor it-c• s traditional autonomy
with regard to the wider society, its abiiity to cogent on that
society's operation, to argue for justice, to protest in the face of
domination and oppression, to create a vision of the future - all of
this is eroded.
The invasion of the technical ethos into education is
confirmed by developments internal to the institution as well. The
apparent superiority of scientific and techical knowledge means that
valid knowledge comes to be associated with facts, facts that are
verifiable and predictable; interpretation, nuance of meaning,
becomes suspect, labelled 'subjective'. Knowledge, under this
pressure, takes the form of object, something which can be
transferred, unchanged, from one mind to another; it is something to
be deposited in the learner. (Paulo Freire has referred to the
process by which this occurs as the "banking" concept of
education. 3 ^) This kind of education is buttressed by the doctrines
of positivism: reality if equated with only those phenomena which
can be classified, counter, explained, i.e., turned into objects.
Such a process, says Inglis, bespeaks a "reifying habit of
mind" 33
; and an education based on it encourages reification. It
3 2 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed
. New York: Seabury
Press, 1970, p. 50.
3 3 Fred Inglis, Ideology and the Imagination
. London: Cambridge
University Press, 1975, p. 111.
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This is an education, then, which validates things rather
than meanings. History, for example, becomes a series of facts -
names, battles, dates - which one has either 'right' or 'wrong', and
which bear little apparent relevance to the contemporary world.
The decline of history as a subject of study reflects the severing of
tradition necessary for the development of the technical mind.
Alv.n Toffler's Future Shock carried this to an extreme, arguing that
because information was changing so rapidly (presumably he equates
knowledge with information), it was pointless to try and acquaint
students with their past.
In similar fashion, a foreign language assumes the status of
object: it becomes something one learns to speak or translate. The
mysteries of culture contained within its structure, its capacity to
express the values and traditions of a people - its living quality -
is squeezed out. Even science is not exempt from this process of
reification, becoming, as it does, a meaningless collection of
formulae and equations which must be learned in order to pass a test.
It is clear that i ntersubject i ve learning - knowledge of the other
and the we, as Georges Gurvitch describes it 34 - has very low
34 Georges Gurvitch, The Social Frameworks of Knowledge
,
New York:
Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row Publishers, 1972, p. 26.
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The technologizat ion of education has proceeded in other
areas as well as the curriculum. The metaphor of factory captures
well the operation of most educational institutions in this country:
the need for mass production, designed to develop more commodities
at a cheaper price, inevitably leads to mechanization, the drive for
efficiency, atomization of the work process, and uniformity of
product. From an educational perspective, the consideration that
large numbers of students have to gain a sufficient amount of
knowledge within a certain period of time exerts great pressure
against engaging in critical discussion of the material, encouraging
its challenge, examining alternative interpretations, and the like.
Quantity overtakes quality. Teaching machines reduce labor costs;
they also confirm the assumption that knowledge consists of facts, of
'right' answers; televised lectures to overcrowded lecture halls
represent the grimmest caricature of the shift from an interactional
encounter between teacher and learner to a technical and instrumental
one. Again, however, Habermas would argue that it is not technological
advancement which is the problem here; such aids can be of immense
assistance to the educational enterprise, but not when they supplant
the transaction, the communication.
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We return again to the communicative meaning carried by the
technica, invasion of education. intersubjectivity is ignored or
subverted; coiiaborative inquiry, aiming to sustain and expand
mutual understanding, is repiaced by the individual acquisition of a
body of facts, the sole purpose of which is to secure the requisite
number of credits to obtain a dipioma or degree. Critical skills
are foregone for skills in repetition and computation. Education
becomes a passport - to an occupation, to financial remuneration, to
status. Education conceived as an initiation "into an inheritance
of human achievements of understanding and belief" ” no longer has
currency in the contemporary world.
^Humanistic Critique. Many aspects of the above critique
represent echoes of the critique advanced in the sixties and early
seventies by authors such as Paul Goodman, John Holt, Jules Henry,
Carl Rogers, and Charles Silberman. Collectively these authors paint
a grim picture of American schools and universities: authoritarian,
hierarchical structures; the emphasis on competition; the grading
system; the concern with intellectual learning to the exclusion of
emotional experience; the push for uniformity and quiescence; the
irrelevant curriculum; and the resultant suppression of spontaneity,
independence, initiative, emotional expression, creativity, and the
3 5 Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration, 1
1 oc . c i t
.
,
p. 22.
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Efforts to address the problems and needs so keenly observed
by these critics have taken several forms over the years: the
development of the 'open classroom', in which students progress at
their own pace, free to shift focus from one area of study to another;
the development of a curriculum more personally relevant to students;
the abolition of the grading and examination systems; and a change in
the role and function of the teacher, captured in the term 'learning
facilitator'. In keeping with the proposal that affective
experiences should provide an essential counter-balance to cognitive
learning, educators are using techniques which facilitate the
development of self-awareness, of value clarifications, of effective
interpersonal skills, and of personal responsibility for the content
and process of learning. While pedagogical reform has been the
primary goal for the movement, broader issues such as administrative
relationships in schools and teacher training programs have also been
considered in the literature.
This seems, on the surface, to represent a call similar to
that which the earlier discussion made when it referred to the
necessity for education to recognize the extent to which it was a
'communicative activity 1
. Certainly it is a call for a return to a
36 See, for example, Charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom
,
New
York: Random House, 1970.
199
a situation in which interpersonal skills are considered of paramount
importance; and the heavy emphasis on individuality and creativity
together with the affirmation of persona, experience, certainly seels
to run counter to the transformation of human beings into objects of
a technological society. Yet it will be argued here that, despite
protestations to the contrary, this movement ultimately reflects
and confirms the technological society whose manifestations it
condemns; and further, that it is this contradiction which has
blunted the thrust of an initially effective impulse towards reform.
This ultimate attachment to technological society can be
identified in two related areas: (I) despite its effort to transcend
the constricting rationality which is dominant in the society (and
which Habermas has defined as an 'instrumental rationality'), the
reform movement retains a technological self-understanding; and (2)
in its overriding concern to rescue the alienated and dominated
individual, the movement fails to develop a sound social and political
critique; as a result, it ends up encouraging and legitimizing
de-politicization. These two aspects will be considered in turn.
The technological self-understanding of the reform movement
is revealed at the point at which, in its enthusiasm to provide
students with genuine alternatives to a demeaning and stultifying
education, the movement draws on the only body of knowledge that
appears to guarantee results: technology. Consequently, in the
200
effort to resuscitate the interactional encounter, the students, the
classroom, the teachers, are unobtrusively turned into objects.
Consider the number of books spawned by the reform movement which
consist of collections of exercises and techniques designed to
achieve an already-designated goal - for clarifying values, for
raising self-esteem, for getting in touch with one's feelings, for
learning to be emphathic. One such book, unsel f-consc ious
1 y titled
Toward a Technology for Humanizing Education
, reflects these
tendencies rather explicitly. In the opening chapter, its author,
David Aspy, writes:
There are many models for describing the classroom inter-
action, but since we live in a technological society, an industrial
model is likely to be a communicative vehicle. Thus, we can talk
about three stages of production: (1) input, (2) process, and
(3) outcomes. 37
There follows seven chapters outlining various exercises
designed "to construct a technology which will enable us to assess
and/or improve the levels of humaneness within classrooms" 38
. Such
exercises usually take the following form: an object is determined -
for example, the raising of self-esteem - and a set of exercises are
detailed which are supposed to achieve the stated purpose. Thus, for
example, students might be asked to spend ten minutes giving only
37 David N. Aspy, Toward a Technology for Humanizing Education .
Illinois: Research Press Company, 1972, p. 7*
38 ibid
.
,
p. 15 .
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positive feedback to their partner; or they might be asked to share
'new and good things that happened this week' with the rest of the
group. It is not denied here that such exercises may help a student
feel better about himself, or that s/he may gain some deeper self-
awareness as a result of the experience. It is suggested, however,
that insofar as no attention is paid to, for example, whether a
student actually has genuine positive feelings for another or not, to
that extent, students are being treated as objects; they are being
manipulated to achieve a certain, already designated, state. When
the aim assumes greater significance than the students, a technical
ethos is providing the framework for the activity.
Jean Bethke Elshtain, in a paper examining some of the radical
teaching proposals which have derived from the reform movement, points
out that one of the major aims of the proposals is the creation of a
'positive atmosphere", something that is assumed will help students
"feel good" and "counteract (their) distress" 39 . "Good vibes" are
desired, rather than "pain and anxiety". 40 Such an aim, she argues,
reflects the movement's compatibility with a utilitarian understanding
of human behaviour - it assumes that "what matters is that the quantity
or yield of aggregate pleasure should be greater than the yield of
39 Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Social Relations in the Classroom", Tel os
,
Number 27, Spring 1976, p. 100.
40 ibid., p. 1 0A
.
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unpleasure or pain" 41
,
little connection either
reality is finally of no
That the expression of pleasure may have
to internal experience or to the external
consequence
.
This leads to the second aspect of the movement's ultimate
attachment to a technological society: its failure to develop a
penetrating critique of the social order in which it attempts to
function. This is not to suggest, however, that these educators
have ignored the need for social change; on the contrary, they seek
it, envisioning the educational system as one of the institutions in
the society with greatest potential for effecting it. George Brown
says, for example,
The greatest potential for change and significant improvement
in our individual predicaments and in our dilemma as a society lies in
the school. It is the one institution in Western society outside the
family that most profoundly affects the human condition. It is also
the i ns t i tu t i on that, though resistant, is the most practical in which
to innovate ... If schools can be significantly changed - elementary
through university - we can ameliorate the deleterious effects of
education and contribute substantial ly toward improving the human
condition - a contribution the schools are uniquely in a position to
make. 42
But the movement has stopped short of plumbing the depths of
the society which gave rise to the educational system it so
4
1
ibid
.
,
p . 1 Ok .
42 George Brown,
Viking Press,
Human Teaching for Human Learning.
1971
, PP- 8 - 9 .
New York:
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Nowhere here or in the rest of the book do the authors make
any serious attempt to consider how American education arrived at the
position so well catalogued above - except as Alan Graubard points out
to say that "we" made it that way. 44 Who? Why? The only conclusion
seems to be that the situation has come about out of the rigidities of
bureaucracies, or the inadequate visions of individuals. The
solution offered by Postman and Weingarter - the energetic pursuit of
the correction of such perspectives - involves no fundamental examin-
ation of the values and institutions of the society. They frequently
Neil Postman and Charles Weingarter, Teaching as A Subversive
Activity
. New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1969, p. viii.
Alan Graubard, Free The Chi ldren
. New York: Vintage Books, 1972,
p. 23.
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from Habermas' point of view, their analysis allows no room
for an understanding of the political and economic pressure towards
a substitution of instrumental for communicative action;
consequently, they legitimize - if only be default - the increasing
technol og i zat ion of the socio-cul tural world, and confirm the
de-politicization required for the continued operation of the soceity
In other words, they contribute in large measure to the maintenance
of the motivational syndromes of civil and fami 1 i al
-vocat ional
pr i vat i sm.
One significant manifestation of the movement's
assimilation to technological society is its abetting of the demise
of critical thought. While one can appreciate the motivation behind
such suggestions as abolishing grades, encouraging children to follow
their own initiative, and abandoning both the 'traditional' classroom
and the 'traditional' teacher role, it is important to recognize the
potential contained in them for the loss of reflective, critical
thought. This possibility emerges more clearly when these suggestions
are juxtaposed to the idea of education outlined by Oakeshott: as a
'serious and orderly initiation into an intellectual, imaginative,
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"oral and emotional inheritance", an "engagement to learn by study"
a "detachment from the immediate local world of the learner, its
current concerns, and the direction it gives to his attention".
The sense of discipline and effort connoted by this
description is often lost in the writings of the reform movement.
Noting that one radical teaching manual contains suggestions for
teachers on how to counteract the belief that intellectual work is
"often accompanied by the feeling of doing lonely, isolated, hard
labor" 4
5
,
Elshtain writes:
The lonely, isolated, hard labor of Marx at work on Das
Kapi_tal_ or Freud during his period of painful self-analysis which
formed the basis of Die Traumdeutung perhaps? ... Both Marx and Freud
saw their tasks, difficult and painful ones, as the creation of ways
of looking at the world which were at odds with the dominant reality.
The stress on "no pain" is reminiscent of B.F. Skinner's goal of a
behavioural ist-technologist utopia - the creation of a world of
"automatic goodness" in which no one knows frustration nor pain. 46
The ‘individualized study contract, 1 while responding to the
desirability that students be able to construct their own program of
study, also threatens to discount the substance of that program: as
Elshtain points out, the statement that "anyone (can) get an A who
chooses to do the necessary quantity of work" 47 reveals the tendency
45 Elshtain, "Social Relations in the Classroom," loc. ci t.
,
p. 101.
46 ibid.
4 7 Quoted in Elshtain, "Social Relations in the Classroom," loc. cit.,
p. 101.
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to forget the quality. Abandoning set curricuia in favour of
ai lowing students to fo.iow their own initiative in terms of wha,
they 'choose' to study can iead to the situation reported by the New
York Times several months ago, in which students can receive a high-
school diploma without having to read a book. 4 8 Phrases such as
Fritz Peris' 'wisdom of the organism' connote the corresponding
impress ion that the only 'wisdom' worth having is that which, albeit
latently, already exists in some way within the individual. The
accumulated wisdom of the centuries, presently gathered in libraries
and museums, attains the status of 'second class'.
The issue of a curriculum which is 'personally relevant'
figures here - again, it is evident that this suggestion responds to
a perception that students have been forced to learn bodies of
knowledge from which they feel alienated. At the same time, however,
the blanket imperative of 'personal relevance' allows no comprehension
of the 'manipulated consciousness' most students bring to school.
If Habermas' analysis is correct, a technocratic society requires
certain kinds of knowledge (pract ical -moral in particular) to be
considered irrelevant - for most students, 'personal relevance' will
reflect merely the dominant ideology of the society. Without the
accompanying ability to penetrate the smoke-screen of ideological
manipulation, students will continue to mimic the wider society.
4 8 Reported in the New York Times
,
May 29, 1977, p. 1.
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Such suggestions, despite their good intentions, carry moral
meanings which legitimize and confirm the process of de-po, i t i c i zat ion
the reform movement involves, finally, a repudiation of the •public',
through contributing to the ^tivational syndromes of privacy which
’
Habermas has described. To escape the oppressive domination of the
fact', the reform movement turned to subjectivity: everyone has an
opinion, everyone is entitled to express it, and every opinion counts.
Its content is secondary, its expression primary. |„ this momentum,
truth and morality disappear - there are only individual truths and
individual moralities. Critical examination of these, and of their
underlying assumptions, is discouraged - what is communicated is that
there is no general truth to be discovered.
From Habermas' point of view, the movement for educational
reform responds to a legitimate perception of the educational world.
But in lieu of an explicit analysis of the social system which
supports it, in refusing to commit itself to the necessary
transformation of the social and politcal conditions which render
human beings to the status of passive and inert objects, the movement
ultimately pursues a culture of withdrawal rather than of protest.
The public is abandoned for the sanctuary of the private;
de-politicization, under these circumstances, can proceed unchecked.
This is not to imply, on the other hand, that a critique of
0PP ross i ve soc i a 1 and po 1 i t ca 1 cond itions will necessarily p romo t e any
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kind of significant educational reform. The 'social' critics
referred to earlier (authors such as Michael Katz, Clarence Karier,
Joel Spring, and Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis) have fared no better in
developing a genuinely 'radical' education: where they have no. ended
UP gravitating towards the kinds of suggestions already detailed, the
most common resort is to the position best captured in ,van Mlich's
Phrase 'de-schooling'. In a certain sense, it could almost be
argued that their critique has been too incisive: education as an
institution is regarded as so completely assimilated to the wider
workings of the capitalist society that these authors are almost forced
to conclude that changes in the educational system can accomplish
virtually nothing. There seems no room in that massively controlled
and administered bureaucracy for anything like a radical education.
The last chapter of Bowles and Gintis' book School inq in Capital ist
America reflects this impotence: their critique has been so piercing
that education appears lifeless, the feeble lackey of a capitalist
landlord. They are forced to fall back on a tired formula: "Hence
we believe
... that an equal and liberating education system can only
emerge from a broad-based movement dedicated to the transformation of
economic life"'* 9
. The remainder of the chapter seems to imply not
only that a liberating education requires such a transformation, but
that it must wait upon it. Their remarks on strategy occupy the last
few pages of the chapter - hardly a political program of substance.
49 Bowles and Gintis, op. cit. p. 266.
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In Search of An Alternative
The movement for radical educational reform has indeed
faltered in the past few years. The economic crisis has exerted
strong pressure for a return to more traditional forms of education:
grades are becoming of greater significance for college students;
there is concern over statistics on dropping literacy rates; and
there is discernible trend towards so-called 'traditional' schools
which emphasize discipline, respect for the teacher, and basic read-
ing and writing skills. The reform movement has little with which to
counter this growing pressure to abandon its enterprise. (One
theoretician who has offered some cause for renewed hope is Paulo
Freire, a Brazilian educator who developed a program for teaching
literacy skills to peasants, a program which was directly tied to a
social and political critique. This theory has had a growing
influence on educational literature in America, and holds promise for
the continued pursuit of a radical education in this country. The
program will be considered in more detail in the following chapter,
for it intersects at many points with Habermas' work.)
It will be argued in the following chapter that Habermas'
theory offers a possibility for education which moves beyond that
proposed by the reform movement considered in this chapter. That
possibility can be expressed as a new project for education: the
formulation of a 'rational identity'. This concept is drawn from
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Habermas
' essay, "On Social Identity—, in which he argue5 tha[ ^
development of ego identity is inextricably linked to the discussion
of social evolution, and that the designation 'rational' represents a
stage in the development of ego identity corresponding to Habermas'
postulated historically new stage of human evolution.
A brief excursion into the developmental relationship between
individual identity and collective identity from the point of view of
its relationship to the theory of socialevolu ion* * may be useful at
this point; it should further an understanding of the projected
content of the concept of 'rational identity'.
In primitive societies, problems of identity do not arise.
The mythical world images generated by the tribe assign a meaningful
place to every element of the culture, in an effort to stave off the
threatening forces of nature. With the transition to traditional
social formations, political institutions (such as the state or the
monarchy) gain a degree of autonomy with regard to the cosmic order.
At the same time, the disintegration of mythical images allows, for
the individual, the perception that certain circumstances can be
brought under direct control - that is, the world no longer appears
60 Jurgen Habermas, "On Social Identity," Telos, Number 19, Sprinq
1 974, pp. 91-103.
* Note that this progression refers to one of the aspects central to
tracing the developmental logic of world-views. See Chapter 3,
p. b
,
Sect ion ( i v) .
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as completely fortuitous. This development encourages the emergence
of a 'self-identity', formulated in reaction to both the particularity
of the community (which is organized around the political institutions)
and the universality of the cosmic order.
In the following stage, the rise of universal religions (such
as Judaism and Christianity) promotes the formation of an identity
which, for the first time, can be understood separate from concrete
social roles and norms of behaviour - the individual can conceive of
himself as transcending his alliance to the political institutions.
This separation is aided by the disjunction between the sense of
equality before God, and the experience of inequality before the
political and economic institutions; the power of the latter to
provide a sense of collective identity falters. This tendency is
complete in the final stage, with an inevitable cleavage between
identity derived from un i versal i st ic structures (not religion as
such, but the moral systems left over from religion), and collective
identity which is tied to a particular community.
This diremption, says Habermas, constitutes the "problem of
modern identity" 51 and in the face of it, he suggests the following
task:
5 1 ibid
., p. 95.
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From this perspective, a 'rational identity' would contain
elements of both a collective tie and an individualistic expression
Such an identity, Habermas suggests, would
1 ... be grounded in the consciousness of universal and equal
chances to participate in the kind of communication processes by which
identity formation becomes a continuous learning process. Here ...
individuals are the participants in the shaping of the collective will
underlying the design of a common identity.
2 ... presuppose the validity of un i versa 1 i st i c moral systems.
The latter ... can be linked with the basic norms of rational discourse.
This in itself is a step in the direction of a collective type of
identity which ... is grounded in the consciousness of universal and
equal opportunity to participate in value and norm-forming learning
processes. 53
A radically-motivated education based on the work of Jurgen
Habermas would situate itself with regard to this task.
57 ibid.
53 ibid., pp . 99-100.
CHAPTER v
EDUCATION: THE FORMATION OF RATIONAL IDENTITY
The Concept of 'Rational Idpnt-ii-y '
The attempt to formulate a theory of education based on
Habermas' work is immediately confronted with the absence of
programmatic imperatives in that work. As suggested in the previous
chapter, this represents not so much a gap in the theory, but rather
a position internal to it. Habermas' commitment to a model of
discourse, predicated on a 'consensus theory of truth', has its
political consequence in the conviction that it is only those who are
willing to engage in a particular political action (and to risk the
consequences of that engagement) who can legitimately formulate the
strategy of that action. The context of the decision-making can be
articulated; the content belongs to the participants.
It was argued in the last chapter, however, that the failure
to specify content does not imply that Habermas' work lacks a
political imperative - rather, the theory offers both a direction for,
and guidelines to, political activity. From an educational point of
view, that direction can be expressed as the formation of 'rational
identity'. A brief explication of this concept will render the
political imperative more tangible, and, at the same time, will
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indicate the crucial role of education in its pursuit.
The concept 'rational identity' captures the dialectical
relationship between individual and community which Habermas has been
concerned to articulate from the very beginning of his work. The
individual, from this perspective, only exists as part of a social
structure of intersubjectivity. The idea of a monadic ego,
separate, independent of the social world cannot suffice, for it
denies the sociality which is an absolutely intrinsic aspect of the
development of ego- i dent i ty . This does not deny the individuality
of which the ego is capable, but rather locates it as a derivative
I
of an i ntersubject i ve process.
Identity is produced by socialization, i.e., by that through
which the developing person integrates himself for the first time in
a definite social system through the acquisition of symbolic publics.
The identity is secured and unfolded later on through individualization,
i.e., through a growing independence of social systems . 1
And again, "In ego-identity is found the paradoxical relation that
the ego as person is like to all other persons but is absolutely
different from all other individuals" 2 .
Tne mediation, as indicated above, occurs through the
1 Jurgen Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity", Tel os , No.
2 /4
,
Summer 1975, p. ^5-
2 ibid
.
,
p . 52
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Habermas is not unique, of course, in claiming that
individuality is socially constituted, nor that language is the
medium of that constitution; his major contribution in extending
this position lies in his articulation of the historical dimension of
that constitution. By juxtaposing various theories of ego
development (specifically those of Piaget and Kohlberg) and his own
theory of social evolution, he can locate the development of ego
identity within historically unfolding social formations. From this
perspective, he argues that different social formations reflect, and
require, different levels of ego identity. The 'fully rational
society', in this schema, reciprocally requires the highest level of
ego development: full individuation promotes, and is only possible
within, a situation of full participation in the community. It is
only when all members of a society can participate fully and equally
in decisions of consequence to them and, at the same time, retain
their individuality that there exists a possibility of creating the
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 157.
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'public sphere 1
,
an ideal retained in form (but submerged in
substance) since the days of the bourgeois social revolutions.
An education formulated with regard to the attainment of
'rational identity' must, therefore, take cognizance of Habermas'
discussion of the transformation from the present form of social
organization to an historically new form: it is predicated on an
understanding of human beings as able to become aware, through a
process of i ntersubject i ve reflection and critique, of the self-
formative nature of both their own development, and that of the
social structures in which they live. Proceeding on both an
individual and a collective level, it would represent an attempt
to consider the extent to which people have been subjected to
unnecessary authority structures, structures which, through the
invoking of illusory justifications based on distorted communication,
have come to constitute relationships of domination and exploitation.
Such ideological rationalization, both individual and collective, can
be penetrated, Habermas has consistently maintained, through
reflective i ntersubject i ve activity.
To the extent that educational institutions can promote such
activity, one that will enable people to recapture their historical
nature, to penetrate ideology and the distorted communication on
which it depends, and to conceive of the possibility of a new stage of
social organization, based on a universal linguistic ethic and
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This conceptualization of education calls to mind the work
of Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educator briefly mentioned in the
last chapter. To the author's knowledge, neither Habermas nor
Freire is acquainted with the other's work, a fact which makes the
similarities between them even more remarkable, and adds strength to
their respective analyses. (Interesting in this regard is the
different social and economic backgrounds which have produced such
Similar theories. Freire worked with illiterate peasants in a rural
and underdeveloped economy; Habermas' milieu has been the highly
industrial and urbanized environment of West Germany.)
While Freire's writings contain a revolutionary fervor
generally missing from Habermas' more circumscribed style, it seems
clear that the two share an image of an education based on dialogic
activity: according to Freire, "Without dialogue, there is no
communication; and without communication, there can be no true
educat i on" 4 .
In lieu of that dialogic education, he continues, there is a
Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed
,
p. 81
.
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'banking' concept of education: "Instead of communicating, the
teacher issues communiques and makes deposits which the students
patiently receive, memorize and repeat." 5 Such an education simply
mimics, for Freire, the functioning of the wider, oppressive society
He lists the following as its characteristics:
1 .
2 .
3.
k.
5.
6 .
The teacher teaches and the students are taught;
The teacher knows everything and the students know
noth i ng
;
The teacher thinks and the students are thought about;
The teacher talks and the student 1 istens - meekly;
The teacher disciplines and the students are
d i sc
i
pi i ned
;
The teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the
students comply;
7. The teacher acts and the students have the illusion of
acting through the action of the teacher;
8. The teacher chooses the program content, and the
students (who are not consulted) adapt to it;
9. The teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his
own professional authority, which he sets in opposition
to the freedom of the students;
10. The teacher is the subject of the learning process, while
the pupils are mere objects. 6
Against this, Freire argues for a dialogic education, a
5 ibid.
,
p . 58
.
6 ibid
., p. 59-
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. 'Rational identity', then, represents the
end point of a developmental process: it is the individual analog of
the highest form of social organization that Habermas postulates, i.e.
the fully rational society. A brief explication of his theory of ego
identity will elucidate that developmental process and at the same
7 ibid
., p. 33.
8 ibid.
, p. 77.
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time, will indicate the associated
based on Habermas' work.
implications for an education
Drawing heavily on the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, Habermas
argues that the developmental process moves through three broad
stages:
1 ‘ Na tural identity refers to a physical, bodily idea of
the self. The stage corresponds to Piaget's 'pre-
operat i ona 1 level of cognitive development, and encompasses
Stages I and I I ('punishment-obedience' orientation, and the
stage of 'instrumental hedonism') of Kohlberg's scale of the
development of moral consciousness. The child at this level
has not yet mastered a natural language, and accordingly, has
yet been integrated into a social role, i.e., s/he does not
have a concept of reciprocally anticipated behavior.
Social identity indicates the adoption of social roles
which provide the child with an identity separable from his/
her physical self. Corresponding to the level of concrete
thought in the Piagetian scheme, this stage represents that
point in development at which the child can understand,
anticipate and comply with behavioral expectations, whether
mediated by the family or other social institutions (such as
school). Kohlberg's Stages III and IV ('good boy'
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orientation and 'law and order' orientating 3ntatio ) are associated
with this level of identity.
3 . Ego identity corresponding to Piaget's stage of formal
operational thought, indicates a shift from total
assimilation in a socially structured identity to one based,
at least in part, on the ability to separate from particular
social overlays. It occurs at the stage of adolescence,
and reflects the capacity to question the social roles and
expectations formerly accepted as 'givens' of the social
world. These socially ordained expectations can, at this
stage and for the first time, become the object of
reflection and critique. As Habermas puts it, at the stage
of 'ego identity', "
... the bearers of roles transform
themselves for the first time into persons who can maintain
their identity independent of concrete roles and special
systems of norms" 9
.
This level incorporates Kohlberg's Stages V and VI
( 'cont ractural
- 1 egal i st ic 1 orientation, and the 'ethical principle 1
orientation). At this point, however, Habermas wants to go beyond
Kohlberg's final stage, for he believes it stops short of a fully
'rational identity'.
9 Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity", op. cit., p. ^9.
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It will be recalled that Habermas locates the development of
ego identity within the historical unfolding of social formations;
thus, he argues that Kohlberg's Stage VI reciprocally requires a
particular stage of social formation, one characterized by an ideal
of moral freedom for all members of that society, but which, at the
same time, encompasses a notion of human beings as private persons.
Akin to liberalism, this is a social formation in which the 'social
good 1 is presumed to result from the combination of individual and
private goods. Pol i t i ca
1
freedom under such a scheme becomes
conti ngent
.
Kohlberg's analysis
characterization of a social
referred to in Stage VI can
decision-making and review.
,
Habermas argues, does nor allow For a
situation in which the principles
themselves become an object of collective
Such a conceptualization would prefigure
10 Quoted in Dick Howard, "Moral Development and Ego Identity: A
Clarification", Telos
,
No. 27, Spring 1976, p. 178.
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a social formation in which the mechanisms and rationale of norm
justification, rather than indicating the individual's ability to
generalize from self-chosen principles, would derive from the
collective activity of discursively deciding upon normative validity
claims. In such a social formation, (corresponding, of course, to
Habermas' postulated 1 fully rational society ' ), both moral and
political freedom for all members of the society (finally of a
'world society') would be the object of collective pursuit; its
philosophic underpinning would be the 'communicative ethic' which
was elaborated in Chapter II.
0n 1y communicative ethics guarantees the generality of
admissable norms and the autonomy of acting subjects solely through
the discursive redeemabil ity of the validity claims with which norms
appear. That is, generality is guaranteed in that the only norms that
may claim generality are those on which everyone affected agrees (or
would agree) without constraint if they enter into (or were to enter
into) a process of discursive will formation. The question of which
sectors should, if necessary, be regulated through compromise or
formal norms of action can also be made the subject of discussion.
Only communicative ethics is universal (and not restricted to a domain
of private morality separate from legal norms). Only communicative
ethics guarantees autonomy. 11
This communicative ethic, as was argued in Chapter II, is a
linguistic representation of the traditonal ideas of truth, freedom
and justice; it guarantees a symmetrical distribution of
opportunities for all possible participants to choose and perform
speech acts, thereby ensuring:
1
1
Habermas, Leg i t imat ion Crisis
,
p. 89-
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Unrestrained discussion;
2. Mutality of unimpaired self-representation (i. e .,
communication under conditions of individuation);
3* Reciprocity of behaviour expectations.
Under these (as yet, counterfactua
1 ) conditions, a general
will can be rationally formed; participants preserve their
individuality through presenting for consideration what they believe
to be their true interests, and at the same time engage in the search
for the general izable interest which represents their commonality,
i.e., individuals no longer experience themselves or one another as
separate privatized people but rather as thoroughly social.
Because Kohl berg's scale of moral development cannot, as it
stands, contain the shift from moral freedom as its telos to that of
moral and political freedom both, Habermas presses for a so-called
'Stage VII' corresponding both to a rational identity on the part of
individuals, and to a fully rational society. Rational identity,
then, indicates a dialectical tension between individuality and
rootedness in an i ntersubject i ve
1 y constituted social framework -
that is, it is simultaneously an individual and a collective identity.
This developmental schema outlined by Habermas has direct
implications for an educational practice concerned to contribute to
the attainment of a fully rational society. The ability to reflect
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on and critique the present social system with a view to its
transformation requires the development of certain capacities - the
capacity to engage in 1 formal
-operat ional
• thought, and the capacity
reason at the highest levels of moral development (the postulated
Stage VII). These, then, become educational objectives of the
highest priority. As was noted in the discussion of developmental
stages, the shift from 'social identity' to 'ego identity* can only
occur once the stage of adolescence has been reached; only then do
individuals possess the ability to resist total constraint by their
socially-ordained roles; only then does the possibility of critique
and transcendence of the social order emerge. This suggests that a
radically motivated education would tend to focus its attention on
high school and college-age students. As Habermas says,
... only the adolescent who is capable of stepping outside
of the contexts of communicative action from time to time and who can
negate not only propositions and speech acts but also validity claims
as such, (i.e. think hypothetically) learns to master the modalities
of being: i.e., he learns to distinguish being from appearance, is
from ought, essence ... from existence ... 12
Such a choice is corroborated by other aspects of Habermas'
analysis. His discussion of the looming crisis of motivation
suggests that that crisis is most clearly reflected in the declining
1 2 Habermas, "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics," loc. cit.,
p. 165.
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likelihood of a "conventional" 13 resolution of the stage of
adolescence. A conventional resolution involves, in Habermas' terms,
the acceptance of the motivational structure (for work, for
establishing families, etc.) required for appropriate participation
in the society. In lieu of this progression, Habermas envisages two
outcomes
:
1 • Withdrawal, "as a reaction to an overloading of personality
resources (a behavior syndrome that Keniston has observed
and examined in the ' a 1 i entated '
)
1,1
4
.
2. Protest, "as a result of an autonomous ego organisation that
cannot be stabilized under the given conditions (a
behavioral syndrome that Keniston has described in his
'young radicals')" 15 .
A Habermasian based education would attempt to channel the
disaffection into forms of protest rather than of withdrawal.
This focus on the stage of adolescence does not, at the same
time, imply that earlier age-groups need not be considered by a
13 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis , p. 91
•
14 ibid
.
,
p. 92
•
1 5 ibid.
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rad i ca 1
1 y-mot i vated educational practice. On the contrary, there is
strong reason to suggest that work with younger students is vital,
and particularly from a preparatory point of view. Apart from the
fact that younger children need to acquire certain cognitive and
moral reasoning skills as a basis for the later development of
critical-reflective abilities, it also seems that attitudes to the
educational process, and the child's conception of his/her role
within it, are formed early in the educational experience. A
radically-motivated education would strive to create an image of
learning which obviated the associations and expectations attached
to the more usual 'banking' model; such an image would value
collaboration, interaction and curiosity, and its concret i zat ion
would reflect those values. It is an image based on a commitment
to intersubjectivity. Thus, it would support many of the
recommendations made by proponents of school reform in the sixties,
recommendations such as the 'integrated day' programs, the 'open
classroom' format, the emphasis on group projects, collaborative
learning, and so on. These are the kind of changes which help
create a new image of learning, and a renewed interest in education.
The following discussion, however, will address itslef
primarily to education at high school and college level; this choice
reflects Habermas' conviction, deriving from his work on both
communication theory and the crises of late capitalism, that it is
the stage of adolescence which is a crucial point of leverage in the
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development of a political praxis. The discussion will proceed via
a consideration of the two themes which have appeared consistently
throughout Habermas' work: the development of intersubjectivity and
the critique of ideology. In both sections, the example of Women's
Studies programs will be cited in order to consider some of the
practical implications emerging out of the discussion. The chapter
will continue with a brief treatment of some of the structural
implications for education contained in Habermas' work, and will
conclude with a consideration of some of the unresolved problems in
the theory itself.
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The Development of I ntersubject i v i tv
The understanding, recognition and articulation of the
intersubjective bases of our culture - its forms of representation and
expression, its knowledge, its norms and values - must constitute a
major concern of a radically-motivated education. Such a concern is
basic for the emergence of rational identity, for, as is clear from
the previous section, it is the matrix of shared cultural meanings
which is, simultaneously, the basis of community and of genuine
individuation on the part of the members of that community. Couched
in terms of the projected shift to a fully rational society, it is
the disclosing of the intersubjective bases of social life that will
elucidate the notion that truth is discursively discovered, and
rationality the property of i nd i v i dual s- i n- i nteract ion rather than in
isolation. From this perspective, the disregard or suppression of
intersubjectivity is subterfuge, corresponding to the distortion of
communication, and finally to de-politicization; its repression
represents the loss of the social; it is the abandonment of the
possibility that men and women can come together and rationally
reconstruct their society according to their own choosing.
A radical education, then, is confronted with a very
specific task: whatever its subject matter - be i t economics,
literature, medicine, biochemistry, political science - and whatever
the age group to which it is directed, it must enable the student's
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awareness of i ntersubject i ve meanings and aspirations.
Fred Inglis, in one of the most sensitive and beautifully
written books on education to appear in the past few years, provides
an example of an educational process with this intention. In a
chapter entitled "Public Townscape and Popular Culture", Inglis
suggests, as an educational task for students, an historical
investigation of the English townscape: this would stimulate, he
writes, an enlivened discussion of culture, "its whole busy action,
its values, its arts and symbols, structures and institutions" 16
.
From the start, he is very clear that any such examination of culture
must "imply, or make explicit, a powerful political content.
Culture reposes within the circuits of a living politics, and it is
that politics which may explain how our culture may move and change" 17
.
He proceeds, through the use of literature (Lawrence's The
Ra i nbow. Eliott's The Waste Land ) , music (such as the Pastoral
Symphony), art (the painting of Constable and Gainsborough), historical
documents, parliamentary tracts and so forth, to trace the changes in
townscape and countryside in England. This involves, of necessity,
an appreciation of the changes wrought by industrialization, and the
burgeoning of city life; the rise of technology and mass production;
changes in the perception and consciousness of work; the eruption of
16 Inglis, op . c i
t
.
,
p. 162.
1 7 ibid.
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individualism, with all its attendant changes in morality,
philosophical and political thought; the rise of the private world,
and gradual concomitant loss of the public. Consider, for example,
the following paragraph:
The giant size and intermittent splendor of a Victorian
capitalist or industrial building begins ... to become a symptom of a
deep split in the consciousness. On the one hand, power, capital,
organization, the public world; on the other, individuals, domestic
living, powerlessness, poverty, f regmentat ion, the private world.
And a townscape grows up which expresses this split. The corporate
state comes into being; it follows the demise of the public-spirited
and philanthropic Victorian businessman. The diffusion of responsib-
ility through the giant institutions, the need for capital to increase
its surplus-values if it is to hold on to the profits, the managed
perpetration of old social forms and classes in unprecendented
conditions for production and labor, all this created a townscape in
which the giant agencies would place at will the cathedrals of their
productivity, and individuals did what they liked with the space that
was left. The unbelievable speed with which the industrial landscape
covered England, the abrupt change in the materials of building, the
scale of the new technology, the dominance of the free enterprise and
individualist ethic and the absence of an adequate social and moral
economy, combined to devestate the brief, precarious and lovely
balance in the ecology discovered and held for different decades in
different places between 1750 and 19^5- Capital and industry dominated
cities; beneath their vast walls crept out the long lines of private
dwellings whose response to the smell, dirt, magnificence, and brute
size of the city was to cherish the romantic dream of the countryside
at its best. The suburban garden becomes a central symbol of English
domestic lving any time after 1930. 10
Out of such an analysis, Inglis can articulate the following
i ssue:
No doubt the motorways too have
the primacy of the road-building program
known their successes,
the huge and terrible
but
ru i n
l n ibid.
,
p. 176.
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Such an educational activity is eloquently akin to the intent
and thrust of an education based on Habermas' work. First, it is an
example of an educational task directly concerned with the recognition,
examination and re-appropriation of a cultural heritage. Its
historical perspective, encompassing the period from the rise of modern
industry to the present day, prompts an awareness of tradition, and of
the changing nature of that tradition; this, in turn, forces in
students a recognition that their contemporary social situation is not
19
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.
,
pp. 185-186.
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'natural', as it so often appears, but rather socially constructed,
and in numerous identifiable ways. Such a realization, simple as it
sounds, has a number of important consequences for students: it
stimulates a very particular kind of inquiry, one which probes
beneath the actuality of events in order to understand the pressures
and constraints which resulted in one course of events rather than
another; it prompts questions of a moral or evaluative kind - do we
like what happened? Might it have been any other way? What is
likely to happen in the future? Can the present tendency of the
social system to continue the process of industrialization in the same
way be deflected? Such questions lead, in their turn, to reflection
on the operation and rationale of the present society, and to the
recognition that, for the most part, the members of that society have
very little impact on its performance.
This kind of study promotes other kinds of realizations
fundamental to the objectives of a radically-motivated education.
It highlights, for example, the interlocking nature of knowledge - of
art; of literature; of the sciences; of economics and commerce.
The rigorous separation of disciplines which obtains in most
educational institutions can only appear sterile and uninteresting
beside Inglis' description of a learning activity which is responsive
to the interpenetration of all aspects of culture. The kind of
inquiry described here relocates knowledge in a soc i o-h i stor i cal
context; it is not learning which is oriented to acquisition and
23 ^
recapitulation of facts; rather it seeks to examine the past with a
view to refashioning the future. It stimulates the learner's
curiosity, encouraging research into areas and sources of information
which might otherwise never have come to attention. It is precisely
the kind of inquiry which is denied in the 'banking' form of
education; it is reconstructive rather than mimetic.
Finally, Inglis' description suggests structures of learning
quite different from those encouraged by most educational activity.
In fact, it is almost as if his task requi res certain kinds of student
participation - it is very difficult, for example, to imagine it is an
individually-based undertaking. Rather, group activity seems to be
the appropriate mode, one group studying the art of the period,
another the economic thought, another the political history, and so
on, with ail groups pooling their information in order to create a
comprehensive analysis. Co-operative investigation and collaborative
sharing seem the most effective ways to embark on such an educational
enterprise. Certainly the privatized nature of knowledge and its
acquisition is de-emphas i zed ; this is a social, public knowledge.
Ability, in such an educational situation, would be assessed according
to the learner's capacity, in conjunction with his/her fellows, to
understand and interpret the puzzling.
The above is an example of the generation
knowledge - interpretive, as distinct from factual
of a kind of
- which has
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frequently been discredited in modern educational practice. The re
constitution of this 'hermeneutic activity' as a valid educational
process giving rise to 'valid' knowledge is one of the most
potentially radicalizing undertakings of a Habermas i an-based
education. As the institution endowed with responsibility for the
identification and transmission of knowledge, education makes a
critical contribution to the way in which knowledge is perceived.
One of Habermas' earliest concerns (one which has remained
of crucial significance throughout his work) was to penetrate the
fraudulence of scientism, and to reconstitute the possibility of a
normative or practical knowledge on the same level of validity as
scientific knowledge (i.e., to demonstrate that it is susceptible
of reason in the same way). The attempt to prise the practical out
of the grip of the technical is essential if the technolog i zat ion of
social life is to be resisted. Education is in a pivotal position
for such an attempt to alter the wide-spread perception that
knowledge is identical to science.
As demonstrated in the first chapter, Habermas has worked to
critique the dominance of scientism by laying bare its normat i ve
presuppositions. Once these are revealed, the convergences between
scientific and practical knowledge become more discernible. He has
argued that the metatheoret i cal knowledge decisions made by
scientists - "of the utility of an analytic framework, the experience
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of research strategies, the fruitfulness of hypotheses, the choice of
methods of investigations, the interpretation of the results of
measurement, and the implicit assumptions of operational definitions
not to mention discussions of theoretical foundations of the
fruitfulness of different methodological approaches" 21 - do not
derive from a neutral, objective and value-free pre-theoret i cal
structure. Rather, they are decisions that are made - argued for,
disputed, supported, and justified through rational discussion - by
a community of investigators, operating out of a shared
intersubjective framework. It is this element, that of intersub-
jective constitution, that is suppressed by the scientistic self-
presentation of modern science.
Critical reflection on the theoretical and methodological
decisions of modern science would demonstrate that these decisions
are made in essentially the same way as are practical or normative
questions. The choice - of adopting a particular methodological
strategy, or of accepting a particular norm as legitimate - results
from the same process of rational dec i son-mak i ng ; both decisions
presuppose a community of investigators, a shared theoretical
framework, and the desire to arrive at mutual consensus and under-
standing. The model for both decisions is, in Habermas'
terminology, discourse, or the ideal speech situation. Here,
21 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, pp. 6-7
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theoretical and practical reason converge.
Thus, a major educational requirement from Habermas' point
of view would be that students investigate the theoretical and
methodological presuppositions of whatever discipline they are
studying, so that they understand the process by which its contours
were delineated, its object of concern identified, and its
methodological procedures outlined. A simple example of the import
of such investigation can be seen in Peter Sedgewick's discussion of
the value-laden content of our generally-considered meutral concepts
of health and disease.
All departments of nature below the level of mankind are
exempt both from disease and from treatment - until man intervenes
with his own human classifications of disease and treatment. The
blight that strikes at corn or at potatoes is a human invention, for
if man wished to cultivate parasistes (rather than potatoes or corn),
there would be no 'blight' but simply the necessary foddering of the
parasite crop ... Outside the significances that man voluntarily
attaches to certain conditions, there are no illnesses or diseases in
nature ... What, (you) will protest, are there no diseases in nature?
Are there no infections and contagious bacilli? Are there not
definite lesions in the cellular structures of the human body? Are
there no fractures of bones, the fatal ruptures of tissues, the
malignant multiplications of tumorous growth? Are not these, surely,
events of nature? Yet these, as natural events, do not - prior to the
human social meanings we attach to them - constitute illnesses,
sicknesses or diseases ... Out of his anthropocentric self-interest,
man has chosen to consider as "illnesses" or diseases" those natural
circumstances which precipitate the death (or the failure to function
according to certain values) of a limited number of biological
species: man himself, his pets and other cherished livestock, and the
plant varieties he cultivates for gain or pleasure ... Plant diseases
may strike at tulips, turnips, or such prized features of the natural
landscape as elm trees; but if some plant species in which man had no
interest (a desert grass, let us say) were to be attacked by a fungus
or a parasite, we should speak not of the diseases, but merely of the
competition of two species. The medical enterprise is, from its
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inception, value-loaded; it is not
biology applied in accordance with
simply an applied biology, but
the dictates of social interest.
a
22
An understanding of the normative basis of modern science
would free the social sciences from the pressure to imitate - in self-
understanding, self-constitution, methodology, and application - the
natural sciences. It would enable the realization that the concepts
and operations central to the scientific endeavor are not applicable
to the study of human beings, their social context, and their
objectifications. Here, a radical education can play the role of
advocate. The argument that the structure of science must reflect
its objects and its aim is crucial to Habermas' project: in the case
of man, the appropriate form of knowledge is hermeneutic. It is only
this kind of approach which can recognize, understand and contribute
to intersubjectivity. Whereas empirical sciences seek to explain
by means of causal connections, or demonstrated correlations between
certain variables, hermeneutic sciences seek to generate an understand
i ng of the ways in which men and women subjectively and culturally
experience their social world. Hermeneutic activity occurs through
dialogue: its practical consequences are expressed by Taylor when
he says that "the survival of societal individuals is limited to the
existence of a reliable intersubjectivity of mutual understanding" 23
.
22 Peter Sedgewick, "Mental Illness is Illness", Salmagund
i
,
No.
20, 1972, pp. 211-212.
23 Charles Taylor, "Hermeneutics and Politics", in Paul Connerton,
editor, Critical Sociology . New York: Penguin Books, 1976, p. 172
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From a societal perspective, then, hermeneutics makes possible
the reconstruction of the unconstrained consensus on which open
communication depends. At the same time, engagement in the process
forces a recognition of intersubjectivity and the mutual and
ongoing construction of the social world, i.e., there is a beginning
understanding of the self-formative process in which societies and
individuals are implicated. It is this perception that is crucial
if human beings are to break the grasp of the apparently 'natural 1
forces which currently constrain them and move to participate in
their own self-construction.
This translates straightforwardly into educational terms -
it requires a different method and concern for the teaching of the
social sciences. No longer attached to the logic of technology,
such disciplines are free to generate a knowledge aimed at under-
standing and mutuality rather than one aimed at manipulation and
control
.
As exemplified in the selection from Inglis' book, the study
of history would no longer take the form of a narrative recitation of
dates, names and battles, but rather an activity in which the subject
matter 'comes alive', as it were, for ' students-as- i nterpreters ' . In
a similar fashion, all disciplines which fall under the rubric of
'social sciences' would be taught with a view to stimulating an
awareness of traditions, of historically shared and mediated concerns,
2A0
and an interest in the potential contributions they might make in the
future. In this way, knowledge loses its 'facticity', and appears
in its true, i ntersubject i vel y-const i tuted form.
When knowledge abandons its status as 'object', students are
enabled to adopt a more richly evaluative attitude towards it. The
drawing out of the moral, or normative, dimensions of various subject
matters not only confirms the difference between an hermeneutic and a
technical learning activity, but also directly reflects Habermas'
conviction that the shift to a fully rational society requires the
full development and articulation of such a knowledge. Habermas'
reliance on Kohlberg's theory of moral development would imply that
the latter's educational programs for moral development might be of
great significance for an education based on Habermas' work.
In fact, a review of the literature suggests that Kohlberg's
work in this area intersects with the direction indicated in this
chapter - he has found that the most effective method of moral
education (effective in terms of enabling children to shift to a
higher level of moral reasoning) is a dialogic, or i ntersubject i ve
one. Assigning children at different stages of moral reasoning
(say Stages II, II and IV) to the same group and engaging them in a
discussion of situations of moral conflict has the greatest effect
in terms of overall upward shift of moral consciousness. His
research suggests that children can learn from the reasoning at a
2*n
level above them, and can identify and articulate the fallacies in
the level below them. 24
The choice of method, so akin to the kind of educational
setting implicit in Habermas' work, stems from evidence suggesting
that "the main experimental determinants of moral development (are)
the amount and variety of social experience, and the opportunity to
take a number of roles and to encounter other perspectives" 25
. A
study conducted by Holstein indicated that children who advanced in
moral development had parents who tended to encourage reciprocal
role-taking with the child, or who sought the child's views and
elicited the expression of others. 26 A study by Dowell demonstrated
upward movement in moral reasoning after students had participated in
a form of peer counselling based on Rogerian theory - both the author
and Kohlberg speculate that the intense effort associated with the
understanding of another's experience and perspective contributed in
major ways to the increase in moral reasoning. 27
Any attempt to integrate such work, must, of course, take
cognizance of the fact that Habermas has argued for the extension of
2U Lawrence Kohlberg, "A Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
Education", The Humanist
,
November-December
,
1972, pp. 1 3 _ 1 6
.
2 5 ibid
.
,
p . 15*
26 ibid .
2 7 ibid.
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Kohlberg's scale, an extension tending in a direction which Kohlberg
would no doubt repudiate. Moral education from a Habermasian point
of view would have as its final aim the closest possible approx-
imation of an ideal speech situation. Kohlberg's method - of group
discussion and attempted resolution of moral conflict situations -
seems highly conducive to such an aim.
In keeping with Habermas' attempt to situate moral
development within a social and political framework, it seems that the
most useful examples of 'moral conflict situations' would be those
drawn from actual material under study (this is in contrast to
Kohlberg's examples, which tend simply to be presented). Thus, for
example, an historical event such as the American Revolution might be
explored via an examination of the series of choices made by the
conflicting parties. Role-plays and other simulation games could be
used in order to identify the moral conflicts that arose, and to
discuss the ways in which they were resolved. Consideration of
alternative choices, and articulation of the rationality behind these
alternatives, would promote the kind of activity which, according to
Kohlberg, facilitates the shift to a higher level of moral reasoning.
The issue of 'personal relevance' to the student is of
concern here. A catch-word of the reform movement in education, it
then responded to a situation in which students were expected to learn
things to which they had no personal response, interest or involvement.
2*43
The heart of intersubjectivity, on the other hand, is the personal
and interpersonal recognition of students in the objects of study.
From this point of view, a Habermasian education would no doubt
endorse starting at the point of personal relevance; but it would
move beyond that, working out from that point, considering the
formation of that present life-world, its roots, its original
concerns and preconceptions, its traditions, its hopes, and its
changes. And such an investigation must return to the present, to
the people who engage in that reflection on the past, such that the
enhanced understanding of tradition illuminates the present, and
potentially fashions the future. This is where personal relevance
under an i ntersubject i ve aegis differs from the promulgated by the
reform movement - for it is a personal relevance which leads to an
immersion in common culture, to a recognition of the social ties
which inevitably bind people. It is less an issue of expanded self-
awareness (although this is clearly an essential part of it) and more
one of expanding awareness of one's connectedness to others.
The Example of Women's Studies . The substantial, if uneven,
development of Women's Studies programs in this country over the
past decade is a particularly appropriate phenomenon to consider in
this context. The intent of those programs, and of the movement
which spawned them, can be characterized precisely as a search for
intersubjectivity, and to that extent, reflects the intention of an
education based on Habermas' work.
The initial structural form of the movement, that of the
consciousness-raising group, represented an explicit attempt to
encourage, support and legitimate sharing - of experience, of thought
of anger at isolation and stereotyping, and of hope for change - and
it was through this activity that awareness of long-suppressed
connections and commonalities among women arose. An image formed of
womanhood as an oppressive social role, and out of this, developed a
critique of the instruments of that oppression, the institution of
education being one of the primary targets.
A recognition of the social, rather than the natural, basis
of the female role forces an historical perception of education's
role in its construction: initially, in this country, education was
denied most women, being seen as irrelevant, and even damaging, to
their assigned role in society. As changing social and economic
conditions made it more acceptable for women to have access to
educational institutions, the latter then took on the task of
preparing women for those roles. While perceptions of women and
their appropriate social functions have changed over time, the common
elements - coalescing around their participation in marriage, mother-
hood and domesticity - have formed the basis, and limits, of
education for women. Accordingly, certain professions have
traditionally been closed to them, resulting in their gravitation to
the liberal arts, or into occupational training consistent with, and
complementary to, their designated familial role, such as social work,
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nursing or school
-teaching
. This concerted shaping of women's
academic aspirations has resulted in their repudiation of the
intellectual role - as Conway has suggested, men remain the creators
of knowledge, while women have only been able to take part in its
appl i cat ion
.
28
It was against this background that the Women's Studies
programs took form. The central identified objective was to reveal
the social construction of the female role, and education's
participation in that such that that construction might be
consciously resisted. Both the structure and content of the
programs reflect this objective: structurally, they have been
modelled on the consciousness-raising groups, in the conviction
first that interaction among women was necessary in order that
alternative roles might be formulated; and second, that resistance
to the classroom model of hierarchical relationships involved
resistance to an index of male domination. From this point of view,
a collaborative model not only seems more desirable, but also more
conducive to the attainment, on the part of women, to intellectual
competence and mastery.
In terms of content, the programs have sought first to
28 Jill K. Conway, "Coeducation and Women's Studies: Two Approaches
to the Question of Woman's Place in the Contemporary University",
Daedalus, Volume 103
,
Number 4
,
p. 243 -
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acquaint women with their history so that their common and long-term
oppression might become clearly visible; and second, to illuminate
the suppressed dimension of the study of women themselves. In all
major fields - psychology, literature, history, economics, theology,
political science, philosophy - the experience and concerns of women
have been neglected. The courses sponsored by Women's Studies
programs - Women in Literature, Feminism and Philosophy, Women and
Religion, the Psychology of Women - explicitly reflect the concern to
broaden the general understanding of legitimate knowledge.
From a specifically educational perspective, such programs
are consistent in several major ways with an education based on
Habermas' work. First, they have forced the university to respond,
even i f to a small degree at this stage, more directly to the needs
and interests of its students; second, in their effort to generate
alternative forms of knowledge and methods of its transmission, the
programs stand as an implicit critique of the idea that the
scientific is the only legitimate form of knowledge. The impulse to
study and comprehend the lives and experiences of women is a
hermeneutic one, unconstrained by the dictates of positivism.
Finally, as indicated earlier, the structural forms of the programs
express their i ntersubject i ve concerns. Habermas' theory suggests
exactly the kind of collaborative model of teaching and learning (in
deep contrast to the 'banking' concept of education described by
Freire) which has emerged as a major feature of the program.
2^7
The functioning and intent of Women's Studies are similarly
consonant with the broader thrust towards the attainment of a fully
rational society. The recognition and expression on the part of
women of previously obscured common meanings and experiences prompts
awareness of their traditional exclusion from full social and political
participation; moreover, it encourages the identification of those
needs and interests which, according to Habermas, should be brought
into the communicative situation of discourse as a basis for rational
decision-making. (The history of the women's movement over the past
decade supports Habermas' thesis - that i ntersubj ect i ve recognition
and contact are vital to any projected shift to a higher form of
social organization - at precisely this point. It suggests that
fully individuated activity, such as is required in the ideal speech
situation, arises on the basis of group identification and support -
this was a consistent discovery in consciousness-raising groups, and
appears to carry strong implications for education.)
In addition, the contribution of the Women's Studies programs
to exposing the emotional, social and intellectual constraints imposed
on women by traditionally ascribed roles serves to heighten the crises
of legitimation and motivation which Habermas has described - the
coherent and widely-articulated rejection of traditional educational
roles and the corresponding attempt to carve out new and more
satisfying roles is a significant part of this. The increasingly
sanctioned refusal on the part of women to participate in traditional
family structures captures both elements - on one hand, it is a sign
of w i thdrawl of the motivational commitment to the setting up and
nurturing of a family, and it is simultaneously a questioning of the
legitimacy of a social system which prohibits more expansive and
alternative roles for women. More broadly, this growing rejection
of a socially-constructed role serves to alert other members or
groups of the society to the i ntersubject i ve basis of their own
lives, and to the possibility of transformation.
As the discussions of rational identity and the fully
rational society have made clear, however, the possibility of their
attainment requires more than the recognition and articulation of
intersubjectivity. From this point of view, Women's Studies programs
operating under the aegis of Habermas' theory would need to engage in
a systematic analysis of the ideological nature of women's oppression,
not only historically but also contemporaneously. As Habermas has
expressed it, hermeneutic activity must be supplemented by a critique
of ideology.
The Critique of Ideology
2*49
The necessity for the incorporation of a critical element
into reflectivity, such that the systematic suppression of
intersubjective awareness and activity can be identified, was made
clear in the first chapter. There, it was argued that hermeneutic
activity takes as its object the conscious representations - events,
texts, art forms, religions, and so forth - of the individuals, groups
or societies under study. Any incidence of distortion must remain
inaccessible to hermeneut i cs \ the latter has to be guided by what
people say_ about themselves. Just as psychoanalysis responds as
much to what people to not say about themselves, to the
unconsciously operating forces which influence experience, so the
critique of ideology responds on a societal level to the systematic
distortions of communication, which artificially constrain socio-
cultural life. Hermeneutics cannot mount a critique of false
consciousness
.
The concept of a fully rational society, and the linguistic
and communicative structure which supports it, requires precisely the
ability of participants to engage in a critique of ideology. For
domination, expressed as a set of power relationships which would
not be considered legitimate if it was subjected to discursive
examination, derives its ability to sustain itself from ideological
(thus illusory) justifications. The transcendence of domination,
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and ultimately the institutionalization of a fully rational society,
requires the ability to penetrate those ideological supports, and
for Habermas, this means an ability to penetrate the underlying
distorted communication structures. Non-d i storted communication,
according to this theory, would automatically dismantle and prohibit
the regeneration of unjust and unequal structures of authority;
simultaneously, it would enable the shift towards the historically
new stage of social organization.
The educational task follows from this. Its aim is to
enable students to move from mimetic activity (complete
identification with and acceptance of the social structure) to
cr i t i ca 1 - ref 1 ect i ve activity. The latter requires (as was clear
from Habermas' work on communicative development) the acquisition
of certain skills, linguistically represented as the abilities to
distinguish between illusion and reality, between essence and
appearance, and between is and ought; it is clearly the conern of
a radically-motivated education to facilitate the student's
acquisition of such skills.
It is sobering in this regard to reflect on the implications
of empirical studies which demonstrate that less than half of the
American adult population has reached the levels of development
required as a basis for the emergence of cr i t i ca 1 -ref 1 ect i ve abilities.
Thus, fifty percent of American adults never attain Piaget's stage of
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formal operation thought; and Kohlberg's investigations indicate
that the majority of people operate at levels III and IV on the mora
development scale. 29 From the perspective of Habermas' theory,
then, less than fifty percent of the population has the capacity to
engage in discursive critique and decision-making, an activity
essential to a higher form of social organization. The apparent
cessation of development after a certain point must be of great
concern to an educational practice aligning itself with Habermas'
theory
.
As was indicated in the last chapter, some conceptions of
education are, in fact, prohibitive of the development of critical-
reflective abilities. The latter cannot, for example, be stimulated
by technological means - they cannot be drailled into the student,
ingrained through repetition and practice. The distinction that
Habermas has drawn between the development of technological knowledge
and that of moral practical knowledge is reflected in these different
teaching objectives. As Passmore describes it,
By drill, a child can be taught the multiplication table,
irregular French verbs, a religious or political catechism, the order
in which to test a motor car for results, the order in which to
analyze the salts in a chemical solution. But a person cannot be
drilled into appreciating a poem, making a good translation, detecting
29 Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan, "The Adolescent as
Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Post-Conventional
World", Daedalus, Volume 100, Number b, Fall 1 9 7 1 » P> 1065-
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defects in a new type of car, or suggesting a modification in
accepted chemical routines. Nor can he be drilled into beinq
cri tical . 30
This is not, of course, a startling revelation to educators;
Socrates expressed precisely this understanding in his conversation
with Meno. 3 It is vital, therefore, to reflect on the extent to
which the distinction has been eroded, particularly since the rise of
mass public education and the incorporation of technological
procedures into classrooms. Succumbing to the pressures of
efficiency and cal cu 1 ab i 1 i ty , educational practice has evolved such
that particular skills have been identified which can be imparted
according to a technological imperative; if they have proved
resistant to such atomization and ordered transfer, they have
gradually dropped out of the curriculum, losing significance as an
educational objective.
This kind of technol og i zat i on of classroom experience
provided, as was stated in the last chapter, much of the impetus for
the reform efforts of the sixties. It was suggested in the same
chapter, however, that in the backlash, critical and reflective
abilities were also abandoned in the name of immediacy of experience,
30 John Passmore, "On Teaching to be Critical", in R.F. Dearden,
P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (eds.) op. ci
t
.
,
pp. ^16-417-
31 Eric H. Warmington and Philip G. Rouse, Editors, Great Dialogues
of Plato. New York: Mentor Books, 1956, pp. 28-66.
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the development of self-awareness, and concern for education as a
pleasurable, rather than an irrelevant activity. Critique and
reflection were frequently associated with the overly intellectual,
with distance from experience, and with the isolation and
ineffectiveness of theory. A radical education deriving from
Habermas, while sympathetic to the resistance against technolog i zat ion
of the classroom, must insist that critical and reflective abilities
be retained as of the utmost educational, social, and political
importance - it is these skills which will enable students to take
part in rational decision-making about their own, and their society's
ex i stence.
The issue becomes, from this point of view, one of examining
how these disappearing abilities can be re-activated. Adorno's
aphorism, that the question-mark is the most succinct representation
of the dialectic, points the way here. 32 From this perspective,
teaching which is aimed at stimulating reflection and critique would
proceed through the use of questioning - not one aimed at eliciting
the 'right' answer, but rather a questioning concerned to engage the
learner in an extensive exploration of his/her theoretical and social
pre-suppositions, the set of assumptions, values, and beliefs a learner
brings to the object of study. In this way, latent assumptions and
modes of thought are revealed, new knowledge is acquired, and new
3 2 Theodor W. Adorno.
p. 239-
Minima Moral ia. London: New Left Books, 197*4,
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images and possibilities are stimulated. Such a pedagogical method,
based on questioning and oriented towards reflection, incorporates
normative or moral meanings central to Habermas' concern: it
suggests that no opinion cannot be taken up or criticized. The import
of questioning from Habermasian perspective, then, is that it implies
a validity claim. The moment of questioning (again, not in the sense
of asking for information, but of submitting an assertion, an
assumption, a 'fact 1
,
to judicious consideration) is a moment in which
the world is no longer accepted in its giveness. The significance of
this for Habermas' entire project was described in Chapter II.
We experience the (domains of external nature, society,
internal nature, and language) with a certain degree of giveness - as
objectivity, r.ormat i v i ty
,
subjectivity, intersubjectivity. The
importance of grasping that there is a validity claim attached to
each domain lies in the fact that we can thereby set our experiences
of each one in a different perspective - a perspective which includes
the possibility of the negation of the form in which these different
domains present themselves. In other words, we are now able to
consider the possibility that what we think is true can, in fact, turn
out to be illusion; that although we behave according to a normative
framework which we consider legitimate, the legitimacy may, in fact,
rest upon coercion or mystification (i.e. it would not be verified in
the process of discourse); and finally, that even though a speaker
appears to represent sincerely his true intentions or attitudes, he
may, in fact, be consciously misleading his listeners, or be suffering
from self-deception. The ability to make such distinctions - between
being and illusion, between is and ought, and between essence and
appearance - is essential to successful communication.
The situation of discourse is not only regulative in terms of
the identification of communicative skills which this model
of
33 See Chapter II, p. 85.
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education would be concerned to develop, but also serves as a model
of non-distorted communication against which all other forms,
historical and contemporary, might be judged. In other words,
discourse is a communicative situation which enables an assessment of
the nature and extent of systematic distortion operating in other
communicative situations. A critique of ideology proceeds according
to the standards operative in this ideal speech situation:
unrestrained discussion, enabling unconstrained consensus; mutuality,
or unimpaired self-representation, implying communication under
conditions of individuation; and the complementarity of
expectations, requiring universalized norms of behavior and thus,
the prohibition of privilege.
Thus, a critical analysis of a particular social situation
is guided by the following question:
How would the members of a social system, at a given stage
in the development of productive forces, have collectively and
bindingly interpreted their needs (and which means would they have
accepted as justified) if they could and would have decided on an
organization of social intercourse thought discursive wi 1 1 -format ion
with adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional
imperatives of their society. 34
To ask this question is to presuppose the existence of a
general izable interest that has been suppressed; the educational aim
Habermas, Legitimation Crisis , p. 113 *34
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of the investigation would be to articulate (as clearly as possible,
given the restraints) that interest, and to identify the nature and
mechanisms of the distorted communication which enabled its
suppression.
Habermas' theory of social formations can be seen as an
historical evolution of communication structures in the direction of
the ideal speech situation. The attainment of the latter, however,
is not a necessary aspect of that evolution, and in the present
historical situation, that of advanced capitalism, the possibility
of that attainment seems greatly threatened. Instead, we are
confronted with increasing de-politicization, a movement which has
its culmination in a completely technocratic society. From that
point of view, a critique of contemporary forms of ideological
constraint seems most pressing.
An historical analysis of ideology, however, is an
indispensable preliminary step for a critique of contemporary
communication structures. Not only does an historical perspective
heighten the possibility of identifying present modes of distorted
communication, but it also creates an awareness of a social
organization's ability to alter its ideological support systems in
response to both internal and external pressure. A sense of the
pervas i veness of distorted communication allows people to recognize
the possibility that their own sel f-understand i ngs are ideologically
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constrained
.
Accordingly, an education based on Habermas' work would
encourage the study of history (as is evident from previous
discussion, the idea of 'history' in this context is one which
incorporates all aspects of an historical period, i.e., it includes
all cultural phenomena, modes and forms of thought and expression,
the level of scientific development, and so on). This is in sharp
contrast to much of contemporary educational thought; as was
indicated in the last chapter, a Habermasian education would regard
as ideological the argument that history was no longer relevant to
the modern student.
Inglis' example of the changes in English life wrought by
the industrial revolution can be used to illustrate the kind of
inquiry referred to here. An investigation into the changing nature
of work might provide an appropriate point of focus, and principally,
the movement of laborers from the farmlands into the city factories.
Primary sources - such as diaries, parliamentary papers, newspapers,
popular fiction, factory reports, demographic material - would
provide the information necessary for identifying the nature of the
class relationships in the society, relationships which would be
reflected in the communication structures. (Note that, according to
Habermas' theory of social evolution, this historical period would
fall at the centre of the shift from a traditional to a liberal-
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capitalist social formation - hence, the class antagonisms would not
yet be submerged.) On the basis of such information, students would
be asked to identify patterns of communication in the society and to
describe the nature of the ideology which arose on the basis of them;
in addition, they would need to articulate the precise ways in which
various segments of the population, and particularly the working
class, were denied access to those communication structures.
The contemporary significance of such an historical study is
indicated in at least two areas: first, it would demonstrate that,
contrary to the ideological assertion that the worker was paid 'a
fair wage for a fair day's work', in fact, the worker produced more
value in a day's work than was returned in the form of wages.
Because of that ideology, the capitalist grew richer, pocketing the
'surplus' value produced - capitalism still operates on that same
ideological basis. Second, such a study, through highlighting the
then antagonistic relationship between capitalist and the working
class, would encourage reflection on the present relationship between
those two groups - its submerged nature immediately becomes more
access i bl e
.
As suggested in the last section, role-plays and other
simulation games would prove a useful educational tool for such an
investigation. The attempt to articulate all points of view
-
of the working class, of the factory owners, of child
laborers,
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of parliamentarians, of landed gentry - would demonstrate the
complexity of the issue, and make more concrete the differences
between structures of distorted communication, which exclude
participation on the part of some participants, and the activity of
discourse, which insists on equal opportunity to present needs and
interests, and precludes decision-making on any grounds except that
of the force of the better argument.
The critique of contemporary ideology follows as a necessary
progression from the kind of historical approach just suggested.
Given Habermas' analysis of advanced capitalism, the contribution that
education can make to the development of a critique of ideology seems
to lie in its ability to reveal and promote the developing crises of
motivation and legitimation. Habermas' argument - that the
ideological nature of advanced capitalism becomes more apparent as the
state intervenes to facilitate the continued operation of the system
- indicates that the point of weakness resides in the contradictory
nature of the self-presentation of advanced capitalism and its actual
functioning. Education can play a vital role in exposing that
contradiction, and in creating a framework by which students can not
only detach themselves from a particular societal self-understanding,
but can also begin the process of ascertaining the general i zabl
e
interest which would emerge under conditions of non-distoi ted
communication. The development of such a critical perspective on
the part of students is essential if the possibility of moving to a
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more rational form of social organization is ever to materialize
Instances of contradiction are not difficult to find at the
present time. As was discussed in Chapter III, for example, the
past fifteen years in this country has witnessed a widening gap
between the political system's self-presentation and its revealed
functioning. All such instances - America's role in Vietnam, in
Cuba and in Chile are only the most blatant - represent the targets
of an education designed to expose the ideological underpinnings of
late capitalist society.
Less blatant instances are perhaps more fruitful areas of
concentration at this point. The F.D.A.'s role in investigating
food additives, corporate irresponsibility in regard to exposing
workers to cancerous substances, the complicity of various Health
Departments in covering up major health hazards, corruption within
administrative and police departments - all these are indices of the
split between promise and provision. Investigation of such matters
must finally produce recognition of the process of de-politicization.
One logical point of focus for such a critique would be the
educational system itself. Following the work of the so-called
'social' critics of education referred to in the last chapter, such a
critique would attempt to expose the ideological basis of the
assertion that there exists equal educational opportunity in this
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country, and of the expectation that is crucial for the maintenance
of that belief; namely, that occupational attainment will be
commensurate with educational attainment. The opportunities for
exploring that myth have rarely been greater.
One major problem in this regard, which a radically-motivated
education must confront, arises from the recognition that the re-
politicization of the public sphere does not proceed simply on the
basis of revealing the ideological nature of the present social
formation. If it did, then there would have been far more overt
and continuing response to the discrepancies between rhetoric and
reality that have become increasingly apparent in the American
economic, political and social system; instead, effective political
protest seems to have faltered with the unwinding of the Vietnam war.
Yet, it is since that time that some of the most damaging exposes -
of the ideological nature of the American political system in
particular - have occurred. What seems more of an unknown quantity
at the present time is not the unjust and unequal nature of the
social system, but rather the nature of people's response to that
situation. Habermas' analysis of the motivation crisis suggests that
disenchantment will proceed at a pace consonant with the breakdown of
formerly integrative forces: what is not clear - and this was
suggested in the third chapter - is whether that disenchantment will
take the form of withdrawal or protest. Certainly, the
former
position seems to be attracting more adherents than the
latter; and,
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as was suggested in the last chapter, education has at times
contributed to that by celebrating the private over the public.
An education true to Habermas' theory must counter this
trend. As was suggested in the last chapter, Habermas would
certainly support many of the reform efforts of the past decade - the
stress on expanded self-awareness, personal relevance of educational
content, the move to an interactional rather than authoritarian
relationship between teacher and student, the 'integrated day'
concept which de-emphas i zes the separation between disciplines of
study - but not in the absence of a social and political context.
He would reject privacy at the expense of the public, interpersonal
relationships in lieu of the i ntersubject i ve , personalized subject
matter abstracted from its soc i o-h i stor i cal context. An education
concerned with the re-politicization of the public sphere must resist
the embracing of privacy and relativism; it must insist upon the
possibility of the genera 1 i zabl e interest, of truth that can be
discovered in the course of discursive deliberation. It must seek,
in other words, to incorporate the intent of the reform
effort into
an explicitly social and political context.
This amounts, in large part, to extending the
critique of
ideology to include reflection on the nature of
personal and
interpersonal responses to the social world.
In other words, whereas
the reform movement encourages expression
of true feeling.
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Habermasian education would begin from the prior position of
recognizing the possibility of manipulated consciousness. From this
point of view, individuation is not a matter of 'getting in touch
with one's feelings' (by implication, 'whatever they are'); rather
it is a more difficult and complicated process of reflecting on what
seems to be one's 'true' feelings in an effort to discover their
actual validity. Such a position allows for a critique of withdrawal
as an ideologically induced and supported response which furthers,
rather than counteracts, the process of de-politicization.
This connects, of course, to the activity of discourse which,
in its call for people to be able to offer and argue for what they
believe to be their true interests invites shared and critical
reflection on the interpretation of the society's needs or those of
the individuals who make it up. Without such a process, we are left
with no way to gauge the differences between 'real' and 'manipulated'
interest - only in an interaction situation akin to that of discourse
can we subject what we believe are our true interests to the kind of
critical reflection which can penetrate self-deception. The model
of the T-group is a useful educational tool here for one of the central
tasks of such a group is to observe and reflect on how particular
normative systems are formulated, motivated and maintained (in contrast
to encounter groups, which employ already established normative
systems). This allows for the suggestion of alternative modes of
interaction, and corresponding conscious decision-making and
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implementat ion.
The subjection of the process and rationale of withdrawal
(together with the associated shift to privacy, pluralism and
corresponding diffusion of moral meanings) to systematic reflection
and critique is one of the more significant tasks of an education
which seeks the formation of a 'rational identity'. It not only
provides an alternative vision, it also immediately involves
people in a different, more publicly oriented participation. It
both offers and represents the notion of a genera 1 i zabl e interest and
prefigures the possibility of a fully rational society.
A critique of ideology, then, on both individual and social
levels, would represent a fundamental aspect of any educational
practice based on Habermas' work. The impact of incorporating such
a critical perspective into education will be further indicated
through considering the implications for Women's Studies programs.
The Example of Women's Studies . At the most obvious level, an
explicit concern with a critique of ideology in Women's Studies
manifests itself in programs of study aimed at revealing the historical
trajectory of women's oppression, up to and including the contemporary
age. Responsive to Habermas' theory of social evolution, such an
investigation would locate itself according to the economic, social
and cultural dictates of the series of social formations which he has
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outlined. The role of women in both the stabilization of a
particular formation and in its displacement would provide a
focus for attention.
central
This kind of inquiry has been central to many of the Women's
Studies programs; taking as a primary target the role of women in
capitalist society, such investigations have sought to expose the
ideological content of the socially-proffered conception of women as
the 'social
-emotional centre' of the bourgeois family, alternatively
producer and consumer as economic pressures dictate. From such an
analysis has emerged the possibility of an alternative version of
woman's participation in the society, one that is not gender-based or
formulated under other ideological constraints. Women's studies
programs have addressed themselves to both issues - critique of an
old role and formulation of a new.
Less critical attention has been paid, however, to a more
broadly conceived historical analysis of the role of women, one which
extends beyond the boundaries of a capitalist society. Habermas'
theory would encourage this broader purview on the grounds that such
an analysis would indicate the historical dimension of ideology
itself. In other words, it would highlight the fact that a particular
social formation will organize its ideological support systems
according to its current needs - as those needs change, so does the
ideology - not necessarily simultaneously, but certainly in close
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relationship. From this point of view, the breaking up of one set
of ideological constraints does not by any means imply that the
formulation of an alternative occurs in an ideological ly-free
situation, i.e., that it occurs under conditions free from domination.
The significance of this emerges in a consideration of
contemporary discussions of the role of women in advanced capitalist
society. A theory of education based on Habermas' work would be
forced to take into account the possibility that such discussions,
and the self-understanding which emerges from them, are just as
ideologically constrained as the roles which women are in the process
of rejecting. From this perspective, the break-down of sex-linked
activity, the assertion that women have equal right with men to
education and occupation, the rejection of the nuclear family as the
basic unit of society and so forth - collectively, these tendencies
may represent the exact dynamic of advanced capitalist society rather
than any resistance to it. Madison Avenue's successful capitalization
on the women's movement is only a minor example of this possibility.
Women's Studies programs functioning under the aegis of a
Habe rmas - based education would engage in a sustained critical analysis
of the varieties of images presently offering themselves to women.
Such an analysis would argue that rejection of traditional family
roles with their associations of dependence and constraint also
contains the possibility that women are complying with the pressure
267
for individualistic privatism exerted by the underlying mechanisms of
late capitalist society; that the desire for higher education and
access to previously male-dominated professions may require women to
interact in the same acquisitive and competitive ways that men have
been compelled to do; that the quest for autonomy, insofar as it
remains tied to an individualistic dynamic with corresponding loss of
social content which Habermas has articulated, finally repudiates the
intersubjective awareness which carries the probability of social
transformation. As Habermas has suggested, an autonomy which tends
to withdrawal rather than protest is a precise abandonment of its
critical potent i al
.
One concrete focus of such a critique could be the role and
objectives of the Women's Studies programs within the wider
educational structures. Recalling Habermas' expressed intention of
pressing on the institutions of late capitalism in order that they
reveal their contradictions would seem to establish a broad goal for
such programs, according to which they would have to develop particular
strategies of action. It was stated earlier that insofar as Women's
Studies had generated institutional and financial support for their
operation, they had been successful in requiring the educational
system to be responsive to expressed student need. The result has
been the establishment on numerous campuses across the country of
we 1 1 -funct ion i ng Women's Studies programs. But the question must be
asked as to whether they have, in fact, exerted pressure on their host
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institutions such that the latter have been substantially affected,
or their functioning exposed as contradictory? A cursory glance
would have to assess the impact as minimal. Certainly, many women
who gravitate to these programs find them conducive to their needs
and interests; there now exist opportunities previously absent for
women to study their history, to understand the nature, mechanisms
and causes of oppression, and to formulate alternative visions for
their participation in the society.
But it would seem that the effects of such programs have
rarely spilled over into the rest of the educational institution -
into general course content, methods of teaching, the kinds of
experiences considered valid objects of study, the more general
treatment of, and interaction with women at all levels of the
educational enterprise - students, faculty and administrative
personnel. Frequently, the restriction of concern to the Women's
Studies programs themselves has been a matter of choice - in order to
secure their institutionalization, particularly at a time when such
'special programs' are threatened with economic cutbacks; in order
to provide women with a point of identification previously unavailable
to them; and sometimes, in the belief that a separatist position is
politically the most advantageous.
A conception of education based on Habermas' work would
reject the latter and regard the former two positons as preliminary.
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An index of the further political success of these programs would be
the extent to which they do come to exert a strong and lasting
influence on the wider institution. This would involve changes in
curriculum in all departments, such that women's concerns and
experiences are considered legitimate aspects of the subject matter;
it means the increasing integration (preferably not under the
artifical eye of the legal system) of women into fields long denied
them, such as the natural sciences, mathematics, philosophy,
political science; it means changes in faculty administrative
configurations, such that women have equal access to those positions;
it would require respect at all levels of the system for women's
intellectual capacities and interests. In other words, Women's
Studies must intrude into the centre of the educational institutions
rather than maintain a position of separation. It is only in this
way that women can begin to participate in the creat ion of knowledge,
and thus in the way in which, as Conway puts it, the "culture is
defined and transmitted". She goes on to say in this regard:
The problem ... is complex for women seeking a place at the
center rather than at the margins of the academic institutions which
create and transmit the learned culture of the West. On the one hand,
to be in command of the culture, women must master skills in math and
the hard sciences which have traditionally been defined as unfeminine
and neglected in the education of females. On the other hand, if
these skills in abstract reasoning are to be applied in a manner which
draws on the inner springs of creativity, they must be acquired in a
way which is no threat to the female identity. This can be achieved
by an educational experience which is critical of many of the
assumptions of a male-controlled culture and which takes the female as
the norm rather than the deviant exception to the life of the mind.
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One precondition for such a view of intellectual life is a sense of
solidarity with female colleagues. 35
The last sentence highlights the important function which
Women s Studies has so far been able to provide. The remainder of
the quotation indicates the rest of the task. The shift into male-
dominated classrooms and general course content is a necessary step
if the educational project generated by a Habermasian theory is to
proceed. It requires a consistent demand for representation and
reflection, and a continual willingness to point to the ideological
base of much of current educational activity. It means exposing the
systematic prevention of women's participation in the creation of
knowledge. 36
This brief examination of Women's Studies programs has
indicated some of the directions which would be implied by a
radically-motivated education based on the work of Habermas. Mindful
of the models of discourse and the ideal speech situation, such an
education would attempt to further the increased participation of
women in all spheres of the institution, and would facilitate the
35 J.K. Conway, "Coeducation and Women's Studies," loc. ci t. , p. 241
36 One example of this is cited by Conway in her discussion of the
work of Ida Cannon, a prominent medical social worker who, in the
19^0's, enumerated most of the criticisms of heal th-care del i very
in this country which were to emerge as radical and new in the
1960's. Her work went unheeded at the time, and remains
unacknowledged today. ibid . , p. 246.
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development of the cr i t i cal - ref 1 ect i ve abilities which would
encourage women to examine not only past but also current ideological
intrusions into their self-understanding and aspirations.
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Discourse as a Model for Educational Interaction
Reference to the situation of discourse as a structural
model for Women's Studies programs suggests implications for the
of education - its process as distinct from its content -
in general. Seen from the perspective of preparation for
participation in discourse, and emphasizing a collaborative approach
to inquiry, a Habermasian education would display the basic
suppositions that truth is discovered only in consensus, and that
rationality is a property of i nd i vidual s- in- i nteract ion rather than
of individuals per se. In approaching discourse, it would take
discourse as its model - that is, it would strive to manifest the
characteristics of unrestrained discussion, communication under
conditions of individuation, and reciprocity of behaviour
expectations. Consequent upon such a description are certain
implications for classroom interaction. Ideally, the structure
would be such that students have equal opportunity to participate in
discussion, to initiate it, and to maintain it through asking questions,
defending opinions and assertions; to comment, clarify and interpret;
to express their own feeling, needs and intentions; and to establish
and share expectations of behavior.
The exact relationship of the educational project to the
activity of discourse, however, can be further specified by pointing
out that education as reflexive i ntersubject i ve activity is not
d i scourse. This is most evident in that it is not an activity (in
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contrast to discourse) which is cut free from action and experience.
On the contrary, as was clear, for example, in the sections on
Women's Studies, a radically motivated education would continually
draw on, and address itself to, the experience of students; if the
latter are to understand themselves as simultaneously products and
shapers of a commom culture, their immediate experience of themselves
in the world (whether privately felt or publicly shared) is of
crucial significance.
A second major distinction between the educational activity
and discourse (and the clearest indication of the former's status as
'preparatory for discourse') appears in its structure: there is an
asymmetr ical i ty of relationship between participants. Clearly, some
of this is not intrinsic to the educational process, frequently
representing instead the arbitrary assumption of power on the part of
various participants such as teachers or administrators. In rather
crucial ways, however, some asymmetr ical i ty seems to inhere in the
nature of the educational engagement. Oakeshott, for example, refers
to the learner as a 'newcomer', a 'postulant', being "initiated into
an inheritance of human achievements of understanding and belief'
3
and to the teacher as a keeper of the cultural heritage whose function
in the educational transaction is to facilitate the learner's
induction into that heritage. Habermas certainly seems to understand
37 Oakeshott, "Education:
1 oc . c i t
. ,
p. 22.
The Engagement and Its Frustration",
education in this way, somewhat akin to his conceptualization of the
'organization of processes of enlightenment', a situation in which
an individual or group of people engage with another group of people
in the interest of having the latter begin to perceive themselves and
their position in the society in a different, more 'enlightened'
fashion.
Habermas has also utilized the term 'therapeutic discourse 1
to describe this interaction, a term reflective both of its
prel iminary-to-d i scourse character, and of its analogousness to the
psychoanalytic relationship, particularly with regard to the
centrality of reflection. The following quotation points to the
potential utility of the concept within an educational framework.
... self-reflection, as can be shown in the model of
psychoanalytic-dialogue between doctor and patient, is not a
discourse ... the patient by no means takes up a symmetrical posture
vis-a-vis the doctor from the very beginning; the conditions for a
participant in discourse are precisely what is not fulfilled by the
patient. It is only the successful therapeutic discourse which brings,
as its result, that which in ordinary discourse must be required from
the very outset: the effective equality of opportunities in
perceiving the roles within the dialogue, and in general, in the
choice and exercise of speech acts, must first be established between
partners in a dialogue who are so unequally equipped, 3 8
I ts
clarify that
use in the context of a discussion of education serves to
,
from a Habermasian perspective, the aim of educational
38 Habermas, Theory and Practice , p. 23-
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activity is to enable the student to participate equally, freely and
responsibly in the choice and exercise of dialogue roles. Such a
characterization carries immediate implications for the educational
process. It would be prohibitive, again, of the 'banking 1 form of
teaching so well described by Freire; it would conteract the idea
that knowledge is already constituted, unchanging, an 'object'; and
it would militate against the arbitrary promulgation of one
interpretation, presented as truth. Instead, learning would be
understood as a process of collaborative inquiry, knowledge as
something to be generated in interaction and dialogue. Classroom
structure and activity would reflect this image - small group
discussion would probably be the major 'modus operandi', although the
actual format would matter less than that teacher and student
participate in an interactional encounter. Thus, for example,
lecture-demonstrations or individual investigations would not be
automatically discounted; rather the appropriateness of the form
would be judged according to its contribution to a learning based on
d ialogue.
Another structural requirement of discourse, that every
participant has equal opportunity to pose and defend what s/he
believes to represent his/her 'true' interests, is matched at this
level by encouraging students to consider all alternatives in the
search for knowledge, even those which have been (rationally)
discredited. In this process, the student is not only alerted to the
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idea that there are many different possible alternatives to under-
standing a particular set of apparent 'facts', but is also exposed to
the process by which particular interpretations gain ascendancy over
others. The questions of 'how to we know what we know?' and 'how
and why does knowledge change?' emerge of themselves from this
process. These are questions which would constantly inform a
radically-concerned education.
The quotation also contains however certain implications for
the role of the teacher in the educational process and it is here that
the asymmetr i cal i ty is most apparent. It recalls Habermas'
understanding of the critique of ideology as akin to the
psychoanalytic dialogue; thus it will be useful to consider what
similarities might exist between the role of the therapist in
psychoanalysis and that of the teacher in the educational process.
It will be recalled that the analyst, through dialogue with the
patient, seeks to reconstitute at a public level the submerged and
privatized 'language' expressed in the patient's sympton construct.
The analyst, in this process, is considered less as an interpreter
and more as a teacher, one who "teaches the subject to comprehend his
own language" 39 . The import of this is that the accuracy of the
analyst's interpretation is corroborated "only by the successful
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 228.3 9
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continuation of a self-formative process, that is, by the completion
of self-reflection" 40
. The patient must be able to know and
recognize himself in the interpretation offered.
This formulation is most applicable to that aspect of the
educational process which has been labelled 'critique of ideology',
and involves the development of abilities which enable the understand-
ing and public reconstitution on distorted patterns of societal
communication - for example, the recognition and articulation of how
particular societal norms, in contrast to their self-presentation,
actually function to maintain and reproduce an unjust and unequal
class structure. Here, the role of the teacher, analogous to that
of the analyst, would consist in making interpretive comments,
offering alternative perceptions of the situation, and in general, of
encouraging reflection on all assumptions, beliefs, norms, and values
that are usually taken for granted. Again it can be seen that such
a conceptualization of the teacher's role precludes an authoritarian
posture, an impositional form, and instead impels a dialogic stance
towards students. The authority which the teacher possesses by
virtue of his/her position does not, under this model, automatically
legitimate the authority of his/her perceptions, interpretations, or
bel ief s
.
4 0 ibid., p. 266.
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This model of teacher behavior is akin to that suggested by
Freire: his conception of the teacher role is readily subsumed under
the idea of one who 'teaches the subject to comprehend his own
language'. S/he elicits what Freire calls "generative themes" 41
(themes which occur repeatedly in conversations with students),
refashions them, and presents them to students in such a way that
previously opaque connections and understandings are illuminated.
As part of that process, the teacher presses for continued reflection
on all 'root assumptions' held to by participants.
As was pointed to in the first chapter, however, the
utilization of the therapist-patient relationship as a model for the
process of enlightenment has come under some fire, for inherent in
that relationship is, as Habermas indicates, an asymmetrical i ty, an
inequality of dialogue roles. Just as its invoking was critiqued on
the grounds that it admitted the possibility of a manipulative use of
that unequal exchange, so a radical education formulated on the basis
of an inequality of dialogue roles raises questions about the
possibilities of authoritarian, manipulative, and doctrinaire teaching.
The structural conditions of discourse prevent (at least theoretically)
illegitimate or arbitrary assumption of power on the part of
individuals or groups; in the absence of that structure, the
constraints against misuse of power and authority are far more
41 Frei re, Pedagogy of the Oppressed , p. 86.
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difficult to identify,
the teacher to misuse
authority (by imposing
discussion, penalizing
In an educational setting, the potential for
with relative impugnity - his/her position of
interpretations, arbitrarily controlling
dissenting arguments) seems to expand.
As is clear from the earlier discussion, certain features of
Women's Studies programs reflect this ambivalence. On the one hand,
the model of the consciousness-raising group exerts a strong influence
on the organization of education for women - such groups explicitly
reject hierarchical relationships, attempting, instead, to create
patterns of interaction which, in Habermas' terms, allow for equal
access to, and use of, dialogue roles. In the face of this
commitment to non-h i erarch i ca 1 forms of interaction, Women's Studies
programs which support and strive to provide opportunities for women
to achieve standards of intellectual competence previously denied
them, are confronted with a dilemma. They must devise an educational
process which allows for the transmission of knowledge but which does
not replicate traditional authoritarian teacher-student relationships,
with all their attendant possibilities for manipulation and control.
Habermas' attempted resolution of such a dilemma, through
invoking the model of the psychoanalytic relationship (or therapeutic
discourse) has, as was just noted, come under criticism on the grounds
that it contains no real safeguards against the arbitrary assumption
of power on the part of the therapist. His response to those
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original misgivings is appropriate to the present discussion
In the case of psychoanalysis, two fundamental and two
pragmatic sanctions against misuse in the sense of exploiting
deception can be enumerated. For one, the fundamental theorems lay
claim to truth, and this claim must be defensible in accordance with
the usual rules of scientific discourse, otherwise the theory must be
relinquished or revised. Secondly, the appropriateness of the
interpretation which is theoretically derived and applied to the
particular case, requires confirmation in successful self-reflection;
truth must converge with authenticity - in other words, the patient
himself is the final authority. Furthermore, psychoanalysts must
comply with the requirements of professional ethics and practices of
a legally sanctioned profession of physicians; within limits,
violations of professional norms and regulations can be controlled.
Finally, in general the patient can maintain a certain distance from
his doctor; in spite of transference (and countertransference) the
role of the patient is not a total role, but only one among many within
a differentiated system of roles. Within certain limits, the patient
retains the option to change analysis or to break off the treatment. 42
Similar safeguards are operative in an educational setting.
There is not, of course, a widely accepted and wel 1 -devel oped 'body of
theory 1
,
such as is provided by psychoanalysis, in which to insert the
interaction of teacher and student: the 'right interpretation' in this
context does not have substantiated categories such as the 'unconscious'
and 'repression' to draw on in its support; rather the theory (which,
in this case, would include such diverse elements as the centrality
of intersubjectivity, the communicative ethic, and an analysis of
advanced capitalism) is still very much in the process of development.
The major point, however, is that no theory should be promulgated or
42 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 29.
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acted upon in the absence of open discussion and debate. This is
true for the theoretical framework as a whole, as well as for any
particular aspect that a teacher attempts to communicate to students.
This IS supported by the second caveat mentioned in the quotation and
referred to earlier in this section: the 'truth' of the theory can
only be judged according to the extent to which it is genuinely
embraced by students, and, moreover, acted upon, at least in the form
of further self-reflection.
Teachers, similar to psychoanalysts, have a set of professional
ethics which act in a regulative manner, providing some sanction
against transgression. (One interesting aspect of this is the current
attempt to establish some legal guidelines with regard to issues such
as discipline; from Habermas' point of view, this constitutes state
regulation of activities previously left to tradition, and opens the
possibility for increased community participation in rational
decision-making about the nature and purposes of education.)
Finally, the teacher-student relationship is usually even more
diffuse in its impact than that of the doctor-patient - certainly by
the time students reach high school, their contact with any one teacher
is greatly limited. (From the point of view of the present
discussion, this probably works against the possibility of enabling
students to develop skills which will allow them to pursue a rational
identity within the society.) Far greater impact is exerted on the
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student by the institution of education itself; if this is to be
understood and modified according to the desires of a participant
community, the whole project of education - its present and potential
nature and purposes - must be opened up to discussion and debate.
Despite the several disclaimers Habermas has offered vis-a-
vis his use of the psychoanalytic model, he has remained uncomfortable
with the asymmetrical relationship obtaining between participants in
the process of enlightenment, whether that is occurring in the context
of a psychoanalytic relationship, working-class organizing, or, as
here, in specifically educational settings. A major aspect of the
discomfort stems, it would seem, from the anomolous nature of this
particular facet of the process with regard to the overall activity:
it is almost as if the safeguards involved against misuse of power
presuppose the very abilities (i.e. to engage in discourse) which
have not yet been fully established and which, in fact, the
'therapeutic discourse' is concerned to achieve. While Habermas has
not fully articulated this issue, it is clear where his interests lie
the vindicating superiority of those who do the enlightening
over those who are to be enlightened is theoretically unavoidable,
but at the same time is fictive and requires self-correction: in a
process of enlightenment, there can only be participants.
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The issue points to what seems an ongoing unresolved tension
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for Habermas: on the one hand, the 'linguistic ethic' revealed in
his analysis of communication structures - full and equal particip-
ation for all members of the society - is fundamental for him, and
the attainment and maintenance of its concrete embodiment is a
project which underlies his entire work; on the other, in his
consideration of the process of that attainment, he must contend with
situations which do not and cannot reflect that ethic. While there
is no necessary presumption against the resolution of this issue,
Habermas' apparent ambivalence about explaining the concrete aspects
of these preliminary situations prevents him from articulating the
process of their metamorphosis into situations of full and equal
participation. The relationship remains a purely formal one.
Freire's conception of the teacher-student relationship
offers assistance here, providing, as it does, a far more cogent
notion of equality of participation. Attached to the idea that all
are learners and, simultaneously, that all have the potential to teach,
his theory allows, at the same time, the designated 'teacher' to
exercise the specific skills s/he does have in this situation: to
re-conceptual i ze an issue so that 'students' perceive facets
previously opaque to them; to suggest connecting links between
formerly isolated events, situations, ideas; to offer alternative
interpretations which have not yet been considered. These are
certainly the kinds of interventions made by a psychoanalyst; one
difference in the models is that Freire's teacher is far more personally
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and actively involved in the process, and can invite or even press
for conflict and dissent in a way that the constraints of the
psychoanalytic rel at ionsh
i p wi 1 1 not allow.
It is true, however, that Freire's model was developed in a
situation which exhibited no immediate structural constraints against
the kind of interactions he describes. Considered within the frame-
work of current American educational institutions, the constraints are
more obvious - immense control is exercised over both the content and
the process of education. The characteristics of Habermas' model of
therapeutic discourse seem more responsive not only to this
institutionally created asymmetr i cal i ty between teachers and students
(as well as that involving other participants, such as
administrators) but also to the broader and more inclusive idea of
education which is the focus of attention here. What Freire does
offer - and it would seem to constitute some kind of middle ground
between an education modelled on the psychoanalytic relationship and
one based on the functioning of consciousness-raising groups - is an
impetus towards continued reflection on, and critical analysis of,
that induced asymmet r i ca 1 i ty
.
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Assessment and Critique
The attempt to generate the rudiments of a theory of education
based on Habermas' work has been successful in providing a model for
educational activity both significantly different from the one presently
operating in the society and responsive to the radical impulse in
Habermas' theory. Conceived as reflexive i ntersubject i ve activity,
such an education would take as its dual focus the recognition,
articulation, and development of the i ntersubject ive basis of our
culture, and critical reflection on the forms and expression of that
intersubjectivity. Its telos is the attainment of 'rational
identity', the developmental stage which enables full and equal
participation in a rationally-constituted social formation.
So far, however, the investigation has yielded guidelines
for the activity of education, with correspondingly reduced focus on
the practical difficulties and outcomes of instituting the various
recommendations. Accordingly, the last section of the chapter will
focus, albeit briefly, on this issue, choosing one theme in
particular - the attempt to develop the cr i t i cal -ref 1 ect i ve skills
of students - for consideration. Because of the internal
relationship between these skills and the possibility of the ideal
speech situation (so central to Habermas' postulation of the fully
rational society), this brief investigation will enable some
examination of the viability and usefulness of Habermas' communication
theory
.
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A consistent theme throughout this chapter has been the
importance for a Habermasian education of the development of
critical-reflective capacities: it is these which enable students to
render problematic that which has previously been taken as given; to
examine the form and content of social life; and to generate
alternative visions of that life. Within the specific framework of
the 'fully rational society' such abilities involve choosing, on the
basis of rational deliberation, between competing understandings and
interpretations of social needs, collectively identifying and
deciding upon principles of norm justification, and so forth.
The devising of an educational program specifically
concerned to develop these cr i t i cal -ref 1 ect i ve abilities is by no
means straightforward, however. For any such attempt is immediately
confronted with the recent controversial debate over whether such
abilities, and the possibilities of their acquisition and use, are
class-specific in nature.
A major body of literature emerged during the 1960's to
suggest that lower socio-economic classes are far less capable than
middle classes of developing critical perspectives on the society to
which they belong, and of expressing their rights, claims, or
interests in a political milieu. 44 Moreover, that differential, it
U4 See Bibliography in Mueller, op . c i
t
.
287
was argued, had a linguistic representation - that is, there are
class-specific differences in the acquisition and use of language
which prevent the lower classes from developing the capabilities
necessary for full and effective political participation.
Mueller, who undertakes a comprehensive review of the
research in his book The Politics of Communication
, describes the
position of the lower-class member in the following way:
The individual's language, cast in the immediacy of his
environment, conditions his perception. The categories of his
language allow for a grasp of the here and now, but they do not
permit an analysis, hence a transcendence of, his social context.
Seen politically, this language reinforces the cohesion of a group
which shares a specific (language) code, but it can prevent the group
from relating to the society at large, and to its political
institutions. The individual experiences his deprivation
subjectively; cognitively speaking, however, he lacks the reference
points necessary to perceive the objective reasons for his condition
and to relate it to the structure of the society in which he is
living. The individual's language thus becomes his internal
plausibility structure. In narrowing his ability to discriminate, to
conceptualize, and to analyze, it renders his conditions more
acceptable to him. He is immune from perceiving alternatives. 45
This would seem to have strong implications
aiming to develop critical and reflective capacities
Consider, for example, the following table, based on
Anselm Strauss:
for an education
in children,
the research of
4 5 Muel 1 er
,
op . c i t
.
,
p. 55.
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1. perspective
2. organization
3. classification
and relation
^4
. abstractions
5. use of time
Lower Class
fixed perspective;
rigid description.
lack of clear
referents; few
qual i f i cat i ons
;
segmented
organizational
framework; little
grasp of context of
event i f more than
one actor involved.
relative inabi 1 i ty to
use categories for
people and acts since
the speaker tends not
to think in terms of
classes; imprecise
use of logical
connect i ons
.
insensitivity to
abstract information
and questions.
d i scont i nuous
;
emphasis on the
particular and the
ephemeral
.
Middle Cl ass
use of several stand-
points and
alternative inter-
pretat i ons
.
frequent qual i f i c-
ations and i 1 lus-
trations; clear
narrative is complex;
unitary framework of
organization.
rich conceptual
terminology;
frequent classific-
ation and use of
logical categories.
sensitivity to
generalizations and
patterns
.
continuous; emphasis
on process and
development.
46
It is the kind of material which formed the basis of the
so-called 'compensatory' educational programs widely heralded in the
1960's; on a similar basis, one conclusion might be that a
Habermasian education may also need to take, at least at this level,
a remedial focus.
46 Quoted i n Mue 1 1 er
,
op. c i t
, pp. 53~5^-
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But the compensatory programs came under increasing fire
during the late 1 960 ' s in a body of literature which arose in
explicit opposition to the findings suggested above. The programs
themselves were denounced, on the grounds that they stigmatized the
lower socio-economic classes, holding up the speech variant of the
middle classes as the norm, and attempting to impose that on other
social and racial groups. Moreover, the empirical research which
generated the programs (of which the above table is representative)
was subjected to severe criticism; it was claimed that the verbal
capacities of lower class and black children had been misunderstood,
and, more significantly, as far as critics were concerned,
misrepresented. 47 The labels generated in that investigation -
'culturally deprived', 'socially disadvantaged' etc., - obscure,
according to the critique, the real basis of socio-economic
exploitation; the implication, it was argued, was that it was
linguistic deprivation which caused lower soio-economi c status, thus
mystifying the ways in which the wider social system exploited the
working classes. Under the guise of eliminating poverty, which was
indeed the expressed aim of the compensatory programs, 'compensatory
education' facilitated adhesion to a capitalist society. Dittmar
cites the following quotation as an example:
The economy is expanding most rapidly in those service
industries that demand high educational attainment and highly developed
47 See William Labov, Sociol inguistic Patterns , University of
Pennsylvania Press, Pa., 1972.
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Symbo1 systems. At the same time, as a result ofnc eased productivity, there has only been moderate expansion inmanufacturing employment in the United States in the past twentyyears. Unskilled jobs are rapidly disappearing as more and morlphysical work is assigned to machines. The economy is being^ °n
!
in which worl<ers produce physical products to onem which they produce services. Many of the new services deal withthe management of information. Society, therefore, is acceleratingits need and demand for persons who have developed highly skilled
elaborate methods of processing information, and who are able to
manipulate the environment, not directly as in factory work, but
representat lonal ly by symbolic means - the means essential for
coping with the conditions of an advanced technological
civil i zat ion . 48
The indictment, impl icit in the compensatory education
programs, of working class and black children and their families was
also a target of this critique. Dittmar quotes from a program
designed by Bereiter and Engelmann, in which the authors describe the
verbal capabilities of the children:
They are indifferent to the content of verbal utterances; in
their social environment (family) they have not experienced the
linguistic stimuli necessary to be able to use language with any
degree of mean i ngfu 1 ness ; they lack the ability to grasp and reproduce
with linguistic adequacy correlations, processes, etc., their
retarded development is accounted for by a 'dissociation' of speech
and behavior similar to that which is assumed for mentally-retarded
and psychologically disturbed children. 49
William Labov has been one of the most articulate critics of
the compensatory education programs; he has demonstrated,
48
In Norbert Dittmar, Soc i ol i ngu i s t i cs , London: Edward Arnold Ltd.,
1976 p. 86.
49 ibid.
,
pp. 80-81.
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successfully, that lower class children speak not a distorted version
of Standard English but rather a different kind of English, one which
deviates systematically and regularly from the standard version.
These differences, however, in contrast to the claims of the original
researchers, do not involve impaired logical or analytic capability.
Rather non-standard English uses different syntactical features (such
as double negation - 'nobody knows nothing') for the same
communication. This is the kind of linguistic feature which the
compensatory program sought to 'correct'.
Labov has been able to demonstrate that what he refers to as
Black English Vernacular, rather than possessing fewer or worse
possibilities of expression, instead employs other, functionally
equivalent, linguistic forms. Moreover, according to Labov, lower
class speech contains rich symbolic imagery which contributes to a
wel 1 -devel oped sense of imagination and fantasy. Compensatory
education, from this point of view, seeks to impose a system of speech
which would place children in verbal and communicative conflict with
their 'mother tongue'. Labov concludes,
The view of the black speech community which we obtain from
our work in the ghetto area is precisely the opposite from that
reported ... We see a child bathed in verbal stimulation from morning
to night. We see many speech events which depend upon the
competitive exhibition of verbal skills ... a whole range of
activities in which the individual gains status through his use of
language. We see the younger child trying to acquire these skills
from older children, hanging around the outskirts of older peer
groups
and imitating this behavior to the best of his ability. We see
no
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connection between verbal
of the street culture and
skill in the speech events
success in the schoolroom.
characteristic
5 o
So any education program aiming to develop critical and
reflective abilities, such as one operating under a Habermasian
aegis, would have to be cognizant of what Labov has amply demonstrated
that speech variants, though divergent at the level of grammar,
possess, at the same time, functionally equivalent possibilities of
expression. Habermas' theory does seem capable of responding to this
at an educational level, thus avoiding the difficulties encountered
by the attempt to remediate children with apparently different levels
of skill: he has always emphasized the communicative context of
language use rather than the specific linguistic features (in fact,
the entire controversy over class-specific language differences has
added credence to a recent development in linguistic philosophy to
which Habermas subscribes, viz. that the speech ac_t is a more
legitimate point of focus than the grammatical rule, or, to express
it another way, that communication is more than the regimented use of
particular linguistic skills). Moreover, his work on language has
centred on the identification and articulation of a set of linguistic
features, i.e. the pragmatic universals, which he insists are germane
to ilLL communication situations and which should, therefore, provide
a common linguistic base. The demonstration of their existence,
then, is necessary to any attempt to develop an educational program
50 Quoted in Allen D. Grimshaw, "On Language in Society: Part 1"
Contemporary Sociology, Vol . 2, 1973. p. 583-
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based on Habermas' work, but avoiding the pitfalls of the
compensatory programs.
This brings Habermas' communication theory to the foreground.
Its substantiation becomes of central importance to his entire
theoretical endeavor, for it is out of this universal communicative
and linguistic base that he has drawn the concepts of the ideal speech
situation and the model of pure communicative action. Without that
basis, the entire foundation of his theories of communication, social
evolution and, more specifically, the possibility of a 'fully rational
society' would falter.
Accordingly, one of the most pressing tasks which Habermas
faces is the validation of his theory of communicative competence.
The mechanics of this validation could only be specified on the
basis of an in-depth acquaintance with linguistic philosophy, and
certain aspects of the theory are likely to remain philosophically
contentious for a long time to come; nevertheless, there are some
points in need of immediate clarification which can be identified
here
.
With reaard to the claim that the pragmatic universals
inhere in every language, for example, Habermas would have to
account for the fact that the Vietnamese language does not contain
personal pronouns (at least as we know them in English) and, as
reported by Buck-Morss, that some traditional African languages
do
29^
not contain a verbal distinction between reality and appearance. 51
Such variations on Habermas' thesis may or may not prove detrimental
(this could only be judged by an expert in linguistic philosophy);
they do raise the possibility, however, that the 'communicative
ethic developed by Habermas, rather than being universal, as claimed,
may in fact be tied more closely to the socio-economic development of
the Western world.
This possibility gains more credence when it is recalled
that Habermas, in his attempt to concretize the theories of
communicative competence and social evolution, using his work on
ego-identity as a bridge, draws heavily on the work of two
theorists - Piaget and Kohlberg - both of whom have been recently
criticized on the basis that their respective theories of
development, while claiming universal applicability, in fact reflect
particular socio-economic developments and values.
It will be recalled that Habermas used Piaget's work on
cognitive development as a basis for his own account of the
development of communicative competence, attempting, thereby, to
buttress his claim to the universal nature of that development.
Again, his ability to substantiate that claim is essential if his
51 Susan Buck-Morss , "Socio-Economic Bias in Piaget's Theory
and its
Implications for Cross-Cultural Studies", Human Development,
Vol . 18
,
1975, P- ^0 (Note)
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account of a rationality which can be normat i vel y-der i ved from the
structures of communication (and thus of the image contained in
those structures of a 'fully rational society') is to stand. His
use of Piaget to substantiate that claim carries with it strong
pedagogical implications, namely the importance of enabling children
to progress through the stages of cognitive development to the stage
of formal operational thought.
Habermas' work is damaged, then, by critiques of Piaget's
work which suggest that his account of the evolution of cognitive
competence represents not a universal sequence but rather as Buck-
Morss describes it "the particular logical structure of Western
capitalism in its present industrialized stage, that characterizes
both the socio-economic mode of production and the mode of
consciousness" 52 . From this point of view, Piaget's stages mark the
"progressive assimilation of the structural principles of bourgeois
industrialism" 53 . Certainly, this is an issue not easily or quickly
judged, but Habermas' uncritical use of Piaget's work may jeopardize
his own theoretical formulations.
mora
There are similar problems in his use of Kohlberg's
stages of
1 development. Certainly, Habermas' addition
of a seventh stage
ibid., p . 37.
ibid., p . COCO53
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indicates his dissatisfaction with Kohlberg's work, but his failure
to reflect or comment upon the possible difficulties associated with
incorporating that work is a curious oversight. It would seem that
Habermas accepts that the moral stages as outlined, apart from the
failure to derive the seventh stage, are in fact universal as
Koh 1 berg claims. One of the most troubling aspects of this is the
apparent espousal in that work of many of the values of liberal and
advanced capitalism - respect for property, for example, is a major
theme in Kohlberg s writings, losing out to the value of human life
as a prime moral consideration only in the higher stages of moral
development. Moreover, individual right is the index of morality
throughout Kohlberg's schema:
Moral development in terms of these stages is a progressive
movement towards basing moral judgements on concepts of justice. To
base a moral duty on a concept of justice is to base it on the right
of an individual; to judge an act wrong is to judge it as violating
such a right. 54
This translates, finally, into an unequivocality for Kohlberg
about the highest form of moral reasoning: it is a private
application of a universal principle:
54 Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral and Regligious Education and the Public
Schools: A developmental View", in Sizer, T., (ed.), Rel igion and
Public Education
,
Boston: Houghton-M i f f 1 i n Co., 1967, p. 173-
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a morality of justice which claims to judge the law can
never be anything but a free personal idea. b5
The implications for cultures which have always accorded a
high priority to the collectivity, sometimes giving it higher status
than a single life, are not considered. Certainly Habermas elevates
the collectivity to a pre-eminent position, co-extensive with the
status of the individual, but even so, it seems that the only
conclusion to be drawn is that cultures committed to the collectivity
are, of necessity, functioning at a lower level of moral reasoning
than that exhibited by advanced capitalism.
There are further problems in Kohlberg's work. As was
indicated earlier in the chapter, his research suggests that the
development of moral consciousness is best facilitated in situations
of group discussion and review. In this way, moral reasoning seems
closely tied to dialogic communication; and yet Kohlberg is highly
equivocal when it comes to the issue of collective decision-making.
This seems to derive from his cultural background as much as from
any empirical evidence. He argues in the following
paragraph against
the validity of majority beliefs in moral situations,
partly
partly
because
because the majority has no consensus on moral issues
studies show that majority beliefs are grounded more
b5 Lawrence Kohlberg,
the Platonic View"
Harvard University
"Education for Justice: A Modern Statement
of
in Sizer, T., (ed . ) , Moral Education,
Boston:
Press, 1970, p. 77-
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on Stage III beliefs in conforming virtues and Stage IV conceptions
of law and order than upon Stage V awareness of justice and
constitutional democracy. 56
Now one might not take issue with this as it stands;
Kohl berg is certainly right that consensus does not exist on most
moral issues, and there is no a priori reason to doubt that current
majority beliefs stem from Stage III and Stage IV levels of moral
reasoning. What is disconcerting, however, is that Kohlberg, on
that account, dismisses the possibility of rational collective
decision-making based on the Stages higher than III and IV.
Another, more clearly ideological example of his
reticence
in the area of collective moral decision-making,
comes from an
article entitled "Collective-Developmental
Theory and the Practice of
Collective Moral Education".
57 Here he argues - in the face of
statistical demonstrations to the effect
that Kibbutz children, who
live, work, and learn in a communal
environment and engage in
collective decision-making, function
at a higher level of moral
consciousness than U.S. middle and
'disadvantaged' class children
-
that collective moral education
is akin to indoctrination.
56
ona
l
S
Counc i 1 ^ for
the New Social Studies, May
1973, P-
- Lawrence Kohlberg, . ’ i t
j ve-Deve 1 opnten t a
1
^ory and th^
Practice of Collect, ve-Mor
Ed«c.r
^^^£!!3L Pat!L olJouth
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Habermas' detailing of the seventh stage becomes, in this
light, no mere addition of a stage, but rather a fundamental re-
ordering of Kohl berg 1 s schema. For Habermas, the highest stage of
moral reasoning j_s one of discursive wi 1 1 -format ion
,
in which all
members of the society, participating under conditions of
individuation, collectively decide on the legitimacy or otherwise of
those universal principles which, in Kohlberg's schema, are left
self-evident. How this affects, and is affected by, the latter's
apparent repudiation of collective decision-making, something which is
clearly reflected in the stages of development as he has outlined
them, remains unconsidered.
There are other troubl esome aspects of Kohlberg's work which
Habermas has allowed to pass without comment. Buck-Morss, for
example, picks up on other potentially ideological points which are
smuggled in under the guise of statistical evidence. She notes
Kohlberg's assertion that "retardation" 58 in moral development (an
example of which is that 'disadvantaged' children lag behind middle
class children in speed of movement through the stages) can be
attributed to the "amount of social and cognitive stimulation
provided by the culture (or sub-culture) in question"
59
.
From this
perspective, Buck-Morss argues, Kohlberg can show that lower class
50 Buck-Morss, "Socio-Economic Bias in Piaget's Theory ... " j_oc I_c_U
p . kk .
59 ibid.
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children see the law as an external force which must be obeyed
(Stage 1 reasoning), whereas upper-middle class children are more
prone to make autonomous moral judgements relative to the
circumstances, and to the awareness that bad laws can be changed
(Stage V reasoning), without having to reflect on the broader social
circumstances working to cement such differential perception. As
she puts it,
perhaps the moral rigidity of the lower-class child reflects
the reality of authoritarian or arbitrary enforcement of the laws
against his segment of society, whereas the upper middle class's
greater flexibility of principle reflects its ability to bend the law
in its interest, and to avoid its punishment, even when caught. 60
Habermas' failure to comment upon these kinds of
difficulties in Kohlberg's work renders his heavy dependence upon it
questionable. This is not to suggest that his theory falls or stands
with those of Piaget or Kohlberg, although it would certainly require
substantial re-formulation if he was to revise his use of their
theories. It is to suggest that his unreflective use of their work
is an anomolous aspect - given his ardent committment to the critique
of ideology - of his own. It is certainly one of the major obstacles
to be overcome in any future attempt to substantiate the theory of
social evolution, and, thereby, to legitimate the possibility of the
'fully rational society'.
6 0 ibid.
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We return now, after substantial digression, to the issue of
different linguistic capacities, and its educational implications.
For the critique of the compensatory educational programs and the
argument that language variants such as Black English Vernacular
contain the same linguistic and communicative potentials as Standard
English, do not provide a clear direction for the crucial (from
Habermas' point of view) educational task of enabling students not
just to develop but also to use the cr i t i cal -ref 1 ect i ve abilities
necessary for the perception of ideology, and for participation in
discourse. Assuming that all language variants provide the linguistic
skills necessary for those abilities, the focus must now turn to the
utilization of such skills. From this point of view, it may well
be demonstrable that lower socio-economic classes employ critical and
reflective abilities less frequently than the middle classes, but it
seems equally as clear that the latter do not employ those skills
very frequently either. In fact, de-politicization implies a
diminished use, on the part of all members of the society, of exactly
those ab i 1 i t i es
.
Here the latest work of scoiologist Basil Bernstein may prove
a useful adjunct to Habermas' theory. Bernstein was perhaps the
major figure in the early investigations leading to the demonstration
of class-specific differences in speaking abilities and patterns (he
referred to 'elaborated' and 'restricted' speech codes, associated
with the middle and working classes respectively). Accordingly,
he
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he has been thoroughly denounced and his work rejected in the backlash
against the compensatory education programs; Bernstein, in fact,
explicitly dissociated himself, and has continued to do so, from
those programs, protesting that his investigations were never intended
to signify the inferiority of working-class speech. Whatever the
truth of that situation, Bernstein's latest formulations have
incorporated much of Labov's work, and have focused on the social
constraints operating on the acquisition and use of particular
linguistic abilities. From this point of view, it may be possible to
demonstrate that less frequent use of critical and reflective skills
is a result of 'systematic distortion 1
,
to use Habermas' terminology,
perhaps mediated via educational systems. Any class differences in
utilization of speech variants would then be understood not as a
function of the inferiority of working class speech, but rather as a
case of a culturally mediated restricted access. Bernstein argues
that most speakers are able to say what they want or need to, and
that most control more than one cognitive mode and have access to a
range of ways of talking. So the focus has now turned to the
con s t ra i n t s i mposed on va r i ou s utilization patterns. Bernstein says
in this regard,
Language is a set of rules to which all speech codes must
comply, but which speech codes are realized is a function of the
culture acting through social relationships in specific contexts.
Different speech forms or codes symbolize the form of the social
relationship, regulate the nature of the speech encounters,
and
create for the speakers different orders of relevance
and relation.
The experience of the speakers is then transformed by
what is made
significant or relevant by the speech form ... Because
the speech form
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3 func t ! °n of a given social arrangement, it does notmean that the speech form does not in turn modify or even change thatsocia structure which initially evolved the speech form. Theformulation indeed invites the question: Under what conditions does
a given speech form free itself sufficiently from its embodiment inthe social structure so that the system of meanings it realizespomts to alternative realities, or arrangements in the affairs of
men? 1
Again, this direction seems highly suggestive for any theory
of education based on Habermas' work. It is worth pursuing, for
example, what has hinted at earlier: that restricted access to a
speech variant which allowed a critical perspective on the culture
could be regarded as a measure of de-politicization - decreasing
literacy skills, together with lowered reading and comprehension
abilities (buttressed, no doubt, by an increasing dependence on
visual and aural stimuli - such as is induced by television viewing)
may reflect aspects of decreasing abilities in the use of the
elaborated speech variant.
Educationally, this suggests the need for a detailed
investigation of the ways in which present educational systems
inhibit general access to the kinds of skills needed to participate
in a critique of ideology and in a situation of discourse, and, on
this basis, the formulation of programs designed to counteract that
'systematic distortion' of communicative processes. Cognizant of
Labov's work, such programs are probably best undertaken within the
context of particular linguistic variants.
61 Quoted in Grimshaw, "Language in Society", loc. ci
t
.
,
pp. 578-579
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Freire s experience with illiterate farm workers in Brazil
appears to provide the best available model for this activity. He
repo rts outstanding success in enabling peop 1 e not on ly to acquire
literacy in a very short time (6 to 8 weeks), 62 but also, and at the
same time, to utilize critical and reflective skills such that their
self-image changed significantly, and their ability to identify
instances of ideology increased measurably. Freire's method points
clearly to the difference between inculcating linguistic skills
(along the lines of compensatory education programs) and developing
the skills needed to engage in critical and reflective activity.
(That differential, along with its political implications, was to cause
Freire's eventual expulsion from the country).
The suggestion that educational programs designed to develop
these skills are best undertaken within the context of particular
linguistic, and therefore cultural and social, environments reveals,
however, another potentially problematic feature of Habermas' work,
one that has been suggested previously. While the chapter has
primarily focused on the educational possibilities within the present
social formation, there needs to be some consideration of the
mechanics of the projected shift from the present formation to the
postulated historically new stage of human development; what part
might such an educational program play in that shift?
6 2 Freire, op. ci t . , p. 59-
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The 'fully rational society' depends on the model of
discourse, a situation in which all members of the society can
participate in collective decision-making - this requires, finally,
it would seem, the acquisition on the part of all the members, a
common grammar
,
vocabulary and range of meaning. Given the val id
outcry against the compensatory programs' arbitrary designation of a
particular language variant as the language of choice, it is difficult
to conceive of the process by which the particular variant best
suited to the creation of Habermas' envisioned ideal speech situation
might be chosen. Even more difficult to imagine is the empirical
process (as distinct from the formal) by which a range of common
meanings might be acquired.
The sort of educational activity which derives from Habermas'
theory exemplifies this difficulty. The classroom situation may more
or less approximate the model of discourse: freedom of expression and
of participation. But there are arbitrary limits to the activity
which pre-empt the full achievement of the ideal speech and action
models. Habermas argues, for example, that the ' general i zabl e wi 1
1'
emerges as a result of, among other things, unrestricted discussion.
But what does this mean in practical terms? An educational system
designed on Habermasian lines may well be able to inculcate the
critical-reflective skills necessary to participation in discourse;
but that does not seem to guarantee anything about the
process of
acquiring common meanings or of identifying a general will.
1 1 may
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enable students to penetrate the ideological smoke-screen of advanced
capitalist society, but it seems unable to ensure its transcendence. 63
Rather there seems some hidden hope that metamorphosis will ensue of
its own accord from the actual attempt to engage in discourse.
Here we confront again Habermas' unwillingness to specify the
concrete steps involved in the transition from the current form of
social organization to that of the 'fully rational society'. He is
clearly committed to the idea that that movement can be rationally
undertaken; but it seems at least intuitively clear - and Habermas
does appear to be cognizant, albeit unwillingly, of the fact - that
that transition will at some point require the abandoning of certain
aspects of the ideal speech situation. His own recognition of this
appears in his reluctant discussions about the potentially inevitable
need to 'break off dialogue' with certain groups (presumably those
unwilling to give up power) for the sake of the movement towards a
more rationally constituted society. He will acknowledge that such
a repudiation of attempted dialogue may have to occur; but he reamins
mute as to what the next step might be.
It was argued in Chapter IV that it was incorrect to argue
that Habermas' work contained few guidelines for a political praxis.
It was suggested that in fact it carried numerous implications for
political activity at the stage designated 'organization of processes
63 See in this regard Alvin W. Gouldner, The Dialec tic of
Ideology
and Technology, New York: Seabury Press., 1576, pp.
138-152.
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of enlightenment', and the present chapter has demonstrated this in
regard to the development of an educational praxis. Habermas argues
that it is only those who are willing to engage in strategic political
action who can legitimately decide on the particulars of that action.
But insofar as Habermas' theory does not allow him to comment on this
form of political activity, except to the extent that he acknowledges
it must invariably violate the model of discourse, it does place in
doubt the possibility of the actual institutionalization of the ideal
speech situation. As his theory is presently constituted the model
of discourse can play a regulative role, of considerable significance;
its inability to provide a theoretical basis for the actual moment of
social transformation, however, must limit that significance.
The problem is, it seems, built into Habermas' theory,
deriving precisely from the nature of the task he has set:
to create anew the same integration of the individual beings
with their political community within the horizon of a universal cosmic
order, as was effected by the myth ... This time, however, the (task
must be accomplished) under the extreme conditions meanwhile posited
by the modern ideas of the freedom and of the complete individuality
of the human subject. 64
He argues precisely and persuasively for a situation in
which individual interests and universal interests intersect in such
a way that neither set is compromised. He has not, however,
64 Habermas, "On Social Identity", 1 oc . c i
t
.
,
p. 95*
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delineated in a comprehensive fashion the elements of that
intersection. Consequently, its possibility remains just that -
possibility, one that can exert a regulative pressure to be sure,
still a possibility, in sore need of a concrete referent.
a
but
CONCLUSION
As should be apparent at this point, Habermas' thought is
both wide-ranging and complex; his theoretical project encompasses
the attempt to formulate an epistemological basis for both normative
rationality and critical theory, the identification and illumination
of a 'latent positivism' in Marxist thought, a detailed analysis of
the crisis potential of late capitalism, and the development of a
theory of social evolution which, juxtaposed to his work on
communication, prefigures an historically new form of social
organization, the 'fully rational society'.
Within that framework, the dissertation chose, as something
of a unifying thread, to focus on Habermas' changing conception of the
relationship between theory and praxis: this selection was made at
least partly because of Habermas' attempted movement beyond the
position of his earlier colleagues in the Frankfurt School, a
position which seemed to admit of little possibility for the
development of an effective political praxis, given the demise of the
working class movement and the constraints of advanced capitalist
society. In order to investigate this more precisely, the
dissertation attempted to elicit from Habermas' work the rudiments of
a radically-motivated education. This was in an effort both to
discern the possibilities contained in his work for the fashioning of
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a political program, and to reflect on some of the unresolved issues
in that work.
The institution of education has frequently been identified
as playing a fundamental role in any projected social transformation
- this has been true from the days of Socrates, through those of John
Dewey and beyond. Yet, despite this perception, education has
remained relatively isolated from the ongoing concerns and political
activities of Marxists, theorists and practitioners alike, who
seek
the transformation from a capitalist to a socialist
state. This is
remarkable in view of the fact that the history of the
last 50 years
suggests, as the Frankfurt School
- among other groups - has so
cogently argued, that the possibilities of a
revolutionary
transformation of the social order have diminished
considerably.
Habermas' overt endorsement of a political
program of radical
reformism encourages, then, the likelihood
that his thought will
involve practical inplications for
(using) the
and to test the basic
institutions of present day capitalism
or kernel institutions of this
system
to chal 1 enge
l
The educational system seems
a particularly appropriate
one for th i s
kind of endeavor.
Frankel , "Habermas Talking:
An Interview loc. ci
t
58 .
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In addition, the institution of education seems a useful
framework within which to view Habermas' explicit shift of focus -
from subjectivity to intersubjectivity, from the isolated subject to
individual s- i n- i nteract ion
,
from oppression to 'systematically
distorted communication' - which was explored in the early chapters
of the dissertation. The directions emerging from that shift of
focus - concern with intersubjectivity, an analysis of ideology as
rooted in distorted communication, and the articulation of the
possibility of a rationally-constituted social formulation - all
contain hints of the potentially significant role in which the
institution of education could play in reversing the socially created
and sustained process of de-politicization. It is this latter
concern which has informed, and no doubt will continue to do so,
Habermas' theoretical project.
Given the nature and stated aims of the dissertation, only
the contours of a radically-motivated education could be articulated.
These emerged straightforwardly from his major themes, were fashioned
with a view to his own stated objectives (to provide an
epistemological basis for a practical rationality and, on that basis,
to work toward the establishment of a 'fully rational society') and
provided a vantage-point from which to reflect back on the original
theory. The most persistently troubling aspect of Habermas' work,
as seen from this perspective, concerns his attempt to derive (from
the structures of communication) the normative basis of a practical
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rationality, and the associated situation of ideal speech and action.
It was suggested that considerable evidence needs to be adduced in
order to support that theory's claim to universality (particularly
given its present heavy reliance on theorists whose work is currently
under review); it was also suggested that Habermas' fundamental
concern with mediating the interests of individuals with those of the
community finally prevents him from being able to consider, and thus
illuminate, the mechanics of the shift from one social formation to
another. In light of this, it was concluded that while the concept
of the ideal speech situation can play an extremely useful regulative
role, it is not able to shoulder the theoretical burden assigned it
by Habermas. It falls silent exactly at the point of transformative
change, the point, it seems, at which the dictates of the ideal speech
situation may have to be violated.
Despite these comments, it seems clear that the theory as it
stands offers substantial direction for the development of praxis.
This was explored in the final chapter, which indicated - albeit
globally - the contours of a philosophy of education informed by a
radical intent: that philosophy took 'reflexive i ntersubject i ve
activity' as its central image. As was stated repeatedly throughout
the dissertation, the success of such activity (and thus of Habermas
attempt to reformulate the theory/praxis relationship) can only be
gauged by the extent to which it gives rise to a "successful social
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practice which erodes a fraction of actual constraint" 2 - herein lies
the urgency of attempting to develop practical programs based on
Habermas' work. The accuracy of his vigorously pursued, and
potentially crucial, argument that it is reflective activity,
undertaken within a situation of i ntersubject i ve interaction, which
can reverse the process of de-politicization depends finally on
concrete attempts to test it.
2 Wellmer, A Critical Theory of Society , p.
**1
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